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This dissertation is a study of the mechanization of cotton spinning in turn-of-the-
twentieth-century China. More specifically, it examines efforts made by the Chinese workers to 
keep imported spinning machines performing at maximum efficiency in their cotton mills. Such 
efforts ranged from customizing and modifying machines to suit the specific needs of individual 
cotton mills to repairing broken machines, maintaining aging machines, and sourcing parts 
locally by copying the originals. It also addresses endeavors made beyond the shop floor such as 
the cultivation of cotton varieties that better accommodated machine spinning and knowledge 
production of spinning technology and cotton cultivation in professional journals. 
The study of industrialization, especially regarding the rise of factory workers as a new 
social class, was once a popular topic for social historians and feminist scholars in the China 
field. Previous scholarship investigated the fragmented nature of the Chinese working class in 
terms of gender, skill, and native places, with detailed accounts of the workers’ daily lives. 
However, these studies have paid little attention to the actual process of mechanization. 
Mechanization on the Chinese shop floor was far from smooth, since foreign machines 
malfunctioned for various reasons at different stages of operation, requiring continuous 
adjustment, maintenance, and repair. Without an examination of this challenging process, we 
underestimate the Chinese as passive recipients of machines and technologies, under the 
assumption that Western machinery was a one-size-fits-all instrument for Chinese 
industrialization.  
 
My dissertation rectifies this neglect by reconstructing the concrete process of 
mechanization from a technological perspective. It draws upon a variety of technical writings 
such as machine manufacturers’ manuals, their contracts with client mills, engineering journals, 
agricultural reports, and factory regulations. It also revisits more conventional sources such as 
interviews with former factory workers. A critical reading of these sources reveals that Chinese 
engineers, machinists, and female machine operators strived to solve technological problems 
specific to their factories, with multiple layers of knowledge obtained through hands-on 
experience of machines and cotton as well as formal engineering education. All these human 
efforts to make better use of machines under varying financial, technological, and material 
conditions of each cotton mill, combined with larger political and social circumstances, 
determined the course of mechanization in China. The factory system in China was thus a 
craftwork, locally made on the basis of the global circulation of machines and technologies. 
By highlighting the process of mechanization, rather than mere importation of machines, 
this study makes interventions into the discussion of Chinese industrialization and, beyond that, 
into debates about industrialization and technology transfer more generally. First, in exploring a 
range of handwork performed by technical experts at different stages of mechanization, it argues 
for the significance of manual labor in the making of the factory system, thereby complicating 
the long-held dichotomy between craft and mechanization. Second, by demonstrating how new 
sets of knowledge were created on the Chinese shop floor in the course of using foreign 
machines, it challenges the assumption that technology transfer simply emanated from the West 
to be disseminated to the rest of the world.
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This dissertation is a study of the mechanization of cotton spinning in turn-of-the-
twentieth-century China. More specifically, it examines efforts made by the Chinese workers to 
keep imported spinning machines performing at maximum efficiency in their cotton mills. Such 
efforts ranged from customizing and modifying machines to suit the specific needs of individual 
cotton mills to repairing broken machines, maintaining aging machines, and sourcing parts 
locally by copying the originals. It also addresses endeavors made beyond the shop floor such as 
the cultivation of cotton varieties that better accommodated machine spinning and knowledge 
production of spinning technology and cotton cultivation in professional journals. All these 
human efforts to make better use of machines under varying financial, technological, and 
material conditions of each cotton mill, combined with larger political and social circumstances, 
determined the course of mechanization in China. The factory system in China was thus a 
craftwork, locally made on the basis of the global circulation of machines and technologies. 
By highlighting the process of mechanization, rather than mere importation of machines, 
this study makes interventions into the discussion of Chinese industrialization and, beyond that, 
into debates about industrialization and technology transfer more generally.1 First, in exploring a 
range of handwork performed by technical experts at different stages of mechanization, it argues 
for the significance of manual labor in the making of the factory system, thereby complicating 
the long-held dichotomy between craft and mechanization. Second, by demonstrating how new 
                                                 
1 I use the term “Chinese industrialization” in a narrow sense. In other words, I use it to indicate the emergence of 
the machine-powered factory system in China at the turn of the twentieth century. Not every factory system is 
machine-powered. For instance, the mass-production of porcelain in late imperial China took place in a factory 
system that achieved a considerable level of division of labor but without mechanization. See Lothar Ledderose, Ten 





sets of knowledge were created on the Chinese shop floor in the course of using foreign 
machines, it challenges the assumption that technology transfer simply emanated from the West 
to the rest of the world.  
The study of industrialization, especially regarding the rise of factory workers as a new 
social class, was once a popular topic for social historians and feminist scholars in the China 
field.2 Inspired by E. P. Thompson’s seminal work on the English working class,3 previous 
scholarship investigated the fragmented nature of the Chinese working class in terms of gender, 
skill, and native places,4 with detailed accounts of the workers’ daily lives.5 However, these 
studies have paid little attention to the actual process of mechanization. Mechanization on the 
Chinese shop floor was far from smooth, since foreign machines malfunctioned for various 
reasons at different stages of operation, requiring continuous adjustment, maintenance, and 
repair. What were the local conditions peculiar to China that generated this mechanical 
challenge? How did they affect manufacturing processes at the headquarters of foreign 
manufacturers? Who was able to install, operate, and repair the equipment, and what kinds of 
                                                 
2 Scholarship that I discuss in this dissertation is limited to the United States. The study of Chinese labor movements 
has a much longer history in the People’s Republic of China. Since the 1950s, Chinese scholars have attempted to 
chart the suffering of factory workers under imperialism and capitalism, compiling histories of individual mills and 
conducting interviews with former workers. These documents (wenshi zhiliao) serve as important primary sources 
today. 
 
3 E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Pantheon Books, 1964). 
 
4 The literal meaning of the native place is a place where a person is from, but its significance in one’s social life in 
China was more profound than that. Those who left their native place for work, like most factory workers in 
Shanghai, networked with people from the same native place.  
 
5 Emily Honig, Sisters and Strangers: Women in the Shanghai Cotton Mills, 1919-1949 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1986); Gail Hershatter, The Workers of Tianjin, 1900-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1986); Elizabeth J. Perry, Shanghai on Strike: The Politics of Chinese Labor (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1993). More recently, Elisabeth Köll has examined the development of Dasheng Cotton Mills from a perspective of 
business history. Although her focus is more on the transformation of corporate structures and business practices, 
one of the chapters of her book deals with the realities of factory work. Elisabeth Köll, From Cotton Mill to Business 
Empire: The Emergence of Regional Enterprises in Modern China (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University 




skills and knowledge were required? Without answering these questions, we underestimate the 
Chinese as passive recipients of machines and technologies, under the assumption that Western 
machinery was a one-size-fits-all instrument for Chinese industrialization. My dissertation 
rectifies this neglect by reconstructing the concrete process of mechanization from a socio-
technological perspective.   
Cotton spinning refers to a process of transforming fluffy cotton fibers into thin long 
threads. Before the arrival of spinning machinery in China, this process was carried out by hand, 
mostly by mothers and daughters in peasant households. The spinner joined the ends of cotton 
fibers, each measuring less than one inch with variations, by continually attenuating and twisting 
raw cotton, relying on a spinning wheel and subtle movements of the hands and fingers. 
Spinning long and continuous yarn at an even quality and thickness required a considerable level 
of skill, and it was even more challenging to work with cotton, since its staple length is short and 
it lacks scales to enable animal fibers like those of wool to adhere to each other more easily. 
Handspun yarn was then woven into a range of tubu (土布，a Chinese term for handwoven 
cloth), usually under the same roof, and the final product was either used domestically or sold to 
the market. Cotton spinning and weaving in this way formed a robust handicraft industry in 
China.6 
The mechanization of this process meant the replacement of the spinner by the spinning 
machine, but this was a definition in the narrowest sense.7 The shift brought about far-reaching 
                                                 
6 On the history of cotton spinning before mechanization, see Francesca Bray, Technology and Gender: Fabrics of 
Power in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Gang Zhao, The Development of 
Cotton Textile Production in China (Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University: distributed 
by Harvard University Press, 1977); Philip C. Huang, The Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985); Philip C. Huang, The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the 
Yangzi Delta, 1350-1988 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990). 
 
7 The mechanization of cotton spinning had a different consequence for the hand weaving sector. With increased 
supply in spun yarn, it rather rejuvenated China’s rural hand weaving industry. See Albert Feuerwerker, "Handicraft 
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social, economic, and technological changes in China and in other parts of the world. The 
consequences for society were so profound that in most scholarship, the periodization of modern 
times starts with the Industrial Revolution, which has been viewed by many as all about the 
mechanization of cotton spinning in eighteenth-century Britain.8  
While taking into consideration the changes and ruptures caused by industrialization, my 
dissertation focuses on some forms of continuity that cut across the temporal division between 
early modern and modern and the spatial boundaries between the household workshop and the 
factory shop floor. Although fast-revolving spinning machines deprived hand spinners of their 
jobs, the factory system created whole new groups of technical experts such as engineers, 
machinists, and operators. A close examination of their work reveals that performance of 
spinning machines hinged on their skill and knowledge, which they obtained not only by reading 
books, but also through hands-on experience with the machines. Hands-on experience refers to 
all sorts of practical knowledge they obtained while working on the shop floor. They gained such 
knowledge by experiencing and observing rather than reading and writing, mostly through their 
bodily engagement with machines, parts, metal, and cotton. In this sense, the nature of their 
knowledge was not greatly different from that of craft knowledge shared by early modern 
artisans who, based on their bodily experience of matter, claimed themselves to be knowers of 
nature.9 By examining this continuity of craft knowledge into the factory system and, more 
                                                 
and Manufactured Cotton Textiles in China, 1871-1910," The Journal of Economic History 30, no. 2 (1970), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2116872; Linda Grove, A Chinese Economic Revolution: Rural Entrepreneurship in the 
Twentieth Century (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006). 
 
8 Robert C. Allen, The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). 
 
9 Pamela H. Smith, The Body of the Artisan: Art and Experience in the Scientific Revolution (Chicago: University of 




importantly, its centrality in the making of cotton mills, my dissertation reconsiders the binary 
relationship between craft and mechanization. 
The craft knowledge of the “modern” technical experts has been mostly undervalued, due 
in part to China’s longtime emphasis on textual knowledge as represented by the civil service 
exam, which emphasized learning the classics. Following the abolition of the exam in 1905, the 
Qing state began to put more emphasis on practical learning, but the existing hierarchy of the 
knowledge system persisted, creating a new chasm between elitist engineers and other less-
privileged technical experts. With the institutionalization of practical learning, the engineers 
began to claim to be a new social group that would lead China’s industrialization on the ground. 
In so doing, they consolidated the old practice of prioritizing mind over body,10 as we can see 
from a cotton mill engineer’s article that described machine spinning as a task that relied on 
“engineer’s head and worker’s hand (技师之头工人之手).”11   
There is no denying that the school knowledge these engineers obtained while receiving 
formal engineering education in China and abroad made an invaluable contribution to China’s 
industrialization. Moreover, the engineering discipline’s pedagogical emphasis on 
experimentation equipped them with a fairly balanced view of theory and practice. Yet, what 
enabled them to emerge as a privileged social class lay in their ability to write. As major 
contributors to professional journals on textile production, they not only wrote about what they 
learned by reading books, but also documented what they learned through their own experiences 
of spinning machines or by observing others’ experiences on the shop floor. The machine 
                                                 
10 Dorothy Ko’s recent study of the Chinese inkstone challenges this assumption. Dorothy Ko, The Social Life of 
Inkstones: Artisans and Scholars in Early Qing China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2017).   
 
11 Fu Daoshen, " Yingmei fangsha jiqi zhi bijiao” 英美纺纱机器之比较 (A comparison of British and American 




operator’s tacit knowledge and embodied skill thus became visible and valuable only when the 
details of technique as well as its importance to the operation of the machine were written down 
in such texts as factory regulations or journal articles. Texts in this way served as a powerful 
medium to convey the centrality of non-textual knowledge in the making of the factory system. 
The engineers in early twentieth-century China, some of whom were perhaps the last generation 
who prepared for the civil service exam, took full advantage of China’s literate knowledge 
culture when navigating a new social order in the era of industrialization.12 
Their vigorous knowledge production about spinning technology attests to the fact that 
the Chinese were not passive recipients of machinery and knowledge. In the long course of 
modifying foreign machines to accommodate local conditions, sustaining the life of aging 
machines through maintenance and repair, copying machines and parts that outstripped the 
originals, and cultivating cotton varieties that better suited machine spinning, new sets of 
knowledge were generated. Some of them traveled back to the headquarters of the foreign 
manufacturers, thus obscuring the boundaries between design and use and maker and user. All 
these processes of industrialization were deeply rooted in local settings, yet they were 
constructed on the global circuits of machines, cotton, and knowledge. The Chinese cotton 
industry was certainly globalized in this process, but it did not result in only China’s 
globalization. While learning about the new market, curious cotton varieties, and unfamiliar 
technologies adaptable to foreign circumstances, the Western machine industry was likewise 
globalized. 
                                                 
12 For an in-depth analysis of the interaction between knowledge work and material undertakings in Republican 
China, see Eugenia Lean’s recent study of Chen Diexian. Eugenia Lean, Vernacular Industrialism in China: Local 
Innovation and Translated Technologies in the Making of a Cosmetics Empire, 1900-1940 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2020). 
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This study centers on the trans-Pacific circulation of spinning machines and technologies 
between China and the United States. Since the opening of the Shanghai Machine Weaving 
Bureau (上海机器织布局) in 1889, known to be China’s first cotton mill, the Chinese spinning 
machinery market had been mostly dominated by British firms. The outbreak of World War I, 
however, took a heavy toll on the British manufacturing industry, creating an unprecedented 
opportunity for American machine firms to advance into China. The American machine industry 
witnessed rapid market expansion in the late 1910s and early 1920s, yet normal operation of their 
products in Chinese cotton mills required considerable effort. Designed to suit American cotton, 
they were not as efficient as British machines in processing short-staple Chinese cotton. Chinese 
cotton was an anomaly that did not fit the current paradigm, but the advent of a new paradigm 
would become possible only through actual use of this unfamiliar cotton type on American 
machines.13  
The manufacturers dispatched their own engineers to China to install and repair 
equipment, yet the best solutions did not necessarily come from headquarters; they rather came 
from the Chinese shop floor, where onsite experiments with the machines and local cotton 
varieties took place on a daily basis. The Chinese struggled to solve problems occurring on each 
shop floor, assessed foreign spinning machines and technologies, and actively shared their 
findings in professional journals. These efforts eventually led to the copying of imported 
machines that they initially did not even know how to operate. 
My research focuses on American machinery rather than British machinery for several 
reasons. First, the sudden popularity of American brands in the Chinese market during and 
                                                 
13 The anomaly-and-paradigm analogy is from Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: 




immediately after World War I shows how a choice between competing technologies could be 
determined by historical contingency. The Chinese chose American machinery not because it 
was technologically superior to British machinery; in fact, its negative association with “poor 
quality,” especially compared to British, persisted despite the advocates’ continued efforts to 
mitigate it. Nonetheless, the Chinese mill owners had no option but to rely on American 
machinery when demands for new equipment were higher than ever and deliveries from British 
machine firms took years to complete due to the war.  
Second, the struggle of American manufacturers to overcome entry barriers set by British 
companies urges us to question the “West” as a unitary entity. Being “Western” or “American” 
did not necessarily guarantee commercial success in the Chinese textile machine market, in 
which every foreign manufacturer had to compete for a market share. Competition to obtain new 
orders was so intense that it was not uncommon to see a price war between fellow American 
machine builders. Moreover, with limited access to up-to-date information on the Chinese 
market and lack of knowledge about its short-staple cotton varieties, the New England 
headquarters often found themselves on the periphery of the trans-Pacific trade. Provincializing 
the New England machine industry helps us to ask exactly who represented the local and who 
represented the global. By doing so, we can recast Chinese industrialization beyond the 
narratives of Westernization or modernization.  
 Finally, the spinning machine business between China and the United States was part of 
an increasing volume of trade and exchanges of knowledge and experts between the two 
countries. The amicable relationship established in the private sector was spurred by Chinese 
students who were educated in the United States on the Boxer Indemnity Scholarship.14 As they 
                                                 
14 Weili Ye, Seeking Modernity in China's Name: Chinese Students in the United States, 1900-1927 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2001). 
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began to play an important role in an industrializing China after returning home, their pro-
American stance facilitated the dissemination of American machinery and technology, with a 
far-reaching influence on China’s culture, education, and industry. These technological 
exchanges were not necessarily limited to the manufacturing sector. While working on the 
machines, they also attempted to improve the quality of raw cotton by establishing experimental 
stations across the country, where they invited American cotton experts to conduct laboratory 
work for the cultivation of American upland cotton. Such efforts further promoted educational 
exchanges between the two countries through the launching of official exchange programs such 
as the Cornell-Nanking Project. 
This study covers the period between 1877 and 1937, during which the Chinese cotton 
industry went through four different stages: from 1877 to 1894, when initial efforts to build 
cotton mills began; from 1895 to 1914, when the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki allowed a 
surge of cotton mills in China, both foreign- and Chinese-owned; from 1915 to 1922, when the 
industry enjoyed a war-induced boom with a shift of machine suppliers from British firms to 
American ones; and from 1923 to 1937, when a decade-long post-war depression swept through 
the whole industry. The study concludes in 1937, when most cotton mills on the coastal area fell 
into the hands of the Japanese. This periodization is important not only politically, but also 
technologically; with interrupted access to large-scale mills and increasing demands for cotton 
cloth in wartime, the Chinese began to resume hand spinning while continuing to build small-
scale mills.  
Contributions to the Field 
10 
 
Standard accounts of economic development have treated mass production as an 
indispensable part of industrialization.15 Characterized by endless rows of machines tended by 
“unskilled” workers,16 this unprecedented production system has been an emblem of a new era in 
which artisans are replaced by machines, handicraft by manufacture, and tradition by modernity. 
However, a careful examination of the construction of cotton mills—a representative 
manufacturing sector of any industrializing society—reveals an unfamiliar dimension of this 
system. Establishing a mill was a complicated project that relied on a variety of financial, 
technological, and human resources, but the most immediate requisite for producing yarn of the 
desired quality and quantity was to order and install machines that would best accommodate the 
mill’s needs. Designed for the manufacture of standard cotton yarn in large quantities, these 
machines were an essential element constituting the mass production system, yet the fabrication 
process of the machines themselves was far from standardized; from initial design to final 
installation, each machine was modified in countless ways to suit local conditions. Chinese 
cotton mills were no exception. Cotton factories sprang up here and there at the turn of the 
twentieth century, but there was no mass-produced factory. Each machine was tailored; hence, 
every factory was unique. 
In various disciplines scholars have attempted to explain economic phenomena that the 
unitary model of industrialization failed to explain. Ever since Julius Boeke’s work on the 
colonial Indonesian economy,17 economists and political scientists have widely employed the 
                                                 
15 For a summary of the classical view on this topic, see Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, "Historical Alternatives 
to Mass Production: Politics, Markets and Technology in Nineteenth-Century Industrialization," Past & Present, no. 
108 (1985): 133-41, http://www.jstor.org/stable/650576. 
  
16 I follow Sabel and Zeitlin’s definition of mass production as “the combination of single-purpose machines and 
unskilled labour to produce standard goods.” Ibid., 133.  
 
17 J. H. Boeke, Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies, as Exemplified by Indonesia (Haarlem: H.D. 
Tjeenk Willink, 1953). 
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concept of “dualism” to analyze the coexistence of a traditional sector with another characterized 
as modern, or a dichotomy between large firms and small enterprises, or the stratified structure 
of the labor market.18 More recently, Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin have suggested 
“flexible specialization” as an alternative to mass production, and as a more compelling theory 
than “industrial dualism,” which, according to their argument, in the end subjugates the flexible 
or traditional sector to that of mass production.19 Taking numerous examples of small-scale firms 
in the nineteenth century, when the spirit of mass production was heightened, Sabel and Zeitlin 
have argued that mass production was not an inevitable path determined by the inherent logic of 
technological development, but rather an outcome of choices contingent on various social 
conditions.20  
The prosperity of numerous industrial districts that featured varied forms of flexible 
specialization attested that “there was a craft alternative to mass production as a model of 
technological advance.”21 In the textile industry in particular, Lyon was the center of 
experimentation with new fibers,22 and Philadelphia was a home for skilled workers who 
produced a variety of specialty textile goods, in which small-scale “proprietary capitalism” 
                                                 
 
18 For a comprehensive theoretical analysis of the concept as well as a review of earlier works, see Suzanne Berger 
and Michael J. Piore, Dualism and Discontinuity in Industrial Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1980). 
 
19 Sabel and Zeitlin, "Historical Alternatives ". For their criticism of industrial dualism, see pp.137-8. 
 
20 In an edited volume published as a follow-up study to the article, they concede that the distinction between actors 
making decisions and contexts surrounding them is not as rigid as they initially argued. Charles F. Sabel and 
Jonathan Zeitlin, eds., World of Possibilities: Flexibility and Mass Production in Western Industrialization (Paris: 
Maison des sciences de l'homme; Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press: 1997), 1-33.  
 
21 Sabel and Zeitlin, "Historical Alternatives," 142.  
 




thrived.23 In China, the introduction of mechanized cotton spinning boosted rather than 
eliminated the hand weaving industry,24 and the Gaoyang industrial district, a rural community 
located south of Beijing, developed into one of China’s most successful hand weaving centers in 
the twentieth century.25  
While building on these studies, my study diverges from them at two distinct and yet 
interconnected points. Whereas they find the most immediate motivation for flexible 
specialization in changing market dynamics, my emphasis is on the side of raw materials, i.e., 
raw cotton in all varied lengths and qualities.26 In his study of papermaking in China, Jacob 
Eyferth argues that fixed recipes were of no immediate use when the quality of raw materials 
was uneven. The Chinese papermakers instead responded flexibly to changes that arose in the 
course of processing bamboo fibers, and what distinguished the master from the less experienced 
makers was his capacity to “produce paper of constant quality from changeable raw materials.”27 
My research shows that such emphasis on flexibility as a response to unstandardized raw 
materials was not specific to the artisan’s workshop. In order to produce standard cotton yarn 
from non-standard cotton fibers, it was inevitable for cotton mill engineers to devise flexible 
                                                 
23 Philip Scranton, Proprietary Capitalism : The Textile Manufacture at Philadelphia, 1800-1885 (Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Scranton has consistently argued for an alternative form of capitalism and 
industrialization against the “big business” model advocated by Alfred D. Chandler, a business historian whose 
work has had a profound impact on American business history. Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The 
Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1977). 
 
24 Feuerwerker, "Handicraft and Manufactured Cotton Textiles in China, 1871-1910."  
 
25 Grove, A Chinese Economic Revolution. 
 
26 In addition to market dynamics and raw materials, economic policies also affected the choice of technology. For 
instance, American cotton mills in the 1830s focused on the production of coarse cotton yarn thanks to the tariff on 
it. See Peter Temin, "Product Quality and Vertical Integration in the Early Cotton Textile Industry," The Journal of 
Economic History 48, no. 4 (1988), www.jstor.org/stable/2121622. 
 
27 Jacob Eyferth, "Craft Knowledge at the Interface of Written and Oral Cultures," East Asian Science, Technology 
and Society: An Internatioanl Journal 4, no. 2 (2010): 189. 
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ways to keep the irregularities under control, and customized machines were a natural outcome 
of such efforts. Unlike the papermakers, however, these engineers had “recipes” to rely on; for 
instance, they referred to engineering data to decide on diameters, spacing, and speed of drawing 
rollers that suited the condition of raw cotton to be processed. On many occasions, however, 
these data did not provide a definitive answer, for, as aggregates of average values, they served 
as a useful guide at best. The rest of the work could be done only by skilled workers with rich 
experience in the given conditions, and hence, I argue, flexibility was a vital part of mass 
production, not just an alternative to it, especially when the quality of raw materials was beyond 
the factory’s control. In other words, the focus of my study is not the manufacture of the 
machines per se, which possibly falls into the sector of flexible specialization. It rather looks into 
how these machines were ordered, installed, and operated in cotton mills with the aid of 
experienced workers, and thus how their skills, experience, and intuition, mostly associated with 
craft knowledge and artisanal work, were crucial to the making of the factory and the mass 
production system. 
Flexible onsite solutions to various local problems and their importance to the process of 
mechanization urge us to rethink local factories as an important site of knowledge production, 
and China as an active player in the process of global technology transfer. Historians of science 
have increasingly adopted a global approach to challenge Eurocentric narratives of scientific and 
industrial development, by focusing on the circulation of knowledge and objects across different 
parts of the world. 28 My project adds to this scholarship by demonstrating that China did not 
                                                 
28 Kapil Raj, Relocating Modern Science: Circulation and the Construction of Knowledge in South Asia and Europe, 
1650-1900 (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Simon Schaffer, The Brokered World: Go-
Betweens and Global Intelligence, 1770-1820 (Sagamore Beach: Science History Publications, 2009); L. Rieppel, E. 
Lean, and W. Deringer, "Introduction: The Entangled Histories of Science and Capitalism," Osiris (Bruges) 33, no. 
1 (2018). This approach is becoming increasingly prominent in the China field. See Fa-ti Fan, British Naturalists in 
Qing China: Science, Empire, and Cultural Encounter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004); Erik 
Mueggler, The Paper Road: Archive and Experience in the Botanical Exploration of West China and Tibet 
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serve as a mere recipient of Western machinery and technology. Technological challenges in 
Chinese factories inevitably led Chinese workers to engage in the process of modifying 
machinery and perfecting the factory system to suit their specific needs. New sets of knowledge 
were generated in this process, which the Chinese actively circulated through professional 
journals, not only in Chinese but also in English. The findings from local cotton mills also 
traveled back to the headquarters of American machine firms, which in turn led to the production 
of customized machinery for the Chinese and Asian markets.   
There is nothing uniquely Chinese in this user-initiated modification of machinery and 
technology. In the United States, for instance, McCormick’s reaping machines gained popularity 
only after fine refinements had been made to the original models as a response to the users’ 
complaints.29 This is partly because science and technology, which are generally considered to 
be universal, are in fact products of the interaction between scientists and instruments on the 
original site of production under specific cultural and material circumstances.30 Hence, 
replication of scientific devices is not always straightforward, as the task requires the transfer of 
the subculture surrounding the original production as well. The same is true of spinning 
machinery. Spinning machines made on the shop floor of America machine firms did not always 
                                                 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); Lean, Vernacular Industrialism. On the circulation of textiles, see 
Giorgio Riello and Tirthankar Roy, How India Clothed the World: The World of South Asian Textiles, 1500-1850 
(Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2009); Giorgio Riello and Prasannan Parthasarathi, The Spinning World: A Global History of 
Cotton Textiles, 1200-1850 (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Giorgio Riello, Cotton: The 
Fabric That Made the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
 
29 Alan L. Olmstead, "The Mechanization of Reaping and Mowing in American Agriculture, 1833-1870," The 
Journal of Economic History 35, no. 2 (1975), www.jstor.org/stable/2119411. Also see the case of the Birmingham 
steel industry, which failed to adopt the Pittsburgh technologies due to a different quality of coal. Gavin Wright, Old 
South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy since the Civil War, Louisiana pbk. ed. (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1996). 
 
30 H. M. Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice (London; Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications, 1985); Steven Shapin, Simon Schaffer, and Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, 




show their best performance in Chinese cotton mills. Modification was inevitable and the user’s 
feedback was essential to this process.  
Nonetheless, examining the failure of “American” machinery on the “Chinese” shop floor 
assumes another significance. Since the categories of science and technology were invariably 
associated with Western civilization in China, doubting the quality of American machinery 
meant not only challenging the universality of science and technology, but also questioning the 
supremacy of the American system and, by extension, the assumed power relations between the 
two countries.31 A global approach thus allows us to question the implicit notion of “imperial 
centers and colonial peripheries,” upheld by postcolonial scholarship.32 Due to the long distance 
to Chinese cotton mills, the New England headquarters mostly relied on second-hand 
information sent by mail from their faraway engineers. Limited access to “true knowledge” of 
China placed them in a vulnerable position, which was worsened by their lack of experience with 
short-staple Chinese cotton and suitable spinning technologies. The politics of knowledge did not 
always operate in a way that subjugated China to the West, and a hegemonic West with 
exclusive authority over knowledge did not exist in this industry. 
The concept of circulation of course requires a careful approach. Fa-ti Fan cautions 
against an uncritical application of the concept, since things and ideas did not always circulate in 
the same way and the image of circulation tends to obscure existing power differentials.33 As 
                                                 
31 After WWI, there was growing intellectual ambivalence toward Western science and technology in Republican 
China. Eugenia Lean, "Proofreading Science," in Science and Technology in Modern China, 1880s-1940s, ed. Jing 
Tsu and Benjamin Elman (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 191. 
 
32 See James L. Hevia, English Lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century China (Duke 
University Press Books, 2009). 
 
33 Fa-ti Fan, "The Global Turn in the History of Science," East Asian Science, Technology and Society: An 




Ruth Rogaski has argued, even the Chinese businessmen in Shanghai who maintained an 
amicable relationship with the Westerners after all worked in a setting where a racial hierarchy 
existed and “Western learning” increasingly set the norm. Hence, larger social and political 
circumstances that both fostered and hindered circulation need to be taken into consideration.34  
Finally, my research adds to the growing scholarship of use-based history of 
technology.35 The social construction of technology (SCOT) approach was perhaps one of the 
first attempts to consider users or consumers as a social group that played an important part in 
the construction of technology.36 Feminist scholars have diversified the scope of users since then 
by drawing our attention to the role of women, the most underrepresented group in the study of 
technology.37 More recently, David Edgerton has further pushed the boundaries by calling our 
attention to the study of “technology-in-use.” He argues: “One particularly important feature of 
use-based history of technology is that it can be genuinely global. It includes all places that use 
technology, not just the small number of places where invention and innovation is concentrated. 
                                                 
34 Ruth Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2004), 108. 
 
35 For a review of scholarship on user-technology relations, see Trevor Pinch and Nelly Oudshoorn, "How Uers and 
Non-Users Matter," in How Users Matter: The Co-Construction of Users and Technology, ed. Trevor Pinch and 
Nelly Oudshoorn (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2003), 3-16. On maintenance and repair, see Andrew L. 
Russell and Vinsel Lee, "After Innovation, Turn to Maintenance," Technology and Culture 59, no. 1 (Jan 2018 
2018): 3-7, http://dx.doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/tech.2018.0004. 
 
36 Trevor J. Pinch and Wiebe E. Bijker, "The Social Construction of Facts and Artefacts: Or How the Sociology of 
Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other," Social Studies of Science 14, no. 3 (1984): 
399-441, accessed 2020/04/10/, www.jstor.org/stable/285355. 
 
37 The literature is vast. Exemplary works include Ruth Schwartz Cowan, More Work for Mother: The Ironies of 
Household Technology from the open Hearth to the Microwave (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Bray, Technology 
and Gender. In the China field, studies of reproductive technologies are particularly prominent. Yi-Li Wu, 
Reproducing Women: Medicine, Metaphor, and Childbirth in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2010); Charlotte Furth, A Flourishing Yin: Gender in China's Medical History: 960–1665 




In the innovation-centric account, most places have no history of technology. In use-centred 
accounts, nearly everywhere does.”38  
Echoing Edgerton’s call in part, Andrew Russell and Lee Vinsel launched collaborative 
research on maintenance and maintainers, which has now developed into an interdisciplinary 
project that involves not only scholars but also engineers, practitioners, and activists. As they 
point out, however, “histories of maintenance and repair continue to rise to the surface only to 
fall again into the depth.”39 Why is that so? Although they correctly find the answer from our 
society’s general obsession with the new rather than the old, they neglect to indicate the still 
Western-centric geography of the field. If we broaden the geographic boundaries into non-
Western regions, which have mostly served as “consumers” or “users” of Western technologies 
for the past two centuries, topics on maintenance and repair abound. Moreover, as my research 
will demonstrate, using foreign technologies in local settings invariably required adaptation and 
modification, forcing us to reconfigure the relationship between use and design.  
Russell and Vinsel define maintenance as “all of the work that goes into preserving 
technical and physical orders.”40 This definition immediately recalls the long neglected technical 
experts such as mechanics, who maintained the orders of textile machines by lubricating gears, 
repairing parts, and sometimes procuring them locally by copying the foreign originals. With 
their undervalued craft knowledge, as I will show throughout the dissertation, they made an 
invaluable contribution to China’s industrialization. However, if we interpret the definition in a 
broader sense to include any human activities to keep machines and systems working properly, it 
                                                 
38 David Edgerton, The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global history since 1900 (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), xiii.  
 
39 Russell and Lee, "After Innovation, Turn to Maintenance," 5. 
 
40 Ibid., 7. 
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becomes obvious that the machine operator’s role as a maintainer was no less important than that 
of a mechanic. Mostly female, their primary job was piecing broken threads on the spinning 
machines, and by doing so they were essentially correcting the inherent imperfection of the 
machines, which did not come with an automatic mechanism for joining yarn ends. In other 
words, the spinning machines could never perform their function—to produce long, continuous 
yarn—without the handwork of experienced operators, which required not only delicate and 
agile movements but also a technical understanding of the machines. Their assistance was even 
more critical in financially-strapped factories with limited investment in equipment maintenance, 
in which yarn breakage was more frequent due to the poor condition of the machinery. By 
highlighting the skill of these “unskilled laborers,” my research argues for female machine 
operators, the most underrepresented professionals in the field, as the true maintainers of the 
factory system.  
Organization  
The dissertation is organized roughly following the life cycle of spinning machinery, with 
each chapter addressing a specific issue that arose in the course of its use on the Chinese shop 
floor. Chapter 1, “Customization,” provides an overview of the mechanization of cotton spinning 
in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century China with emphasis on the rise of American 
machinery. One of the sections examines the concrete process of the customization of spinning 
machinery through a case study of Dasheng Cotton Mills’ 1921 contract with Whitin Machine 
Works.  
Chapter 2, “Malfunction,” investigates how numerous technical experts in the textile 
industry, based in multiple locales across the Pacific, appropriated knowledge and negotiated 
power for their own purposes, challenging the assumed dynamics between China and the United 
States. It highlights the American machine industry’s vulnerable position in the trans-Pacific 
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trade, caused by entry barriers set by British competitors, limited access to up-to-date 
information about the Chinese market, and their machines’ poor performance in processing 
short-staple Chinese cotton.  
Chapter 3, “From Modification to Reproduction,” focuses on hands-on experience, 
defined as sets of practical knowledge that one obtained while working with machines and 
cotton. With an emphasis on the conflicting views on the roller setting for the drawing frame 
between the American manufacturer and its mill clients, this chapter examines why the best 
solutions were likely to come from the Chinese shop floor, where hands-on experiments with 
imported machines and local cotton varieties took place on a daily basis. New sets of knowledge 
were created in this process, and some of them traveled back to the New England headquarters, 
culminating in customized machines and updated manuals. The accumulation of such knowledge 
also enabled the Chinese to produce imitations that outstriped the foreign originals in quality. 
Chapter 4, “Maintenance,” sheds new light on the most underrepresented technical 
professionals: female machine operators. Drawing upon interviews with Dasheng Cotton Mills’ 
former factory workers, it shows how the factory system perpetuated the notion that spinning 
was women’s work that could be performed along with childcare. By casting fresh light on their 
skill as a machine operator, which required not only delicacy and quickness but also a good 
mechanical understanding of the machine, this chapter argues for these “unskilled laborers” as 
the true maintainers of the factory system. 
In an effort to secure a constant supply of raw cotton, the Chinese cotton mill owners 
began to fund research for the cultivation of American upland cotton, which was preferred over 
Chinese varieties due to its long staple. In the long course of experiments and research into its 
acclimation, American cotton brought together concerned Chinese industrialists and American 
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cotton experts, as well as Chinese agriculture schools, their students, and local farmers. Chapter 
5, “Raw Materials,” examines their prolonged endeavors to grow American cotton in 
industrializing China. It argues that industrialization, often considered as an urban phenomenon 
restricted to manufacturing, had a profound impact on China’s rural and agricultural sector with 






CHAPTER 1  
Customization: Custom-Made Machines in the Era of Mass Production 
 
The American textile machine industry witnessed rapid market expansion in the late 
1910s and early 1920s, as Chinese industrialization started to gather momentum and the postwar 
British machine industry continued to falter. Given its mere 2% of the Chinese market share in 
1911, the meteoric rise in 1919 to become a leading supplier of spinning machinery with more 
than 50% of the market share was unprecedented.41 World War I (hereafter WWI) certainly had 
an impact, since it took a heavy toll on the manufacturing industry of Great Britain, which had 
long dominated the global textile machine market except for the United States. Nonetheless, this 
fortunate coincidence alone was not sufficient to explain such explosive growth. Encouraged by 
the potential of the Chinese market, especially when the domestic market began to reach 
saturation, New England manufacturers strived to provide Chinese clients with customized 
technical support by dispatching their engineers to local factories for installation, modification, 
and repair. The outcome of such efforts was custom-made machines that suited each cotton 
mill’s specific needs, which constituted an essential element of the factory system for the mass 
production of cotton yarn.   
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. While providing an overview of the 
mechanization of cotton spinning in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century China, it 
examines the concrete process of the customization of spinning machinery at the stage of 
drafting specifications, through a case study of Dasheng Cotton Mills’ 1921 contract with Whitin 
Machine Works. The first section chronicles the development of cotton manufacturing industry 
in China, which was deeply intertwined with major political events such as the Self-
                                                 
41 Julean Herbert Arnold and United States Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, China: A Commercial and 
Industrial Handbook (Washington: Goverment Printing Office, 1926), 102.  
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Strengthening Movement, the Sino-Japanese War, and WWI. The second section examines the 
rise of American machinery during and after the war, with emphasis on the structure of the Sino-
American machine trade, which was mediated by agent companies versed in both textile 
engineering and the Chinese market. The following section investigates the process by which 
machine lists were drafted and specifications were prepared for Dasheng’s new branch mills with 
the manufacturing capacity of 25,000 spindles. The chapter will conclude with a brief analysis of 
the decade-long post-war depression that started in 1923 and its consequences for the cotton 
industry in China and the United States.   
1.1 Machine Spinning in China before WWI 
In 1877, a number of Shanghai-based businessmen were preparing for a cotton mill with 
starting capital of 500,000 liang. In order to determine the official status of the project, they also 
had to secure support from a high-ranking official,42 since large-scale enterprises at that time 
were required to take the form of guandu shangban, a system whereby merchants provided 
capital and management under government supervision.43 In 1878, one of the businessmen 
named Peng Rucong petitioned Li Hongzhang, the Governor-General of Zhili province, to 
sponsor their project. Li not only approved the proposal but also granted a ten-year monopoly 
right, according to which no establishment of private mills was to be allowed in Shanghai for the 
stipulated time period. In the following year, however, many of the original promoters, including 
                                                 
42 Gang Zhao, The Development of Cotton Textile Production in China (Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research 
Center, Harvard University: distributed by Harvard University Press, 1977), 107. 
  
43 Elisabeth Köll, From Cotton Mill to Business Empire, 16, 34-35. Köll provides a detailed explanation of the origin 
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Peng himself, withdrew from the project in fear of growing governmental influence, leaving it in 
the hands of people directly appointed by Li.44  
Under the command of American textile engineer A. D. Danforth, who was hired as the 
chief engineer of the mill, an order of 35,000 spindles and 530 power looms was placed. The 
machines arrived at Shanghai in 1883, but they were not put into operation until 1890 due to a 
delay in the preparation work. The originally paid-up capital had been exhausted by 1887, even 
before the mill started operations, and additional funds had to be raised including a contribution 
from the Qing government.45 A project that started as a guandushangban enterprise thus turned 
into a joint venture between private investors and the government, although in reality it was 
almost Li Hongzhang’s own private business.46 In 1890, the Shanghai Machine Weaving Bureau 
(上海机器织布局), known to be China’s first cotton factory, finally started operations. 
Unfortunately, however, the entire building and equipment were burnt down only after three 
years of operation.47  
The Sino-Japanese War broke out shortly thereafter, and with the subsequent signing of 
the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, the Chinese cotton industry entered a new phase. The treaty 
granted the Japanese permission to build factories in China, enabling them to expand the realm 
of economic activities from trade to manufacturing. According to the most-favored-nation 
clause, the policy automatically applied to China’s other foreign trading partners, which made it 
obsolete for protecting government-supported domestic enterprises through monopoly status, as 
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foreign companies could easily evade the practice. The state’s weakening influence on industry 
was also caused by Li Hongzhang’s fall after the war. Since he was the single most influential 
figure who had wielded enormous power over various state-sponsored enterprises, including the 
Shanghai Machine Weaving Bureau, his fall consequently reduced the state’s capacity to impose 
the guandu shangban system on the private sector. At the same time, the Qing court, weakened 
by their humiliating defeat in the war, began to emphasize industrialization as a means to 
strengthen national power, encouraging vigorous private investment without government 
intervention.48 China witnessed a surge of cotton mills as a result, both foreign- and Chinese-
owned.49 There were a total of 204,712 spindles in operation as of 1894, all Chinese-owned and 
mostly government-supported. This number increased to 1,148,332 by 1914, out of which 
Chinese-owned mills occupied 687,967, Japanese-owned 307,048, and British-owned 153,320.50  
With the outbreak of WWI in 1914, the Chinese cotton industry began to gather further 
momentum. The war created a significant vacuum in the cotton goods market, providing a rare 
opportunity for the Chinese to expand their domestic market share in the absence of British and 
European competitors.51 The number of Chinese-owned cotton mills increased exponentially 
during and immediately after the war, with an escalation in the quantity of spindles from 687,967 
                                                 
48 This paragraph relies on Köll’s discussion of China’s cotton industry until 1895. See Köll, From Cotton Mill to 
Business Empire, 31-41. 
  
49 Ibid.  
 
50 Fong, Cotton Industry and Trade in China, 8. 
 
51 Ibid., 5-11. As of 1913, Great Britain was the leading supplier of cotton piece goods, but it gave its position to 
Japan after the war. As for the United States, the volume decreased from 26.8 in 1902 to 8.0 in 1913 and 0.02 in 
1923. Arnold and Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, China: A Commercial and Industrial Handbook, 78-
79. As for the yarn, Japan was the leading exporter, before and after the war. Ibid., 84. The position of Great Britain 
in the yarn trade is unclear because the origin of imports that came through Hong Kong was not determined. The 
American government saw that they were from Japan and India (ibid., 83.) whereas Fong argued that they were from 




in 1914 to 2,256, 624 in 1925. 52 The war also favored Japanese cotton mills. Due to a 
combination of economic factors, they decided to move their production facilities from Japan to 
China, and their manufacturing capacity in China increased from 307,048 spindles in 1914 to 
1,636,156 in 1925.53 There were a total of 4,223,956 spindles in China as of 1930, out of which 
3,063,288 spindles (72.52%) were organized between 1914 and 1925.54  
The development of domestic machine spinning naturally brought about import 
substitution in the sector of cotton yarn trade. Ever since the opening of the first five treaty ports 
to foreign trade, as required by the Treaty of Nanjing signed in 1842 following the Opium War 
with Great Britain, machine-spun yarn had poured into China, devastating its hand-spinning 
industry. The volume of imports recorded 33,507 piculs as of 1867 and continued to increase to 
2,748,644 piculs by 1899.55 The figure remained static until 1913, after which it began to show a 
considerable decline to 169,620 piculs in 1930. As we can see from Figure 1.1, the beginning of 
the decline coincided with the wartime period, when cotton mills started to surge in China.  
                                                 




54 Ibid., 9-11; Zhao, Cotton Textile, 96-102.  
 




Figure 1.1. Import Patterns of Raw Cotton and Cotton Yarn in China, 1890-1930.56 
Whereas the development of native industry reduced the volume of yarn imports, rapid 
industrialization led to an escalating demand for raw cotton and spinning equipment, for which 
China relied on imports in varying degrees. Figure 1.1 shows that the import of raw cotton 
continued to increase when the import of cotton yarn was on the decline. Although China was a 
cotton-growing country, the supply hardly met the ever-increasing demand. Moreover, the cotton 
industry preferred American upland cotton over Chinese local varieties, since its long staple was 
deemed more suitable for machine spinning. Despite the Chinse people’s continued efforts at the 
cultivation of American cotton and self-sufficiency in raw cotton, which I will discuss further in 
Chapter 5, Figure 1.1 confirms that their reliance on imports continued to increase.57  
Demand for spinning machinery rose likewise, but WWI had a conflicting effect on its 
supply. As opposed to raw cotton, most of which came from India or the United States and hence 
the supply of which was not directly affected by the war, China almost entirely relied on Great 
Britain for spinning machinery. Since the war affected not only the production of cotton goods 
                                                 
56 Fong, Cotton Industry and Trade in China, 3. 
 
57 Ibid., 1-3. 
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but also the manufacture of textile machines in Great Britain, China was confronted with a 
shortage of machinery, ironically, due to the same war that stimulated its demand to an 
unprecedented level.58  
British manufacturers virtually monopolized the global textile machine market at that 
time, except for the United States. Cotton mills in Europe, Latin America, and Asia all looked to 
British machine builders for their new equipment, which usually led to subsequent transactions 
for additional mills and repairs of old facilities. Platt Brothers alone, the largest of the British 
firms, had a productive capacity in 1914 larger than the entire American textile machine 
industry.59 With an enormous market share, they had literally set global technological standards 
for the manufacture and installation of textile machines, which formed a barrier when American 
companies began to enter the world market as a second mover.  
Dasheng Cotton Mills’ trajectory of machine acquisition confirms the predominance of 
British products in China, at least until the late 1910s. John Hetherington & Sons, one of the 
most prominent British firms, was the manufacturer of 20,400 spindles for Dasheng’s No. 1 mill, 
established in 1899.60 They again supplied the first 12,000 spindles for Dasheng’s No. 2 mill, 
established in 1907, and the remaining 14,000 spindles were supplied by Howard & Bullough, 
                                                 
58 Ibid. Cong Liu’s recent article makes a similar claim by discussing why the surge of spindles in China took place 
after the war, not during the war. See Cong Liu, "The Effects of World War I on the Chinese Textile Industry: Was 
the World’s Trouble China’s Opportunity?," The Journal of Economic History 80, no. 1 (2020), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022050719000858. 
 
59 Thomas R. Navin, The Whitin Machine Works Since 1831; A Textile Machinery Company in an Industrial Village 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), 325. 
 
60 The machine sets were originally ordered in 1893 by Zhang Zhidong, the governor-general of Huguang from 1889 
until 1894. With his transfer to Nanjing, the plan for a cotton mill fell through. The machines (manufactured in 1895 
and possibly shipped in the same year) were neglected on a shoal of Shanghai Huangpu River for three years and 
then were repurchased by Zhang Jian, the founder of Dasheng Cotton Mills. Although they had never been in actual 
operation, they were considered secondhand due to the poor conditions. Dasheng xitong qiye shi bianxiezu 
大生系统企业史编写组, Dasheng xitong qiye shi 大生系统企业史 (Business history of the Dasheng system) 




another renowned British company.61 A few years later, in 1914, Dasheng launched a plan to 
construct its No. 3 mill, and in the next year, it placed an order of 30,300 spindles with Howard 
& Bullough.62  
The manufacture and delivery of the machines took almost six years. Due to WWI, 
which broke out when the order was just made, they did not arrive at the factory site until the 
spring of 1921.63 Demand for spinning equipment continued to grow with the increasing number 
of cotton mills across China, but it was never fully met. While anxiously waiting for the delayed 
equipment for the No. 3 mill, Dasheng was planning to establish additional branch mills, and 
they had no choice but to rely on an alternative machine supplier. Finding a reliable machine 
builder was a painstaking task, since acquisition of equipment required substantial capital 
investment and a lasting impact on the company’s productivity for the coming thirty years, the 
average lifespan of textile machinery. Dasheng therefore probably wanted to continue their 
business with Howard & Bullough, whose quality had been proven during the past few years of 
operations. Even after the war was officially over, however, the British machine industry did not 
seem to be in full recovery.  
                                                 
61 The first 12,000 spindles were secondhand products originally purchased in 1897 by the Shanxi Commercial 
Bureau (山西商务局). As with the case of Zhang Zhidong, their plan for a cotton mill was not accomplished, and 
the machines were abandoned on a wharf of Tianjin for almost a decade, the worst conditions for the storage of any 
metal product. The remaining 14,000 spindles were brand new, purchased in 1906, the year before the opening of 
the mill. To save expenses, Zhang Jian dispatched Yu Shifeng to Britain and directly purchased the machines from 
the manufacturer without relying on Shanghai-based intermediaries. Ibid., 44.  
 
62 Ibid., 145. Figures of spindles are not consistent in this book. For instance, a table on p. 143 shows that the 
company acquired 34,000 spindles in 1921, instead of the 30,300 in 1915. According to Zhang Cha’s report on the 
progress of the construction of No. 3 Mill, Dasheng ordered 24,000 spindles and 4,000 shuangxian (双线) in 1915, 
and additional 6,000 weft spindles (纺纬纱机) in 1919. The total comes to 34,000. Nantong shi dang'anguan 
南通市档案馆 and Zhangjian yanjiu zhongxin 张謇研究中心, eds., Dasheng jituan dang'an ziliao xuanbian: 
fangzhi bian III 大生集团档案资料选编: 纺织编 III (Selected archival materials on the Dasheng group: Textiles 
production III) (Beijing: Fangzhi chubanshe, 2004), 351.  
 




1.2 The Rise of American Machinery 
In 1919, the committee for the establishment of Dasheng’s No. 6 mill decided to place 
an order of 10,000 spindles from Whitin Machine Works (hereafter Whitin), a New England-
based American machine firm. Around the same time, a plan for the No. 8 mill was proposed, for 
which an additional 15,000 spindles were purchased from the same manufacturer.64 After many 
delays in payment, the plan for the No. 6 mill eventually fell through due to insufficient 
fundraising; consequently, the order of 10,000 spindles was canceled. The remaining 15,000 
spindles were successfully shipped and installed in the No. 8 mill under the supervision of 
Whitin’s engineers, although, as I will discuss in the final section of this chapter, Dasheng’s 
hasty expansion of manufacturing facilities drove the company to near bankruptcy. 
Whitin Machine Works was one of the largest American textile machine manufacturers 
providing a full range of spinning machines. Located in Whitinsville, Massachusetts, it originally 
started as a cotton mill named P. Whitin & Sons, established in 1826 by textile machine builder 
Paul Whitin and his sons. Under the leadership of the third son, John Whitin, who spent most of 
his time working on machines in the mill’s machine shop, it eventually developed into a machine 
company that supplied equipment to major cotton mills in the United States. Most machine 
orders, at least during the first half-century of its business, came from cotton mills located in 
New England, especially in the Providence area, and Whitin became an indispensable part of 
America’s early industrialization featuring mechanized textile production.65  
With the rise of the Southern market in 1880, the geography of the textile machine 
business changed significantly. Cotton mills began to emerge in the South during the postwar 
                                                 
64 Ibid., 147.  
 




reconstruction era, which was fueled by growing demand for cheap machine-made cotton goods 
from abroad; China was one of the primary importers. The change was also spurred by the 
increasing reliance on steam and electricity. Since these new power sources removed physical 
constraints imposed by waterpower, cotton mills no longer needed to be located near a river.66 
The South continued to grow into a major producer of cotton yarn and fabrics, and in 1920 its 
size was almost equal to New England. For machine manufacturers, this meant the opening of a 
whole new market. With successful contracts with Piedmont Manufacturing Company, the 
progenitor of cotton manufacturing in the South, Whitin soon gained a foothold in the region as a 
dependable machine builder.67 As of 1907, approximately half of Whitin’s machinery was going 
to the South.68  
In order to succeed in this new domestic market, Whitin was forced to modify some of its 
decades-old business practices. For the first time in its history, the company began to do business 
through sales agents by paying commissions. The management was initially reluctant to embrace 
the change, as they had long believed that the best advertisement should always be a reputation 
for high-quality products; aggressive sales tactics remained secondary at best. Such a passive 
attitude toward marketing was not unique to Whitin, but was prevalent throughout the entire 
industry at that time. The so-called “gentlemanly” strategy was feasible due in part to relative 
economic prosperity in the earlier time period, when competition to get orders was not as fierce. 
However, after suffering from a depression in 1893, which swept through the entire national 
economy with an especially hard hit on New England mills, Marston Whitin, the successor of 
                                                 
66 On the relationship between power sources and industrialization, see Jeremy Atack, Peter Passell, and Susan Lee, 
A New Economic View of American History: From Colonial Times to 1940 (New York: Norton, 1994), 197-201. 
 
67 Navin, Whitin Machine Works, 204-09. 
 




John Whitin, signed a contract with an agent company, recognizing the South as their only 
promising market.69  
The Southern market also brought about a change in methods of handling and 
transportation. Before 1880, when deliveries were more or less restricted to New England, most 
Whitin machines were assembled on the shop floor, fully boxed and transferred to client mills by 
rail. The only exception was carding machines, which were too large to fit into railroad cars. 
However, this system incurred considerable surcharges when it came to long-distance 
transportation. The machines of course could be shipped by steamer at much lower expenses, but 
marine shipping required multiple transfers, thereby causing higher risk of damage en route. The 
New England manufacturers, who preferred rail to water for this reason, attempted to devise a 
more economical way of transportation and came up with a method called “partial boxing.”70 By 
disassembling machines and partially boxing them, they were able to reduce packing charges, 
which offset high freight rates by rail, dropping total rail shipment costs to the level of marine 
shipping. One disadvantage of this new system was that now the manufacturers had to dispatch 
erectors who could supervise the installation of their machines at client mills. Totally 
unnecessary when the machinery was shipped fully assembled, these professionals traveled from 
one mill to another to make sure that their products were properly installed. With the growth of 
the Southern market, demand for erectors increased as well. Three or four were enough to cover 
the entire Southern area at first, but the number increased to a hundred by 1917.71  
                                                 
69 Ibid., 211, 17. For a more detailed analysis of their business with Southern sales representatives, see ibid., 217-23. 
 
70 This method seems to have been devised by Lowell Machine Shop although evidence is incomplete. Ibid., 214. 
 




Business in the South equipped Whitin and other New England-based manufacturers to 
venture into East Asia decades later. In order to succeed in this unfamiliar domestic market, 
which was perhaps as foreign as China in terms of business culture, they were forced to modify 
some of their key principles. Many newly instituted practices during this time period, such as 
sales through agent companies, partial boxing, and the employment of erectors, transformed 
them into companies that were capable of conducting long-distance business beyond New 
England, although China presented them with a whole new set of unforeseen challenges. After 
decades of experience in the South, they were in possession of a pool of skilled engineers who 
can travel around to install and repair their machinery for the client mills. They also became 
familiar with doing business through the intermediation of agent companies. Finally, they had 
accumulated a good wealth of knowledge of packing for long-distance shipping, although trans-
Pacific shipping would require a far more advanced level of technique, as I will discuss in 
Chapter 2. They were thus poised to seize the opportunity when WWI create a significant 
vacuum in the global textile machine market. 
In January 1916, a New York-based trading company by the name of Gaston, Williams 
& Wigmore (hereafter Gaston) approached Whitin with a proposal to sell its spinning machines 
on commission in the foreign market.72 Founded in October 1914 by three shrewd businessmen 
who wanted to take advantage of WWI, Gaston was a promising firm in possession of ten 
steamships with subsidiaries in major cities of South America, the Mediterranean region, and 
Asia. According to the proposal, Gaston would purchase Whitin machinery for export, primarily 
to China and Japan but also to Russia and India. They would acquire the ownership of the 
                                                 
72 The company was named after the surnames of the three founders, George A. Gaston, W. H. Williams, and J. A. 
Wigmore. This paragraph draws on Thomas Navin’s discussion of the partnership between Whitin Machine Works 




machines and pay for it in cash, f.o.b. the Whitins station—i.e., Whitin, the seller, would be 
responsible for transportation costs from its manufacturing facilities to the shipping station.73 
After that point, Gaston would take over all shipping costs and liability en route to the factories 
of their foreign clients, both inland and marine.74 Gaston would sign separate contracts with 
these mill clients, in which they would charge amounts large enough to cover machinery costs, 
shipping expenses, and commission. 
Whitin had never actively engaged in foreign sales, although they had once made a 
failed foray into the Mexican market. Due to their early experience of high entry barriers set by 
British companies, Whitin was not enthusiastic about Gaston’s proposition, at least initially. 
Nevertheless, the chance of financial risk seemed slight, and the war in Europe certainly 
provided a favorable opportunity this time round. In March 1916, Whitin appointed Gaston as its 
agent company in East Asia.75 Introduced by the Chinese name Weiding (维定), advertisements 
for Whitin spinning machines thus began to make an appearance in Huashang shachang 
lianhehui jikan 华商纱厂联合会季刊 (China Cotton Journal) under the directorship of Gaston’s 
Chinese branch Meixing gongsi (美兴公司) (Figure 1.2).  
                                                 
73 F.O.B., “Free on Board,” is a term widely used in international shipping. Always followed by the name of a 
loading point, it is used to clarify the responsibilities for shipping expenses between the seller and the buyer. “FOB 
the Whitins Station” means that the seller is responsible for all kinds of transportation and handling costs incurred 
while the goods are transferred from the factory to the Whitins Station and then loaded on to railroad cars. Beyond 
that point, the buyer pays for all costs.  
 





Although Whitin was not obliged to deal with the Chinese mill clients directly, their 
involvement in the transactions between Gaston and the Chinese cotton mills was inevitable. As 
opposed to consumer goods, purchasing industrial machinery was by no means a one-time 
transaction. It entailed not only acquiring tangible machines but also receiving intangible after-
sales service needed for installation, maintenance, and repair. Even though Gaston was equipped 
with their own engineering staff, installation and modification of textile machines required 
highly sophisticated technical expertise and hence the residence of engineers dispatched by the 
manufacturer was essential to providing technical services in a timely manner. Soon after signing 
                                                 
76 "Advertisement for Whitin Machine Works. Whitinsville, Mass., U. S. A. 美国维定紡織機器," Huashang 
shachang lianhehui jikan 華商纱廠聯合會季刊 (China Cotton Journal) 1, no. 1 (September 20, 1919): 3.  
 
 
Figure 1.2 Advertisement for Whitin Machine Works in China.76 
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the contract with Gaston, Whitin dispatched their employee Edward G. Whittaker to China, 
which I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 2. 
Around the same time, another American machine builder Saco-Lowell Shops, Whitin’s 
long-time rival in both domestic and foreign markets, also signed a contract with an agent 
company by the name of Andersen, Meyer & Company, Limited (hereafter Andersen).77 Now 
the Chinese spinning machine market would be divided by the two prominent American machine 
builders, Whitin Machine Works and Saco-Lowell Shops, and their respective agent companies, 
Gaston, Williams & Wigmore and Anderson, Meyer & Company (Figure 1.3). Andersen had a 
longer history than Gaston in Chinese foreign trade. Established in 1906, originally as a general 
export dealer, it was a firm that dealt in a broad range of machines from American 
manufacturers. It started to have a separate department for sales of textile machinery in 1915, 
when about 1,000,000 spindles were in operation in China, mostly from British manufacturers. 
Between 1915 and 1931, additional 3,000,000 spindles were installed in China, one fourth of 
which were sold by Anderson, supplied by Saco-Lowell Shops. By 1931, it grew into a large-
scale enterprise with its head office in Shanghai, regional branch offices in most treaty port 
cities, and separate sales departments specializing in textile machinery, power plant, electrical 
works, and other industrial and agricultural machinery.78  
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78 Andersen Meyer & Company, Charles John Ferguson, and Guangzhao Li, Andersen, Meyer & Company, Limited, 





Figure 1.3 The Structure of Sino-American Textile Machine Trade 
Their business in China, in the absence of British competitors, was a huge success. As 
we can see in Table 1.1, American products outnumbered their British counterparts in 1919 with 
more than 50% of the market share. For Whitin, 1920-1921 was one of the most prosperous 
periods in the company’s business history. It sold 858,120 spindles in these two years, which 
came almost close to the 1,021,700 of 1909-1910, the biggest boom period that the company had 
yet experienced.79 Its net return on sales recorded 26, 15, 25, and 41 % between 1919 and 1922, 
respectively.80 Saco-Lowell Shops also prospered during the same time period. Its foreign sales 
in 1919 nearly doubled total foreign deliveries between 1912 and 1918. The foreign sales 
reached its peak in 1921, out of which 65 per cent went to China, 29 per cent to Japan, and the 
remainder to South America, Canada, and European countries.81  
 
                                                 
79 Navin, Whitin Machine Works, 308-09. 
 
80 Navin argues that several fortuitous factors played a part as well, including currency inflation, efficient utilization 
of manufacturing facilities, and machine price changes that were favorable to the manufacturers. Ibid., 333-34. 
 
81 Gibb, Saco-Lowell Shops, 481. 
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Table 1.1 Gross Imports of Spinning Machinery (haikwan tael) 
 




countries     Total 
1911 7,161 241,234 60,159 23,028 331,582 
1912 9,885 307,283 50,229 91,219 458,616 
1913 2,615 572,150 112,500 52,459 839,724 
1914 2,530 1,540,100 187,661 308,169 2,038,460 
1915 15,446 1,076,229 253,490 74,346 1,419,511 
1916 115,431 1,257,961 531,437 29,312 1,934,141 
1917 218,928 669,649 300,607 24,616 1,235,800 
1918 379,867 669,402 642,948 22,777 1,714,994 
1919 1,944,350 813,254 897,760 112,042 3,767,406 
1920 3,897,204 1,925,696 1,071,201 33,627 6,927,728 
1921 11,768,212 11,160,313 3,622,553 240,994 26,792,072 
1922 7,910,042 15,171,830 6,725,264 722,150 30,529,286 
1923 933,533 6,152,364 4,557,784 690,736 12,334,417 
 
Source: China: A Commercial and Industrial Handbook (1926), 102. 
Originally from Chinese Maritime Customs. 
 
The British seem to have rebounded in 1921 and 1922 in Table 1.1, but this should not be 
interpreted as coming from new orders. They were delayed deliveries of old orders that had been 
placed before the war.82 After 1922, imports from both Great Britain and the United States 
shrunk as the Chinese cotton industry entered a depression. Cotton mills continued to be built, 
but at a much slower pace and on a far smaller scale. Mills with less than 10,000 spindles 
became increasingly common in China, which was extremely rare before 1922.  
1.3 Making the One and Only Mill 
In most cases that Whitin entered a contract with a new client, they provided an entire 
package of machines needed to build a complete mill. The size of the contract was determined by 
the total number of spindles to be installed on spinning frames, a machine that comes last in the 
long production line of spinning (Figure 1.4). As we can see in Table 1.2, if a cotton mill were to 
                                                 




enter into an agreement for 25,000 spindles, it had to first decide on the number of spindles per 
spinning frame (348 per frame, hence 72 frames in total), and then work accordingly on a list of 
machines required at stages preceding the spinning frame.83 The scale of spindles thus served as 
the index of a cotton mill’s manufacturing capacity and, when aggregated, a nation’s capability 
in cotton spinning.84 
 
Figure 1.4 Spindles and Full Bobbins on a Spinning Frame.  
On display at Nantong Textile Museum.85 
 
An equally important factor to consider when drafting a machine list was the types of 
yarn to be manufactured.86 Raw cotton went through a number of processes to be spun into a 
                                                 
83 Whitin Machine Works Records Vol. AC-3 (Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School), 
341-49. 
 
84 See, for instance, Yang Sih-Zung’s account of the scale of the Chinese cotton industry in his article. He wrote: 
“The number of cotton spindles in China now totals about 1,300,000.” Sih-Zung Yang, "Textile Industry in China in 
1917," Textile World 53, no. 32 (1918): 3696.  
 
85 Nantong Textile Museum 南通纺织博物馆 has a collection of actual textile machines from Dasheng Cotton 
Mills. The spinning machine in this photo was manufactured in 1921 by Howard & Bullough Ltd., a British textile 
machine manufacturer. Most machines on display are British products, except for a Toyota power loom from Japan 
and a bale breaker from the United States. Photography by the author.  
 
86 International Library of Technology, Cotton, Pickers, Cotton Cards, Drawing Rolls, Railway Heads and Drawing 




long thread, which varied depending on the coarseness or fineness of the end product. A 
minimum of ten different machines was expected for coarse types and fifteen for fine ones; the 
spinning frame and spindles were used only when the processed cotton reached the final stage.87 
The coarseness of the yarn was defined by what was commonly called “the counts of yarn,” a 
numerical expression of cotton yarn’s density. Still in use today, the counts are determined by 
the number of hanks required to weigh one pound, with each hank containing 840 yards of cotton 
yarn.88 For instance, 10s yarn would need 10 hanks, or 8,400 yards, to weigh one pound; 40s 
yarn would contain 40 hanks, or 33,600 yards, in one pound. The higher the number, the finer the 
cotton yarn. Yarn below 30s was generally considered coarse, from 30s to 60s medium, and 
above 60s fine.89 Most machine orders from Chinese mills were for coarse grades. 
In 1921, when Dasheng decided to build new branch mills with a combined capacity of 
25,000 spindles, they ventured into business with Whitin and its agent company Gaston.90 
Intended for the production of yarn ranging from 12s, 14s, 16s, and 18s to 20s, the list of 
machines prepared by Whitin (Table 1.2) displays the basic set of machinery for the manufacture 
of coarse-grade yarn in the 1920s. It was certainly not a comprehensive package because it did 
not include Whitin’s other ancillary machines that provided additional labor-saving benefits. The 
                                                 
87 Ibid., section 16, 2. This book, written as part of a series of textbooks for people engaged in engineering 
professions, is a good introduction to the manufacturing process of cotton yarn in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.  
 
88 There are many other ways to measure the density of fibers, yarns, and cloth. The thread-count system (also called 
threads-per-inch) is one of the most well-known, especially in the bed-sheet market (i.e., 400 counts Egyptian cotton 
bedding). However, this is a measure of fabric quality, not of yarn, and the calculation method is entirely different 
from that of “the counts of yarn” discussed in this chapter.  
 
89 International Library of Technology, Cotton, section 16, 3-4. 
 
90 The transaction thus generated two sets of contracts: one between Whitin (machine seller) and Gaston (broker), 
another between Gaston (broker) and Dasheng (machine buyer). Employees from the three firms worked together 
from the phase of drafting specifications, but Dasheng and Whitin possibly did not have access to each other’s 




list, for instance, could have included automatic distributors, which automatically charged the 
hoppers of automatic feeders. Dasheng possibly judged that such a function was unnecessary 
because the work could be done manually with cheap labor. Likewise, it did not include 
automatic cleaning trunks, a machine for removing impurities from the cotton in its passage from 
the opener to the breaker lapper.91  
Table 1.2 List of Whitin Machines for Dasheng Cotton Mills92 
Department Machines Quantity 
Picker Room Bale Breaker 1 
Automatic Feeders (with 30" Buckley Opener Section 
with Evener Motion) 
3 
Creighton Openers 3 
Breaker Lappers (with Screen Section) 3 
Intermediate Lappers 3 
Finish Lappers 3 
Willow  1 
Roving Waste Opener  1 
Card Room Revolving Top Flat Cards 94 
Drawing Frames 54 
 Deliveries (6 deliveries per frame) 324  
Slubbers 14 
 Slubber Spindles (76 spindles per frame) 1,064 
Intermediates 18 
 Intermediate Spindles (126 spindles per frame) 2,268 
Roving Frames 33 
 Roving Spindles (168 spindles per frame) 5,544 
Spinning Room Spinning Frames 72 
 Spinning Spindles (348 spindles per frame) 25,056 
                                                 
91 Both automatic distributors and automatic cleaning trunks were advertised in Whitin’s catalog published in 1921. 
Whitin Machine Works, Illustrated Catalog of Textile Machinery Made by Whitin Machine Works (Whitin Machine 
Works, 1921), 10, 12.  
 
92 This table is drawn based on a proposal submitted by Whitin to Dasheng via Gaston on December 27, 1921. The 
table includes major textile machines only; the long list of accessories is excluded. A comparison of this proposal 
with the actual contract made between Gaston and Dasheng reveals some discrepancies because specifications were 
continually modified. The final value of the contract between Whitin and Gaston came to USD 711,998.05, and for 
Gaston and Dasheng USD 998,315. The difference comprised Gaston’s commission, trans-Pacific shipping costs, 
accessories supplied from their own stock, etc. Whitin’s proposal is from Whitin Machine Works Records, Vol. AC-
3, 341-49. For the contract between Dasheng and Gaston, see Nantong shi dang'anguan and Zhangjian yanjiu 




Dasheng instead added a willow and a roving waste opener (italicized in Table 1.2), both 
of which were responsible for opening and cleaning cotton waste generated at various stages of 
processing raw cotton. The willow was advertised in Whitin’s 1921 catalog, but only in a 
separate section entitled “Machines for Cotton Waste, Wool, Asbestos, etc.,” which came after 
the introduction of a full line of the firm’s staple products;93 the roving waste opener was not 
even included. These two machines presumably were not an essential part of the machine 
package for a spinning mill, as we can see from their marginal placement in the catalog. Why, 
then, did Dasheng decide to order them? Cotton waste, although reusable, was not suitable for 
making fine yarn, since the fiber was damaged while going through the violent machines and, 
after all, what was left out as “waste” had shorter lint than those successfully spun into yarn. For 
the purpose of coarse types, however, the waste had its own place; after passing through 
machines designed for transforming the waste back to the state of original raw cotton, it could 
rejoin the production line, although the quality would have been slightly compromised.94  
The inclusion of these machines indicates the kind of mill Dasheng was to build. The mill 
would utilize every available cotton fiber in the factory building, even if that meant minor 
deterioration in yarn quality. It is no wonder that the mill administration punished a worker who 
hid a wad of cotton in his shoes to keep his feet warm in wintertime.95 The package was 
perfectly tailored to meet the company’s need to economize on raw materials and, given that 
their first two mills were built with used machines, their preference of cost effectiveness over 
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94 See this Youtube video to see how a roving waste opener works: https://youtu.be/8ZzHxcm02HY. Accessed on 
May 13, 2020. 
 
95 Xuan  Mu and Xuexi  Yan, Dasheng shachang gongren shenghuo de diaocha, 1899-1949 大生纱厂工人生活的
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quality was consistent. By contrast, mills aiming at finer yarn with higher quality would not want 
to reuse cotton waste; hence, no need for the willow or the roving waste opener. Their list instead 
would include the sliver lap machine, ribbon lap machine, and the combing machine for 
additional treatments of cotton between the processes of carding and drawing, thus achieving 
finer quality. The machines were all fabricated by the same manufacturer, but their assemblage 
was eventually made by individual clients who wished to build the one and only mill that would 
best suit the firm’s financial, material, and technological conditions.   
Once a list was drafted, the purchasing company was asked to provide technical 
specifications for each machine. Whitin’s long questionnaire for the fabrication of the drawing 
frame, a machine for aligning cotton fibers in parallel, clearly shows how each machine was 
custom-made: 
How many Drawing Frames? 
How many Heads in each Frame? 
How many Deliveries per Head? 
Total number of Deliveries? 
Weight of Sliver at Back? 
How many Doublings into One? 
Draft? 
Diameter of Coiler Can? 
Interlocking Metallic or Loose End Leather Covered Top Rolls? 
Diameter of Bottom Front Roll? 
Dia. And Face of Driving Pulleys on end of Bottom Shaft? 
Are above Driving Pulleys to be Single or Tight and Loose? 
Which hand are Frames to belt when facing Coilers? 
Length of Cotton to be used? 
Is Back Lifting Roll to be furnished? 
Are Ermen Clearers to be furnished? 
Is Traverse Motion to be furnished? 
Are Hank Clocks to be furnished? 
Is Yardage Stop Motion wanted?96 
 
                                                 
96 Whitin Machine Works, Whitin Cotton Card-Room Machinery (Whitinsville: Whitin machine works, 1925), 115. 
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The overall structure of the frames, of course, would remain unchanged; each frame 
would consist of heads and deliveries, equipped with rolls and other optional machine parts. 
Within these basic rules, however, the manufacturer granted considerable flexibility to the user. 
By asking its client mills to specify the number, the size, and the preferred type of each machine 
part, the manufacturer involved them in the design process. Given that specifications were 
provided not only for the drawing frame but for all other machines comprising the production 
line of a cotton mill, it was possible for the clients to participate in the planning of the entire 
factory with detailed ideas for machines required at each stage.  
The above questionnaire was intended only for the fabrication of drawing frames; there 
were a dozen more machines for which specifications had to be prepared. Full of technical terms, 
the content of the questions makes it clear that one needed to have a good understanding of the 
machine to be able to order it. Customization, for this reason, could be a two-edged sword for 
buyers; while it allowed them a great degree of flexibility, it put them in a position to make small 
and large decisions regarding the selection and arrangement of each machine part, a task that 
required a comprehensive knowledge of the product almost equal to that of the manufacturer. 
Why does the length of cotton matter in designing the drawing frame? How would the diameter 
of the bottom front roll affect the quality of the output? What are the Ermen Clearer and the Back 
Lifting Roll for? Without understanding specific functions of these parts, the purchasing mill 
would not be able to complete the questionnaire for specifications.  
The client was not alone in this challenging work, since, as discussed earlier, the business 
was brokered by agent companies versed in both American textile machinery and Chinese 
business culture. For instance, Dasheng continually relied on Yang Sih-Zung, Gaston’s Chinese 
engineer educated in the United States, for technical advice in the course of ordering and 
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installing Whitin machinery. Whitin also sent its own engineers to China, who not only 
supervised the installation of their machines, but also offered technical advice at the stage of 
drafting contracts. In addition to aforementioned Whittaker, who had been already working in 
China for years, Whitin dispatched another engineer Frederick Randolph Pratt especially for the 
Dasheng project. If a certain specification did not seem technologically feasible, the headquarters 
relied upon these engineers to give advice, although, as I will discuss in Chapter 3, their advice 
was not always correct. Drafted in this way, specifications were finalized in the form of a 
proposal, which was effectively a codification of technological agreements made between the 
seller and the buyer after going through numerous exchanges of letters and cables. 
As for the drawing frame, Whitin’s proposal for Dasheng specified 54 frames, each 
consisting of one head and six deliveries (Figure 1.5).97 Dasheng opted for leather rollers instead 
of metallic rollers, which were touted as yielding greater output but incurred extra charges. The 
Back Lifting Roller had been included since it was advised for especially short cotton fiber that 
was more prone to breakage. Given the mill’s great reliance on Chinese cotton, the Roller was a 
necessity rather than an option. The Ermen Clearer had also been included to ensure better and 
cleaner work.98 Portions of machines for the first 15,000 spindles were shipped to China in 
November 1921via a Japanese steamer by the name of Meiyo Maru.99 Some additional 
adjustments were made after their arrival in the Dasheng factory, and the drawing frames were 
                                                 
97 The figures are from an updated proposal prepared as of December 27, 1921. An earlier version was drafted in 
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98 For descriptions of each machine part, I draw upon Whitin’s 1920 catalog, Whitin Machine Works, Illustrated 
and Descriptive Catalog of Whitin Cotton Card-Room Machinery and Handbook of Useful Information for 
Overseers and Operatives (Whitinsville: Whitin Machine Works, 1920), 124-31. 
 




eventually assembled to have three heads per frame in lieu of the original one head per frame 
(for images of drawing frames and parts, see Figure 1.6).100 101 
 
 
Figure 1.5 Breakdowns of Manufacturing Costs for Drawing Frames  
(44 frames plus 10, totaling 54 frames)102 
 
                                                 
100 The contract made between Dasheng and Gaston specifies three heads per frame, not the one head per frame in 
Whitin’s proposal. Specifications were continually modified.  
 
101 The reason for this change is unknown, but Dasheng possibly wished to economize on the factory space by 
putting each three heads together instead of having them separately. Despite being a last-minute request, it was 
accepted by the manufacturer because the job could be done at the stage of assembly and did not incur extra charges.  
 
102 Whitin Machine Works Records, Vol. AC-3, 344. Due to some minor changes regarding unit costs, two separate 
sets of breakdowns are provided in this updated version of proposal. The nine-page proposal covers specifications 






Figure 1.6 Drawing Frames and Parts. Front view of Whitin drawing frame, back view of 
Whitin drawing frame, and back view of Hetherington frame (from top to bottom).103  
                                                 
103 The images of the Whitin drawing frame are from Whitin Machine Works, Whitin Cotton Card-Room Machinery 
(1920), 122-23. Text and arrows have been inserted by the author. The drawing frame at the bottom, now on display 
in Nantong Textile Museum, was supplied in 1921 for Dasheng’s other mill, by the British firm John Hetherington 
& Sons. The order had been made much earlier, but the delivery was delayed due to World War I. Photography by 
the author. The museum collection does not include any machines from Whitin.  
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Specifications did not always guarantee normal operation of the actual machine on the 
shop floor, although they were finalized after careful consideration of local conditions. It was not 
uncommon to see failures of American machines in Chinese mills, even when made exactly to 
the specifications called for by the mills. In such cases, specifications, as part of the contract that 
carried legal binding force, were likely to put the Chinese mill in a vulnerable position while 
permitting the American manufacturer legal means to evade responsibility, especially when they 
had to debate who was responsible for the malfunctioning machines. When Whitin received a 
letter from one of their engineers regarding the problem of top rollers supplied to a couple of 
Chinese mills, the headquarters emphasized that the rollers were “really specified by them on the 
specifications,” although they were willing to address the issue and assume the entire cost in case 
it turned out to be a manufacturing defect.104  
The details of specifications were thus prone to neutralizing the initial purpose of 
enhancing flexibility, by rigidly defining the size, number, and type of every single part of the 
machines. Intended to incorporate as diverse local circumstances as possible into the design of 
the machines, the meticulously prepared documents now constituting the contract did not allow 
for addressing unexpected technical issues that arose in the course of installation and operation 
after signing the contract. Chinese mills were particularly vulnerable to this issue because neither 
Chinese factories nor American manufacturers had enough empirical data that they could refer to 
when drafting specifications. The short Chinese cotton was particularly responsible for the 
numerous additional modifications made to American machines. Even if the client mill provided 
information on the precise length of the cotton to be processed, it was hard to fabricate a machine 
that perfectly suited the qualities of local cotton varieties in the absence of abundant engineering 
                                                 
 
104 Whitin Machine Works Records, Vol. AC-1, 881.  
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data obtained from years-long experience and experimentation with the given cotton types. 
When machines made exactly to specifications failed to process the local cotton, whose fault was 
it? Would the contract exonerate the manufacturer from any charges, since the machines were in 
any case fabricated to the specifications of the client mill? 
 Despite the frequent failures of American machines in Chinese mills, legal cases were 
uncommon. A close reading of the contract between Dasheng and Gaston allows us insight into 
how Dasheng attempted to protect itself from possible limits of the specifications. The contract 
was concise, with terms specifying shipment, price, payment, insurance, guarantee, and set-up, 
followed by the list of machines to be furnished. Among these, two clauses addressing 
technological aspects are noteworthy:   
Guarantee 
[Both parties] agree that the seller must guarantee their machines are able to use Chinese 
cotton to spin yarn of 12s, 14s, 16s, 18s, and 20s of superior quality; 16s on average. 
Installation 
[Both parties] agree that the seller dispatches foreign technicians to go to the Chinese 
factories and handle installation. Heavy workers, assistant machinists, and so forth will 
be generally hired by the buyer.105 
 
The guarantee clause, written in a simple one sentence, is in fact inclusive of all the details laid 
out in the specifications. This becomes clear if we think about why the meticulous information 
on the numbers, sizes, and types of machine parts mattered; only through a careful arrangement 
of these elements was the cotton mill able to achieve its goal, which was to have machines that 
would “spin yarn of 12s, 14s, 16s, 18s, and 20s of superior quality” using “Chinese cotton.” By 
adding a clause that asks to guarantee successful fulfillment of this goal, rather than repeating the 
specifics of achieving it, Dasheng safely avoided the possible trap of details of specifications. 
For the same reason, perhaps, they wished to keep the wording of “superior quality” as abstract 
                                                 
105 Nantong shi dang’anguan and Zhang Jian yanjiu zhongxin, Dasheng dang'an ziliao: fangzhi bian III, 455.  
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as possible, since by doing so they could retain space for bargaining in the prolonged process of 
modifying the machines, until the machines, once successfully fabricated, shipped, and installed 
by the manufacturer, would begin to produce yarn to their satisfaction. Whitin remained 
cooperative in most cases, even when Dasheng unexpectedly cancelled the order of 10,000 
spindles out of the initial 25,000. They believed, as a latecomer, establishing a good reputation 
through customized service was crucial to their success in the Chinese market. 
1.4 Post-War Depression, 1923-1937 
The wartime boom abruptly ended in 1923, when the Chinese cotton industry entered a 
decade-long depression. Although the industry gradually recovered, beginning in 1932, it was 
soon hampered by the outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Numerous cotton 
mills located on the east coast of China, including Dasheng of Nantong, fell into the hands of the 
Japanese army, and this disruption continued until the end of the war in 1945. Economic 
historians as well as contemporary economists have pointed to three factors that contributed to 
this havoc: post-war depression, financial practices unique to Chinese businessmen, and China’s 
unstable political circumstances.  
By the time British machines arrived after years-long delays, the exchange rate was no 
longer favorable to the Chinese buyers, rendering the unpaid balance of machinery costs much 
higher than the original calculation.106 Moreover, the overexpansion of manufacturing capacity 
in Asian countries in the past few years, combined with the recovery of European cotton mills, 
caused prices of raw cotton to skyrocket and values of cotton yarn to plummet. The wartime 
boom was thus followed by a worldwide depression in the cotton industry. In an effort to remedy 
these bleak market conditions, the Chinese Cotton Mill-Owners Association urged its member 
                                                 




mills to curtail their output by one fourth and yet another fifty percent three months later, but 
these measures made no significant impact.107  
Inefficient mills did not survive this hardship. The most stunning case was Dasheng, 
once one of the most successful enterprises in Republican China. On the brink of insolvency, it 
was put under control of a banking consortium in 1924 until 1937, when management fell into 
the hands of Japanese.108 The auditors’ 1924 report identified overextension, especially the 
acquisition of Whitin machinery for the establishment of its No. 8 mill in 1921 and 1922, as one 
reason for the company’s negative performance.109 The crisis was due in part to bad planning, 
since when the company was planning additional branch mills, its No. 1 Mill was already facing 
liquidity problems. To make things worse, natural disasters devastated cotton cultivation in 
coastal Jiangsu in 1921, including that of Dasheng’s own land-reclamation companies. Having 
lost a steady supply of raw cotton from their affiliated companies, they had to rely on more 
expensive outside sources, which exacerbated already precarious financial conditions. 110 
While acknowledging the significance of external economic factors such as rising cotton 
values, falling yarn prices, and increasing foreign competition, all induced by the excessive 
boom during and immediately after the war, Elisabeth Köll contends that Dasheng’s imminent 
bankruptcy was mainly caused by the management’s inappropriate business and accounting 
practices. They made extensive investment in the branch mills with total lack of returns. Private 
funds were transferred to Zhang Jian, the founder of the company, through his personal or family 
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accounts. Liberal transfers of funds between affiliated companies were authorized by him and 
institutionalized through the company’s peculiar accounting system.111 Additionally, Köll points 
out, their annual depreciation reserves (zhejiufei, 折旧费), funds for making up for the loss of 
values of equipment and fixed assets, fell far short of the standard five percent.112  
Köll’s somewhat Eurocentric account of Dasheng’s “pre-modern” accounting practice 
requires careful appraisal. Although keeping depreciation reserves is the norm for today’s cost 
accounting, its history is relatively short. Moreover, when the Western accounting system began 
to be introduced to China at the turn of the twentieth century, many Chinese businessmen still 
adhered to indigenous accounting practices, because, as Robert Gardella has argued, the old 
system continued to serve as a pragmatic basis for business rationalization.113 Despite that, there 
is no denying that depreciation reserves could have helped Dasheng to better assess the status of 
its fixed assets and thereby update its old equipment in a timely fashion. Without proper funds, 
as I will discuss in Chapter 4, Dasheng was not able to replace worn-out machinery after thirty 
years of use. Perhaps the majority of Chinese mills that started operation in the 1890s and 1900s 
without adequate depreciation reserves were confronted by the same issue in the 1920s and 
1930s, which inevitably led to lower productivity. 
Gang Zhao, in common with Köll, points out the “irrational” financial planning of 
Chinse businessmen as the fundamental cause of the decade-long recession. While 
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acknowledging the gravity of undercapitalization,114 he argues that it was a result of the Chinese 
businessmen’s tendency to overuse capital rather than a natural consequence of capital 
scarcity.115 For instance, they tended to purchase machinery on a large scale, exceeding what 
their paid-up capital could afford, which led to a heavy reliance on borrowing.116 Whenever they 
made a profit, they distributed the funds as dividends or purchased new equipment to further 
expand manufacturing capacity.117 Despite heavy interest burdens, they had “no intention of 
reducing their indebtedness,” which, Zhao states, was “the fundamental mentality of Chinese 
industrialists in general, so far as financial management was concerned.”118 Many of them, like 
Dasheng, failed to set aside a five-percent annual depreciation allowance on their equipment and 
fixed assets.119 
Zhao’s argument for the “irrationality” of Chinese business practices is subject to 
validation, yet his argument raises an interesting point in that it describes the Chinese 
industrialists as speculative rather than conservative. As I will discuss in Chapter 2, not a few 
American businessmen complained about the Chinese people’s conservatism as barriers to their 
penetration into the Chinese market.  
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Finally, China’s political conditions played an important role. In his 1932 analysis of the 
Chinese cotton industry and trade, H. D. Fong, a professor in economics at Nankai Institute of 
Economics, identified China’s unstable political circumstances under warlordism as the main 
cause of the nationwide depression in the 1920s. The recurring civil wars gave rise to an increase 
in taxes, a decrease in raw cotton supply, uncertainty of transport, reduction in market size, and 
high rates of interest, all of which had a negative impact on the development of the cotton 
manufacturing industry.120 
H. D. Fong’s reference to the absence of a strong government makes a contrast with the 
negative attitude of Chinese businessmen toward the guandu shangban from decades ago. They 
were reluctant to engage in government-sponsored projects for fear of excessive state 
interference, but state intervention did not always have an adverse effect on the private sector. 
Implemented in the forms of infrastructure maintenance, consistent taxation, generous subsidies, 
or knowledge production, their mediation or support could be critical to the development of an 
industry.121 The Chinese industrialists were handicapped in this regard vis-à-vis their foreign 
competitors who were backed up by a strong central government.  
The recession in China and the consequent decrease in demand for spinning machines 
had a direct impact on the American textile machine industry. Encouraged by the pouring orders 
from China and East Asia, Whitin began to build their sixth machine shop in 1920. However, the 
construction was delayed, and by the time of completion the need had passed.122 The newly 
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added manufacturing facilities would have inflicted significant financial losses on the company, 
had the emerging New England tire industry not absorbed the surplus manufacturing capacity 
with its increasing reliance on cotton yarn as reinforcing material.123 Whitin’s agent firm Gaston 
could not avoid the blow, either. It went into receivership and was finally dissolved. Gaston’s 
textile machine business was eventually salvaged by Elbrook & Company, Whitin’s new agent 
firm.124 The situation was no different for Saco-Lowell Shops. The shipment of their spindles to 
China plummeted from $ 2,628,000 in 1922 to $126,000 in 1923. Their agent company Andersen 
barely survived the crisis only after being relieved of its financial difficulties by Saco-Lowell 
Shops and the General Electric Company.125 
Had WWI not broken out, Thomas Navin argues, the prolonged depression of the 
American textile machine industry could have started much earlier in 1913-14, rather than the 
generally acknowledged 1923.126 The era of the full-mill order was over in the domestic market 
by 1913, and the Southern mill fever had almost subsided by the time Whitin made inroads into 
China. Orders were still coming, but many of them were for the replacement of existing 
machinery rather than the establishment of new mills.127 Navin presumes that 1909 and 1910, 
when the Southern business reached its peak, were possibly the busiest years in the history of the 
American textile machinery business. There came two more boom periods, one of which was 
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1916-1917, the period between the outbreak of WWI and the United States’ declaration of war; 
the other came in 1920-1921, when orders from East Asia flooded in while British competitors 
were still recovering from the war. Yet in terms of size of sales, drawn from Whitin’s business 
data, the last two fell slightly behind that of 1909-1910. Navin argues that the prosperous years 
of 1915-22 were “abnormal and hectically prosperous years of a war-disrupted economy rather 
than as the brilliant culmination of the industry’s youthful growth and vigor.”128 
The abrupt end to the war-induced prosperity in 1923 validates Navin’s claim, but none 
of the American businessmen of the time foresaw such a sudden end of the boom. Their 
expectancy was not groundless, since all the governmental statistics and industrial reports 
presented a positive outlook for the Chinese market. The U.S. government expressed particularly 
high hopes for the Chinese market, especially in manufacturing: 
No matter in what direction one may turn in China, he will find opportunities for 
industrial development; and modern education is opening the eyes of the people to the 
possibilities in modern industry. With the enormous natural resources that the country 
possesses, with its great wealth in industries and cheap labor, and with an enormous 
home market as well as densely populated continuous territories, China offers probably 
better opportunities for industrial development and for the investment of capital in 
manufacturing than does any other country on the face of the earth. The demands for 
machinery of all kinds during the next few decades will be enormous. One of the 
advantages is that the Chinese have practically no old machinery to scrap.129  
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129 United States Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Commercial Handbook of China (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1919-20), 327. Their view was culturally imperialistic. See below, for example: “In a 
word, China needs foreign assistance in the development of its latent resources in men and materials. From this 
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than competition, with a vision for the future, as the day will come when the Pacific will be the world’s great arena 
of trade and commerce, and that trade will only be worthwhile and a blessing if built upon a foundation of friendship 




China’s industrialization in the textile industry could have conflicting consequences for 
the United States. Whereas textile machine manufacturers would benefit from it, spinning and 
weaving mills could be hit severely by China’s import substitution in the sector of cotton yarn 
and cloth. Nonetheless, the Americans believed that import substitution in China would have a 
marginal impact on their cotton goods export, since industrial development would be always 
accompanied by incremental demand for yarn and cloth, which, in their view, the Chinese 
domestic industry would never be able to satisfy. With “a population of 400,000,000,”130 they 
expected, even a slight increase in the people’s purchasing power could create enormous market 
opportunities.131  
Yang Sih-Zung, Gaston’s Chinese engineer educated in the United States, also made a 
similar claim in one of his articles on the Chinese textile industry: “Considering that China has 
four times the population of the United States but with only 8 per cent of its spindlage, it would 
appear that the increase of spindles at the above rate could go on for a century without saturating 
the country with cotton mills.” Yang’s calculation was not entirely wrong. According to H. D. 
Fong’s statistical data, China indeed had a low number of spindles per population compared to 
other industrializing countries.132 Yang hastened to add that the prospect hinged on several 
                                                 
130 The 400,000,000 did not necessarily refer to China’s actual population at that time. It was rather used as a 
symbolic figure representing the country’s enormous size and great potential as a market. It was widely cited by 
business-minded Americans. See, for example, a memoir written by an American marketing expert, Carl Crow, 
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132 Ibid., 309-12. While Great Britain had 1,199 spindles per 1,000 population as of 1931, China had only 9 spindles, 
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external factors such as competition with other yarn-producing countries, China’s political and 
economic conditions, and the often fluctuating currency exchange rates, all of which turned out 
to be contributing factors to the depression. Yet he did not take these lurking instabilities defined 
by himself seriously. Perhaps he did not feel the need to do so when almost all major economic 
indexes pointed to the bright future of the Chinese market. 
1.5 Conclusion 
The Chinese cotton industry’s conversion to American machinery during WWI was not 
due to its technological superiority over British machinery. In fact, American machinery was 
continually associated with “poor quatliy” in the Chinese market, as will be discussed in the 
following chapter. The shift was rather an outcome of the historical contingencies. WWI took a 
heavy toll on the manufacturing industry of Great Britain while stimulating rapid 
industrialization of cotton production in China. Confronted by a shortage of machinery when its 
demand was higher than ever, China was forced to turn to an alternative machine supplier. WWI 
thus opened up whole new possibilities for American machine builders when their domestic 
market was almost saturated. Excited by the potential of this new foreign market, the New 
England manufacturers strived to provide their Chinese clients with quality machines, 
customized to suit each cotton mill’s specific needs.  
The practice of customization naturally led the Chinese cotton mills to participate 
actively in the process of mechanization. The mill clients were invited to specify the number, the 
size, and the preferred type of each machine part for the whole machine package comprising a 
complete production line. The outcome was a custom-made factory that suited each company’s 
unique financial, technological, and material conditions. The factory did not come to China as a 
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ready-made import; it was a craftwork, locally made on the basis of the global circulation of 
machinery, technology, and experts.    
The customization of spinning machinery was collaborative work. Beginning at the stage 
of drafting specifications, Whitin’s engineers worked closely with the engineering staff of their 
agent company Gaston as well as their Chinese mill client Dasheng. They also communicated 
small and large technical issues to their headquarters in New England so that the machines could 
be modified while being fabricated in their machine shop. It was through this back-and-forth 
process, rather than a unidirectional movement of machinery and technology from the maker to 
the user and from the West to the East, that the factory system was made in China. Everyone 
weighed in with their own views on specific technical issues, but they did not see eye to eye on 
every detail. Disharmony among these people was not uncommon, and the rift deepened as 





 Malfunction: The “Problem” of American Machinery  
 
Through the circulation of machinery and knowledge across the Pacific, both the Chinese 
and Americans involved in the textile industry began to view each other in a way that was 
distinct from contemporary political discourses on the two countries’ foreign relations. Never 
officially colonized by a single imperial power but still in a colonial state, politically in the form 
of extraterritoriality and culturally through such ideas as social Darwinism, China’s relations 
with the West at the turn of the twentieth century have been largely defined by the concept of 
semi-colonialism.133 With varying degrees, semi-colonialism postulates the West as a hegemonic 
entity with exclusive power and authority over knowledge.134 As this chapter will show, 
however, numerous technical experts in the textile industry, based in multiple locales across the 
Pacific, appropriated knowledge and negotiated power for their own purposes, challenging the 
assumed dynamics between China and the United States. As they circulated knowledge about the 
Chinese market, its cotton varieties, and spinning technologies suitable to the local 
circumstances, new types of foreign relations began to form beyond the conventional diplomatic 
realm.  
If China was a latecomer in the mechanization of cotton spinning, America was a second 
mover in China’s foreign machine trade. As a result, American machine firms had to make 
considerable efforts to overcome entry barriers built by British companies, who had literally set 
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standards for machine spinning in the global market. Moreover, their spinning machines did not 
process Chinese cotton as efficiently as British machines, since theirs had been developed in a 
way to suit American cotton, whose fiber length was longer than that of Chinese cotton. The 
negative perception of American machinery was compounded by its poor packaging, an outcome 
of the industry’s inexperience in trans-Pacific marine shipping. The Chinese continued to 
compare the performance of American products with that of British products, and the association 
between American machinery and “poor quality” persisted despite the advocates’ efforts to 
mitigate it. Amid all these challenges, Whitin’s headquarters located in New England often 
found themselves on the periphery of the business with limited access to up-to-date information 
about the Chinese market. 
The national hierarchy of the machine market complicates the binary foreign-domestic 
framework upheld by the studies of Chinese consumer culture. Frank Dikötter, for instance, has 
argued for the “two-tier economy,” under which ordinary people preferred domestic imitations 
with low prices while the rich purchased imported originals to show off their wealth and 
status.135 This logic, however, did not have a direct relevance to the sector of industrial 
equipment or technology-intensive products, where quality was the most important criterion for 
purchase. Also, unlike most consumer goods, industrial equipment did not have a robust market 
for domestic substitutes, although the Chinese eventually began to copy parts and accessories. 
Nor did the nationalistic mode of consumption, promoted by the National Products 
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Movement,136 apply to the acquisition of foreign machinery. Imported machines and 
technologies were essential to the development of native industries.  
The West did not exist as a unitary entity, at least in the machinery market. The generic 
term “imports” was incapable of capturing the dynamics of the machine trade, in which every 
foreign manufacturer had to vie for a market share. Being “Western” or “American” did not 
necessarily guarantee commercial success in China, nor the politics of knowledge operated in a 
way that subjugated China to the West. The only way to survive in this technology-intensive 
market was to provide high-quality machinery, detailed installation instruction, and prompt 
technical assistance to their Chinese clients.  
According to James Hevia, the Western imperialism in China was a “pedagogical 
project” to teach the Chinese how to behave in a world dominated by Western powers.137 
However, the pedagogy was multi-directional. In order to succeed in the Chinese market, the 
Americans also had to learn how to do business in China. Adopting a global approach, this 
chapter challenges the implicit notion of “imperial centers and colonial peripheries” underlying 
Hevia’s argument. The Whitin headquarters’ precarious position in this global machine trade 
belies the assumed power relations between the West and China, compelling us to question 
exactly who represented the local and who represented the global. The mechanization of cotton 
spinning was certainly a global phenomenon, but it did not result in only China’s globalization. 
While learning about the new market, curious cotton varieties, unfamiliar technologies suitable 
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to foreign circumstances, and appropriate packing methods for trans-Pacific shipping, the New 
England machine industry was likewise globalized.  
This chapter starts with an analysis of the vigorous knowledge production about the 
Chinese market both at the commercial and governmental levels in the United States. It 
highlights the role of U.S.-educated Chinese engineers as go-betweens for knowledge transfer. 
Despite the overflow of information, however, Whitin continued to complain about their lack of 
“true knowledge” of China that was not written into official documents. Drawing upon 
correspondence between their headquarters in New England and the engineers in Shanghai, the 
agent firm in New York, and cotton mill clients across China, the second part investigates 
Whitin’s desperate attempts to learn more about the Chinese market through unofficial channels 
such as gossip. What aggravated their precarious position was the persistent association of 
American products with “poor quality” in China. Whereas the Americans attributed this to 
Chinese “conservatism,” the Chinese had practical grounds for the suspicion: insufficient 
packaging and unfamiliar design. The final section examines these conflicting views on the 
“problem” of American machinery.  
2.1 Knowledge Production: Chinese Engineers as Go-Betweens 
As China emerged as a promising market, the American industrial circle responded with 
active knowledge production of the country in professional journals like Textile World. Since its 
first issue in 1888, Textile World had served as a crucial source of information for those who 
engaged in any sector of textile industry in the United States.138 From economic trends and 
government policies to development of new technologies and machinery, it covered a wide 
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variety of issues in the markets of cotton, wool, and silk, encompassing every stage of 
manufacture from raw materials to final goods. The main content of the journal, in addition to 
the numerous machine advertisements, confirms that the targeted audience was not individual 
consumers but manufacturers and wholesalers. With more than one hundred pages in each issue, 
it remained a weekly periodical until June 1932, when it changed to a monthly. The frequent 
publication in the preceding decades signifies the industry’s overall prosperity in those days, 
when interest in the Chinese market was also at its peak.   
Yang Sih-Zung, a U.S.-educated Chinese engineer who worked for Gaston, Whitin’s 
agent firm, was an occasional contributor to the journal. In February and March of 1921, he 
published two articles in quick succession: “China’s Americanized Knitting Industry: Its Rapid 
Development and Bright Future—American Machines and Supplies Preferred” and “Cotton 
Manufacturing Industry in China in 1920: American Machinery Overcame Prejudice and Gained 
Considerable Use in Chinese Mills—Spinning Handicapped by Importation of Yarns.”139 
Published in the full first page of the journal, they attested to the editorial office’s keen interest in 
the topic. The articles gave an overview of the economic conditions of the Chinese knitting and 
cotton industry respectively, drawing upon Chinese sources including statistics and photos of 
installed machines in Chinese factories. The article titles were also found in Bulletin of the 
Public Affairs Information Service and Industrial Arts Index, compilations of indexes to the 
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published literature on industry and business.140 Anyone who was interested in doing textile-
related business in China and was thus conducting research on its business potentials would have 
stumbled upon Yang’s articles. The same journal also published in 1922 a short bulletin 
announcing Yang’s departure for Shanghai as a manager of Elbrook & Company, Whitin’s new 
agent firm succeeding Gaston.141 Yang in this way established a solid foothold in the American 
machine industry as an expert on the Chinese textile market.  
U.S. knowledge production of the Chinese market received strong support from the 
American government. In 1920, the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce published an 
official primer for those interested in doing business in China, entitled Commercial Handbook of 
China.142 With continued popularity, a revised edition was published in 1926 with a new title: 
China: A Commercial and Industrial Handbook.143 In the letter of submittal, which replaced the 
usual preface, Director of the Bureau stated the purpose of the publication:  
It has been recognized as of first importance, then, that American merchants and 
manufactures should have at hand and in convenient form as comprehensive and recent 
information about China as could be compiled. This book is an earnest effort to supply 
that need…In each instance the information given is believed to be of real practical 
value, and it is the earnest hope of the Bureau that this handbook will afford to the 
exporters of the United States a background for their study of the basic trade 
potentialities of the important and ever-interesting Republic of China.144 
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The director concluded the letter emphasizing that as of 1926 China had become the second 
“best Asiatic customer” and one of the “foremost sources” of raw materials for the United 
States.145 They occupied only 6.04% of China’s foreign trade in 1913, but the number increased 
to 16.28% within a decade, following Japan’s 22.25%.146 
The 800-page long handbook covered literally everything to know about China: 
geography, history, import trade, export products, industrial development, taxation, 
infrastructure, currency, and commercial and economic information on major treaty port cities. 
Conducting such extensive market research was costly and time-consuming; therefore, it was a 
project that could be performed only at the state level. At the same time, however, its massive 
coverage served as its own weakness. Given that it took six years to publish a revised edition, it 
was impossible for the Bureau to provide the most recent information about China on a weekly 
or monthly basis.  
In terms of the scope of information, Yang’s articles by no means matched the official 
handbook. However, the strength of Yang’s articles and, by extension, of weekly or monthly 
periodicals was the speed of publication that enabled the authors to make a prompt report on 
urgent economic matters. Also, as opposed to a rather conservative approach of official 
documents that mostly focused on providing basic information and analyzing the past few years, 
the focus of Yang’s articles was more on offering business prospects. The two sources were 
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complementary in this sense, and only when the American businessmen read them together, were 
they able to make the best use of them.   
When the United States was vigorously learning about the Chinese market, China was 
also active in producing and circulating knowledge of its own industry. Beginning in the late 
1910s, China witnessed a surge of professional journals. Huashang shachang lianhehui jikan 
(China Cotton Journal, 华商纱厂联合会季刊), Fangzhi shibao (Textile Times, 纺织时报), and 
Fangzhi zhoukan (Textile Weekly, 纺织周刊) were some of the most popular ones. In these 
journals, the Chinese analyzed development of their textile industry, shared solutions to specific 
technical issues, and assessed all types of machines and technologies, both foreign and domestic. 
It was also through these journals that machines and machine parts were advertised. Unlike the 
United States, however, support from the central government was almost absent. Most efforts to 
produce knowledge were made in the private sector by interested industrialists and professional 
associations. 
As a native Chinese, Yang had access to all these Chinese sources. In his cotton article, 
for instance, he cited statistics published in Huashang shachang lianhehui jikan, which contained 
information on the ownership of major spinning mills in China and the number of spindles 
installed in each mill.147 This inside information, difficult to obtain in the United States, was 
particularly valuable to American manufacturers, since it allowed them to have a more concrete 
sense of the scale of the market, thereby developing appropriate marketing strategies. 
Information on the volume of exports from the United States to China was available through 
U.S. government statistics, but their final destinations in China after crossing the borders, such as 
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regional distribution of cotton mills or the average manufacturing capacity of each mill, was not 
easy to track down without relying on Chinese sources.  
With knowledge of the Chinese market and expertise in textile engineering, U.S.-
educated Chinese engineers like Yang were the most valuable human resources that the 
globalizing American machine industry was in need of. Born on January 9, 1892, Yang Sih-Zung 
(楊锡仁) attended an elementary school in Suzhou and then Nanyang Middle School in 
Shanghai.148 In 1910, when he was eighteen years old, he applied to enroll in the second batch of 
students to be sent to the United States on the Boxer Indemnity Scholarship, a scholarship 
program established by the Roosevelt administration with the excess of the Boxer Indemnity.149 
After passing the placement exam with the highest grade, he entered Worcester Polytechnic 
Institute in Massachusetts to study electrical engineering (Figure 2.1). He earned his B.S. in 1914 
and an M.S. in the same major from Columbia University in 1915, and then studied textile 
engineering at the Lowell Technological Institute.150 Having started his career as a manager of 
Gaston’s Shanghai office, Whitin’s agent company in China, he continued to engage in textile-
related business and education while traveling back and forth between China and the United 
States.151 A prolific writer who reported on the Chinese textile industry for an American 
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audience, he was an archetype of a new social class that embodied the global dimension of 
Chinese industrialization. 
  
Figure 2.1 Yang Sih-Zung and Cosmopolitan Group at WPI. Yang on the bottom, far right. 
Courtesy of WPI Archives & Special Collections, George C. Gordon Library.  
 
Yang’s decision to study electrical engineering, especially after getting first place in the 
placement exam, reflects the changing attitude toward the formal acquisition of practical learning 
in early twentieth-century China. Although the response of educational institutions to industrial 
development, mostly through the establishment of engineering departments, was not unique to 
China,152 the change had more complicated implications for Chinese society given its long 
tradition of the civil service examination that emphasized learning the classics. Following the 
abolition of the exam in 1905, which marked a watershed in China’s educational history, the 
Qing state began to put more emphasis on practical learning. Statistics show that engineering 
majors accounted for the biggest part among the students who studied in the United States 
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between 1909 and 1926.153 The change was initiated by the Qing court in 1908, when it started 
to control overseas students’ choice of study. According to a decree issued in the same year, 
students were required to major in subjects like engineering, agriculture, and natural sciences to 
be eligible for government scholarships. The same policy applied to the Boxer Indemnity 
Scholarship, by means of which a good number of brilliant Chinese students were sent to and 
educated in the United States to become engineers, agronomists, physicists, and 
mathematicians.154  
As they began to play a pivotal role in building a new China after returning home, the 
position of the United States in China’s foreign relations became increasingly important with its 
“soft power” having a far-reaching influence on China’s culture, education, and industry.155 As a 
strong advocate of American machinery and technology, Yang continued to represent American 
machine firms in the Chinese market against the skepticism about the performance of their 
products. His attachment to the United States also had an impact on his political orientation. 
Having stood on the side of the Kuomintang during the Chinese Civil War, Yang eventually 
relocated to Taiwan with the establishment of People’s Republic of China in 1949, along with 
many other recipients of the Scholarship (Figure 2.2).  
 
                                                 
153 Zhang Yufa, "Returned Chinese Students from America and the Chinese Leadership (1846-1949)," Chinese 
Studies in History 35, no. 3 (2002/04/01 2002): 52-86, http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/CSH0009-4633350352. 
 
154 At least 80 percent of the students had to major in engineering, agriculture, and mining. Ye, Seeking Modernity, 
53. 
 
155 “Soft power” refers to a country’s ability to persuade and attract others through its culture, political ideals, and 
policies. Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). The 
most well-known case is Hu Shih, a Chinese philosopher who was influential in the May Fourth Movement. After 
studying agriculture at Cornell University, he changed his major to philosophy, which he studied at Columbia 




Figure 2.2 The Reunion of Boxer Indemnity Scholarship Recipients in 1959. The photo 
was taken at Yang Sih-Zung’s home in Taipei. Students sent on the first two batches 
included some of the most influential figures in Republican China such as Hu Shih 
(back row, third from right), Chao Yuanren (back row, second from right), and Mei Yiqi 
(front row, center).156 
 
In addition to U.S.-educated engineers, an increasing number of graduates from domestic 
technical institutions and vocational schools began to work for global companies dealing in 
machinery and industrial equipment. Andersen, Meyer & Company, an American trading firm 
who represented Saco-Lowell Shops in China, highlighted in its yearbook that Chinese sales 
engineers were “one of the greatest assets of the company.”157 Connecting American machine 
manufacturers and their agent companies to cotton mills across China, they stood at the forefront 
of this transnational trade. 
Yang continued to work for Elbrook & Company until the outbreak of the Sino-
Japanese War in 1937. In 1931, after delivery and installment of Whitin machinery for a cotton 
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mill located in Urumqi, which took years to complete, Yang wrote a lengthy letter to the 
headquarters to report on the progress. Impressed by the unusual journey of their machines, 
Whitin decided to publish his letter into a booklet： 
A few months ago a letter came to Mr. Swift from the Whitin representative in China. It 
was an unusual letter. We showed it to a few friends with the comment that romance still 
lives in business—even in the textile machinery business. And because they agreed so 
completely that it was an unusual letter, we thought other Whitin friends would be 
interested in it. So here it is—just as it came to Mr. Swift. The accompanying map of 
China is simple, but accurate, and may be helpful in following the route described by our 
representative, Mr. Yang.158 
 
They entitled the booklet “Whitin Machinery Travels Marco Polo’s Trail,” possibly 
inspired by Yang’ reference to Marco Polo in describing the challenging delivery route from 
Beijing (Peking) to Urumqi (Tihwha): “No man has yet crossed over the trails from Tihwha to 
Peking or vice versa, faster than did Marco Polo.”159 This engaging title, however, somewhat 
romanticized Yang’s original account of western China. The years-long delivery was certainly an 
adventure, which always connotes romanticism to some degree, but Yang’s emphasis was more 
on the practical challenges he and the team encountered on the ground. There is no denying that 
his letter contained some elements of an epic tale, and most of all, Yang was a talented 
storyteller with a broad interest in current affairs, as we can see from his witty account of Sven 
Hedin: “Several world famous explorers, including Sven Hedin, simply gasped at the sight of a 
miniature cotton mill in Urumchi. Too bad these dinosaur hunters know and care no more about 
textile machinery than we do about their prehistoric pets; otherwise you would read the story of 
your mill up there in the National Geographic Magazine or the transactions of the Smithsonian 
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Institute.”160 Nonetheless, his letter still reads like a well-written business report that faithfully 
covers the history, geography, and the industry of Urumqi, a remote city located in the far 
northwest of China, with rich references to politics and other contemporary issues. Most of all, 
none of the logistical difficulties were described as “romantic” in his original letter. It was rather 
the Whitin headquarters that conjured up an image of mysterious western China after reading 
Yang’s letter, stating with excitement that “romance still lives in business.”  
The cover page image of the booklet shown in Figure 2.3 is a visualization of Whitin’s 
romanticized view of western China. At first glance it is a visual reconstruction of Yang’s textual 
description of the shipment: “The first shipment of Whitin machinery (Shanghai stock) was 
transported by rail to Suiyuen, thence reloaded on 200 camels (not over 180 lbs on each side of 
each camel), forming a strange looking caravan that made a record crossing of the Mongolian 
desert—5-1/2 months.”161 Yet, layers of nuanced meanings, which Yang’s original passage did 
not convey, were added to this image in the course of editing. By positioning the caravans 
against the backdrop of the Great Wall gradually fading into snow-covered mountains, the editor 
presented them as heading toward some exotic and mysterious place. As the leader’s triumphant 
posture implies, they would eventually “conquer” the place, since they were equipped with 
machines and rifles, the symbols of their “advanced” technology and “superior” civilization. The 
image in this way effectively encapsulated the West’s stereotypical view of the East as exotic, 
primitive, and inferior, which Edward Said would define decades later as “Orientalism.”162  
 
                                                 








Figure 2.3 “Whitin Machinery Travels Marco Polo’s Trails.”  
Written by Yang Sih-Zung, edited and published by Whitin Machine Works. 
 
Urumqi was by no means representative of China as a whole. The remote city located in 
Xinjiang beyond the Great Wall probably had nothing in common with Shanghai and other treaty 
port cities, except that now it too had a cotton mill. By the same token, Whitin’s view of Urumqi 
was one of their many attitudes toward China. Their romanticized view of western China had to 
be adjusted accordingly when dealing with the shrewd businessmen on the east coast. The 
Chinese market remained “mysterious” in the sense that Whitin continued to have difficulty in 
obtaining the most up-to-date information about it, but there was no room for romanticism in a 
business world where everyone had to vie for a share. 
As a go-between, Yang never stopped transmitting knowledge of China to his American 
colleagues, teaching them how to do business in China. But as discussed in Chapter 1, even he 
failed to foresee the imminent depression that swept through both the Chinese cotton industry 
and the American machine business, although he was alert to the political and economic 
instabilities lurking in China. The field was overflowing with experts, but their knowledge, 
whether commercial or technological, was not always reliable. Official knowledge had its 
limitations, especially when competition to obtain new orders became increasingly fierce. 
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2.2 “Too Far Away”: The Unknowable Market and Unofficial Knowledge 
Six months after the signing of the agreement with Gaston, Whitin dispatched Edward 
G. Whittaker, an employee of the company’s experimental department, to China (Figure 2.4).163 
Having his office in Gaston’s Shanghai branch, Whittaker worked in close association with 
Gaston’s engineering staff, helping them with the installment of Whitin machinery in Chinese 
cotton mills. Whittaker’s residence was a double-edged sword for Gaston. While his expertise 
was of great help to their engineering team, it was no longer possible for them to conceal the 
information of their Chinese clients, which they were reluctant to reveal in fear of Whitin 
becoming familiar with the Chinese market. The fear crystallized into a reality. Although Whitin 
continued to take correspondence with Gaston’s headquarters in New York to take care of daily 
business and to be updated on the situation in China, the most sensitive information about the 
Chinese buyers as well as their own agent company came from Whittaker and his future 
successors to be stationed in Shanghai.  
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Figure 2.4 Management of Huaxin Cotton Mills and Edward G. Whittaker.164 
 Whittaker worked in collaboration with the Gaston people, but their relationship was 
not in good shape, ultimately deteriorating to a point where they refused to interact with each 
other. When the Whitin headquarters received an urgent cable from the Shanghai office asking to 
advise Whittaker that machinery for a Chinese mill was ready for set-up, they were perplexed.165 
Why would the two parties try to communicate via the Whitin headquarters located in New 
England when they were sharing the same office in Shanghai? Coaxing Whittaker into building a 
peaceful relationship with Gaston, the headquarters outwardly expressed in their pages-long 
letter that they had “a great deal of confidence” in his ability to handle the situation while 
acknowledging the exceptional level of “finesse and diplomacy” that the job involved.166  
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At the same time, however, they had possibly begun to question Whittaker’s credibility 
as well as capability. In addition to the strained relationship with Gaston, the headquarters 
learned through a different channel that he was advertising Whitin products under his own name, 
which was an obvious violation of their contract with Gaston.167 Their business in Shanghai 
seemed to be operating under disturbing circumstances, but they no longer interrogated 
Whittaker because, as they wrote to him, they were “too far away to pass judgment on it.”168 
In April 1920, four years after their dispatch of Whittaker to China, the Whitin 
headquarters decided to send one more employee, Philip J. Reilly, as an assistant to Whittaker. 
Whittaker objected to the idea on the grounds that there was no need for additional manpower,169 
although it is doubtful if that was the actual reason for his disapproval. According to the 
headquarters’ letter to him, the “real object” of sending Reilly over to China was to “form the 
nucleus of an organization” in preparation for the future after termination of their partnership 
with Gaston. They had contemplated handling the business themselves or finding another agent 
company, and in either case, they judged, having their own engineering team established in 
China would be beneficial.170  The decision to send Reilly was made prior to their receipt of the 
disconcerting cables about Whittaker, and therefore it is hard to tell if the headquarters was 
planning to keep Whittaker in check by sending one more employee to China. After Reilly’s 
arrival in China, however, most of their correspondence was kept up with him rather than 
Whittaker. 
                                                 










Reilly took on the superintendence of machine installation at two Chinese cotton mills. 
Upon the headquarters’ request, he sent regular reports on the progress made at each mill, 
through which the headquarters, who always lamented their being “so far away,” wished to 
collect all the “gossip” and “local news” pertaining to the Chinese cotton industry.171 In a letter 
dated September 8, 1920, Reilly wrote about the ongoing tensions between Gaston and Yung 
Sung Kung Mill.172 Many machine parts arrived broken or missing, but Gaston kept nothing in 
stock, causing delay in mill operation. Gaston also charged far higher prices for machine 
accessories than their American competitor Andersen, which outraged the mill people. “They are 
wild,” wrote Reilly, “and I heard said ‘No more from Gaston, Williams & Wigmore.’”173 Two 
months later, Reilly conveyed another concerning situation, this time at Huaxin Cotton Mill. 
Gaston failed to win Huaxin’s three recent orders, since it had no money to float the contracts. 
Mr. Chow, the owner of Huaxin, liked Whitin machinery but was not willing to take the risk of 
doing business with Gaston, and Reilly feared that they might not be able to obtain any future 
orders from this promising Chinese cotton mill. “Whitin,” wrote Reilly with anxiety, “is in the 
hands of a company respected by none out here and with no friends available.”174 
 The omen of disaster did not go awry. On March 17, 1921, several months after Reilly’s 
warning letters, the New York Times announced that Gaston, Williams & Wigmore were going 
into receivership.175 The once-prominent American export firm thus came to an end after seven 
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years of business. Fortunately, Whitin was not seriously affected by this affair. After perceiving 
all the symptoms that indicated a poor financial situation, Whitin reached an agreement with 
Gaston to take over all the contracts held for Whitin textile machinery, which took place almost a 
month before the announcement of receivership. The arrangement did not come without risks, as 
they had to assume Gaston’s financial liability for the orders as well. Nevertheless, Whitin 
judged it would do more good than harm, since they could at least prevent successive 
cancellations of existing orders.176  It also allowed them an unexpected opportunity to directly 
deal with Chinese clients,177 although they ended up finding a new agent firm, Elbrook & 
Company, several months later. 
Around the same time, Whitin began to work on a large-scale project with Dasheng 
Cotton Mills, who placed an order of 25,000 spindles for their No. 6 and 8 branch mills after the 
long delay in delivery from British machine firms. Anticipating further transactions with this 
promising mill client, the Whitin headquarters expectantly told Reilly that they were “very 
anxious to please them in every way.”178 They dispatched a new engineer, Frederick Randolph 
Pratt, a member of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers with a rich experience in mill 
construction, planning to provide the best technical service to Dasheng Cotton Mills and other 
prospective clients.179   
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However, the contract was not carried out to full term. In January 1922, two months 
after the manufacture and shipment of the first 15,000 spindles, Whitin was notified of the 
cancellation of the remaining 10,000 spindles.180 From continued postponement of payment, 
Whitin sensed that something was going wrong with Dasheng, yet they did not expect 
cancellation since it was, they believed, legally impossible.181 Baffled by the unexpected notice, 
the headquarters contemplated their action and decided to accept the cancellation after careful 
consideration:  
As we review the history of our connection with you since the placing of this order, we 
are impressed more and more with the fact you have been most considerate and have met 
us most fairly in the spirit of the contract in every way and now that you ask us to cancel 
the last 10,000 spindles for the reason you have abandoned for the present your intention 
to build a mill at Nantung Chow, we feel disposed to accept this cancellation feeling the 
circumstances justifying us in taking this action because by so doing it will further 
cement the friendly relations that have already been established. We, therefore, formally 
accept your cancellation of the last 10,000 spindle unit on order through Gaston, 
Williams and Wigmore as per Column H, trusting that if you should ever reconsider this 
proposition to build this mill in Nantung Chow, we would have your very fair 
consideration at competitive prices.182 
 
This humble official letter, hiding all the embarrassment, disappointment, and possibly 
resentment, was written in the hope of resuming the transaction when Dasheng was ready to do 
so. In the same year, however, Dasheng went into insolvency. As discussed in Chapter 1, the 
company came under the directorship of a banking consortium, which lasted until 1937.183 The 
auditors identified overexpansion, particularly the establishment of its No. 8 mill to which 
Whitin supplied 15,000 spindles, as one of the reasons for the crisis.184  
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The Whitin headquarters had no idea about Dasheng’s financial situation, although they 
would have learned of it later. While enduring continued delay that eventually led to 
cancellation, they strived hard to get the inside story through their engineer Pratt, who was then 
in charge of the Dasheng project. But they often felt that “it was very hard to arrive at a true 
knowledge of the situation” since they were “so far from each other.” 185 Throughout their 
correspondence, the headquarters were desperate for up-to-date information on the Chinese 
market, often feeling frustrated at their remoteness. In a different letter to Pratt, they requested 
that he send “a real gossipy letter” on a monthly basis about the actual conditions in China.186 
But given that mail delivery took six to eight weeks,187 it was impossible for them to receive 
real-time Chinese news with full details.188  
General information about the Chinese market was available in various forms including 
journal articles and government handbooks, many of which provided a positive outlook on the 
trade of American machinery in China. However, American nationality did not necessarily lead 
to rise in sales. Each company had to vie for business, convincing Chinese mill owners of the 
superior quality of their products and services. Whereas their initial marketing strategy was 
developed vis-à-vis British products, once they established a foothold in China, the business 
turned into a competition between fellow American firms, often resulting in a price war. The 
Whitin headquarters overtly criticized Saco-Lowell Shops’ cheap pricing strategies for 
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“demoralizing the market in China,”189 but now that their competitor had started the war, they 
had to fight back. Under such circumstances, economic knowledge produced at the macro-level 
such as statistics or trade balance was of no immediate use. They instead needed access to the 
ownership and the administration of specific mills, their plans for new factories and preferred 
machine types, and the rival company’s recent bid for a complete machine set. Unofficial and 
local, all this knowledge belonged to what we call gossip, for which the Whitin headquarters 
desperately relied on correspondence with their faraway employees, agent firm, and Chinese mill 
clients. 
2.3 The “Problem” of American Machinery 
In his 1921 article on the Chines cotton manufacturing, Yang Sih-Zung reported with 
confidence that “the superiority of American spinning machinery has been established in the 
Chinese market by the successful introduction of over 500,000 spindles to date.”190 As the title 
suggests, however, this success did not come without obstacles. By the time American firms 
began to enter the Chinese market, strong brand loyalty toward British machines had been 
established, which damaged the competitiveness of American products. Yang wrote:  
[T]here were almost unsurmountable obstacles which the patient agents of spinning 
machinery had to overcome. There was the inertia of the conservative mill men—for 
most mill men are conservative. They imagined that American machinery is not strong 
and viewed tape drive frames with suspicion. Then there was the stubborn opposition 
offered by competitors, who have had the monopoly of the market for the last fifty 
years.191 
 
Although Yang did not specify who the monopolistic “competitors” were, it is not hard to tell 
that they were British manufacturers. The “fifty years” was somewhat exaggerated, because it 
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was only thirty years since China’s first cotton mill had been established. Nevertheless, thirty 
years was long enough to build brand loyalty that, once established, was hardly destabilized in 
this “conservative” industry. 
A similar statement about Chinese “conservatism” in association with their brand loyalty 
to British brands is found in the U.S. government’s official handbook. The section on the 
hardware trade is particularly revealing: 
The Chinese people are an extremely conservative people, and the introduction of 
goods bearing a new or hitherto unknown chop or trade-mark is a slow process. 
However, once known and found to stand for excellence and value, a trade-mark is of 
the utmost value, as the very conservatism which makes the Chinese slow to adopt the 
new trends to make them extremely loyal customers…American and British methods 
of importation, sale, and distribution are practically identical, and the principal 
advantage which British manufactures have over American is the fact that many of 
their chops or trade-marks are better known in China owing to having been longer in 
the market.192  
 
Hardware referred to heavy consumer goods, usually made of metal, such as lamps, stoves, and 
cutlery. The Americans contended that despite the equally excellent quality of their products, 
they always lost to the British competitors due to the brand loyalty of the “conservative” Chinese 
consumers.  
The degree of “conservatism” must have been higher in the sector of industrial equipment 
such as spinning machines, as they required a much larger capital investment than general 
hardware for household use. Machinery acquisition was among the biggest initial expenses for 
building a cotton factory, and therefore it was not uncommon for capital-deficient Chinese mills 
to rely on more affordable secondhand machinery, as Zhang Jian did for Dasheng’s first and 
second mills. Also, the acquired machinery had enduring consequences for the yarn’s quality as 
well as the mill’s productivity for the coming thirty years. For these reasons, decisions to 
                                                 




purchase machinery had to be made carefully, especially when the Chinese were forced to 
choose the unfamiliar American machines over the familiar British ones. By being prudent, or 
being “conservative” as Yang and the Americans claimed, they wanted to minimize possible 
technological and financial risks. Reluctance regarding American machines hence came from 
cautious judgment rather than “prejudice.” Yang and the Americans failed to capture the Chinese 
people’s prudence, the flip side of conservatism, as a practical mode of capital investment.  
The quality of a machine expected to perform for thirty years could not be verified within 
a year or two. Durability, a key element constituting quality, took an entire life cycle of the given 
machine to be validated. Indeed, quality was deep knowledge of the machine that could be 
gained only after going through small and large breakdowns and repairs over the long course of 
its operation. Its approval took both time and experience. When the American machine firms and 
their agent companies began to enter the Chinese market as late movers, they were not equipped 
with this approval, an important source of Chinese businessmen’s brand loyalty to British 
brands. It was true to a certain extent that they were at a disadvantage in China’s foreign trade. 
Nonetheless, the Chinese people did not purchase machinery merely based on brand 
loyalty. Their suspicion about the flimsiness of American machines was not entirely groundless. 
As we can see from the dispute between Gaston and Yung Sung Kung Mill discussed in the 
previous section, it was not unusual for American machines to arrive at Chinese factories either 
broken or damaged, or with parts missing or stolen during transport. In fact, Yang also brought 
up this issue in his article on American knitting machinery: “One of the greatest handicaps the 
importers have to face is the poor packing in which American knitting machinery arrives in 
China. Many machines arrive broken or otherwise damaged.” 193  
                                                 




The problem of inadequate packaging was not peculiar to textile machinery, but rather 
prevalent in all U.S. exports. The magnitude of the problem can be found in the U.S. 
government’s publication of an official handbook on packaging. Entitled “Packing for Foreign 
Markets,”194 it was published by the Department of Commerce in an attempt to reduce “the large 
losses resulting from careless and inadequate packing of merchandise for oversea shipment.”195 
The handbook was also the first publication of their Trade Promotion Series. Under the 
supervision of the Transportation Division, a nationwide survey of export packing practices was 
conducted by visiting shipping rooms of representative exporters in each commodity group and 
by interviewing experts about their knowhow, accumulated through years of experience in the 
field.196 The four-hundred-page handbook covered almost every item exported by the United 
States, including machinery, chemical products, leather, food, and textiles, with methods of 
packing tailored to each category. It also discussed the specific circumstances of major importing 
countries such as their climate, port facilities, custom charges, and inland transportation, as well 
as laboratory research on the scientific box-and-crate construction carried out by the Forest 
Products Laboratory in cooperation with the University of Wisconsin.197  
“[T]he enormous growth of our overseas trade in recent years, and the increasing number 
of newcomers inexperienced in the export business, makes it imperative that some standard be 
established for the packing of our goods destined to foreign markets.”198 The introduction to the 
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handbook clearly shows that the increasing awareness of the importance of proper packaging 
was a consequence of the globalization of the American economy. Unlike domestic 
transportation, which was mostly connected by rails, trans-Pacific shipping required weeks-long 
marine transport and additional inland journeys in China, as well as more frequent loading and 
unloading. Heavy yet fragile textile machines were particularly vulnerable to such 
circumstances, and their success in the Chinese market hinged on proper packaging rather than 
express delivery.  
The first edition of the book did not have a separate section for textile machinery, 
although general considerations under the category of “Machinery” were specific enough to 
provide the manufacturers with ideas for adequate packaging.  The absence can be attributed to 
the industry’s relatively late entry into the global market. Its foreign business began to boom just 
a few years before the publication of the handbook, and therefore, when the Department began to 
collect data for the project, the textile machine industry was not yet in the status to provide a 
well-established set of packing practices for overseas shipping; it was rather in a position to learn 
from other companies exporting similar types of industrial equipment. In 1940, when the 
Department published a revised edition, textile machinery had its own section, in which detailed 
methods of packing automatic looms and knitting machines were provided.199  
Four factors had to be taken into consideration for machine packaging: breakage, rust, 
loss of parts, and varying requirements of importing countries.200 Packaging for local delivery by 
wagon or truck was relatively simple; machines only had to be attached to skids and covered 
with waterproof burlap paper. For domestic shipment by boat or train, they had to be crated 
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additionally. For foreign shipping, however, even this supplementary protection device was not 
sufficient. Machines had to be entirely boxed to withstand exceptionally rough handling, to avoid 
punctures from the corners and edges of other containers, and to prevent pilferage (Figure 
2.5).201 They had to be securely fastened to minimize movement inside the box, hence the need 
for internal braces tailored to the shape of each machine (Figure 2.6). They also had to be 
prepared for ports that were not equipped with proper unloading facilities by adding some extra 
strength to the boxes.202 Finally, they had to be perfectly waterproofed in preparation for the 
salty sea air, which caused rust not only when the ship was at sea but also when the cargo was 
stationed and waiting to go through customs.203 In India, for instance, it was advisable to import 
textile machines during the dry season due to the exceptionally high humidity, and in China, 
exporters were warned about frequent monsoons and typhoons along the southern coast.204 Many 
American manufacturers thought little of such extraordinary hazards of marine shipping, 
believing that packing for domestic transport would be satisfactory for export delivery. Export 
service, however, required “boxes constructed fundamentally different from their domestic 
packages.”205  
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Figure 2.5 Box Packaging for Automatic Looms206 
 
Figure 2.6 Internal Packaging with Braces for Automatic Looms207 
Poor packaging had a direct impact on the machine’s performance, and yet it was still a 
secondary issue. What was fundamental to the negative perception of American machines in 
China was their unfamiliar design, especially compared to British models. Every spinning 
machine was designed to process short cotton fibers into a long, continuous thread, but when it 
came to technical details to achieve this goal, each machine builder, whether British or 
American, had different approaches. For instance, both Whitin and Saco-Lowell Shops preferred 
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the tape drive over the band drive for its ability to add a more uniform twist to the yarn through 
constant control of the spindle speed (Figure 2.7).208 As Yang complained in his article, 
however, the Chinese “viewed tape drive frames with suspicion,” perhaps because they were 
accustomed to band drive frames used by British machine firms for decades. The British 
certainly enjoyed the privilege of the first movers in this regard, and Yang and the American 
businessmen’s grievance was legitimate to some extent.  
 
Figure 2.7 Tape Drive from Whitin’s 1921 Catalogue. The text reads: “The advantage of this 
method of driving spinning and twister spindles as compared with band driving is that a 
more uniform twist is imparted to the yarn, due to the nearly constant spindle speeds 
obtained.” 209  
 
 Nevertheless, the Chinese people’s skepticism was not simply based on the unfamiliarity 
of American machines or their brand loyalty to British products. They strived to assess the 
machines technologically, especially in terms of the quantity and quality of spun yarn, and their 
analyses of the pros and cons of these machines were widely circulated through professional 
journals. In his 1919 article entitled “A comparison of British and American Spinning 
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Machines,” Fu Daoshen, an assistant engineer of Hengfeng Cotton Mill and a prolific writer on 
textile engineering, provided a technical analysis of spinning machines from both countries, 
primarily relying on the translation of a Japanese article.210 He argued that American machines 
were by no means inferior to British ones on the basis of his own experiments, as well as the 
Japanese source. According to his experiments, British machines showed slightly better 
performance in quantity of spun yarn. As for roving frames, however, American machines 
outperformed their British counterparts. For carding machines, the two groups did not show a 
noticeable difference.  
At the end of the article, Fu Daoshen briefly commented on the problem of American 
machines: “It is not possible to conceal the shortcomings of American machines, since they are 
made to process American cotton, whereas British machines have profounder experience of 
Chinese and British cotton. Therefore, all the measurements for [American] spinning machines 
should follow the British way.”211 “Yet,” he concluded, “British machines and American 
machines have no significant difference（英机美机无甚差异也）.”212 Although his general 
stance on American machines was the same as that of Yang and the American businessmen, it is 
noteworthy that he addressed, if only briefly, the fundamental disadvantage of American 
machinery in Chinese circumstances, which was due to neither Chinese conservatism nor brand 
loyalty, but was rather an outcome of the long tradition of spinning technologies specific to the 
United States and its cotton varieties.  
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He did not provide any further explanation as to why cotton type mattered to spinning 
technologies and machine design, probably under the assumption that the readers were well 
aware of the relationship. It mattered because its staple length was the single most important 
component that determined the roller setting of each machine. Machines whose rollers were not 
properly adjusted failed to produce yarn of the desired quality and quantity. As Fu wrote, 
American machines were designed in a way to suit long-staple American cotton, and therefore 
they had to go through substantial modifications in order to process short-staple Chinese cotton. 
Fu did note the necessity of modification, but by mentioning it very briefly at the end of the 
article, he implied that it was a job that could be done easily and hence that did not have a 
significant impact on the performance of American machines. However, modification of roller 
setting required deep knowledge of the machine and local cotton varieties, which could be 
obtained only through continued experiments on the shop floor. The headquarters of American 
manufacturers did not necessarily have better solutions than their Chinese users, since, as Fu 
wrote, they did not have experience of Chinese cotton. 
Perhaps Fu did not want to make a big deal of it, since that would not only undermine his 
main argument, but more importantly, he had a good reason to defend American machines. As he 
wrote, he was one of the first persons who introduced American machines to China. When he 
traveled to the southern United States in 1915 to look around newly established cotton mills, he 
found the quality of their equipment satisfactory. Years later when he advised Huaxin Cotton 
Mills and Yuyuan Cotton Mills in Tianjin on machine acquisition, he recommended Saco-Lowell 
Shops, and both mills acquired machinery from this American manufacturer. The same company 
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also supplied equipment to his own Hengfeng Cotton Mills for its new manufacturing 
facilities.213 
In 1922, three years after the publication of Fu’s article, the journal published yet another 
article on the same topic. The author was Zhu Xiwen, who was likewise working for Hengfeng 
Cotton Mills. Entitled “Pros, Cons, and Choices of British and American Spinning Machines (英
美纺纱机器之优劣及选择),” Zhu’s article provided a detailed technical analysis of all the 
machines needed for the construction of a cotton spinning mill one by one.214 His argument was 
identical to Fu’s: American machines were not necessarily inferior to British ones. By discussing 
technical details of each machine type manufactured by individual companies, whether British or 
American, he even attempted to overcome the national boundaries that had defined the machine 
market.  
Like Fu, he also noted the relationship between cotton types and machine design:  
When it comes to the quantity of spun yarn, British spinning machines outperformed 
American ones, but as for the quality vice versa. That was because British machines were 
made on the basis of cotton varieties grown in the regions under British control, whereas 
American machines were made on the basis of American and Sea Island cotton with long 
and clean fibers.”215  
 
In providing a technical solution to improve the insufficient outcome of American machines, he 
acknowledged that the audiences were still complaining about the unsatisfactory performance of 
American machines. Fu had written in 1919 that the shortcomings of American spinning 
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machines could be easily remedied through modification, but three years later the Chinese 
people’s suspicion was still an ongoing issue; hence yet another article to reassure them. 
American machines were certainly high-quality products, as all the advocates including Fu, Zhu, 
and Yang claimed, but their modification to accommodate Chinese cotton varieties required 
considerable efforts. Skepticism about their quality persisted in China, possibly because their 
difference from British machines was felt much larger on the shop floor than the advocates 
acknowledged in writings, especially after going through the lengthy process of modification.  
Full of technical terms and details, both Fu and Zhu’s articles took the form of typical 
technical writing, but that does not mean that the authors’ stance on spinning machines and 
technologies was value-neutral. They wrote the essays in defense of American machines. In 
other words, they strived to convince the readers that American machines were as good as British 
machines, not vice versa. They were advocates of American machines, not only because they 
were the users of these machines themselves, but more importantly, Nie Yuntai, the owner of 
their Hengfeng Cotton Mills, was an active promoter of Sino-American trade.216 Nie was also the 
first vice-president of the Chinese Cotton Mill-Owners Association, the publisher of the journal 
in which these articles were published. It was highly likely that Nie’s favorable position on 
American machinery had an impact on the journal’s overall editorial direction. Most importantly, 
both Andersen and Gaston were their regular advertisers. The editorial team perhaps wanted to 
refrain from publishing articles that were overtly critical of products supplied by their loyal 
clients.  
2.4 Conclusion 
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Both the American and Chinese textile industries were active in producing and 
circulating knowledge about each other. On the American side, there was an increasing emphasis 
on practical knowledge of the Chinese market and China in general, differing from earlier 
knowledge transmitted by American missionaries, whose understanding of China was shaped by 
their civilizing mission based on implicit cultural imperialism.217 New social classes began to 
emerge as knowledge brokers, and the role of U.S.-educated Chinese engineers was particularly 
important in the machine business. The Chinese views on the American technology were 
likewise practical. They did not embrace American machinery simply because it was American 
or Western. They were prudent in assessing its performance, continually doubting its quality. 
The Americans attributed this to Chinese “conservatism” and their stubborn brand loyalty to 
British brands, but it was more of a result of their practical mode of machine acquisition, 
informed by their experience of American machines that did not process short-staple Chinese 
cotton as efficiently as British ones.  
The field was awash with knowledge about China, but official books and articles did not 
necessarily provide information that the American machine firms sought after. In order to obtain 
“true knowledge” of China, the Whitin headquarters increasingly relied on gossipy news through 
correspondence with their faraway engineers, agent firm, and Chinese mill clients. Their 
informants were not always reliable, however. The headquarters were suspicious of the Gaston 
firm’s ill management, of their employee Whittaker’s dogmatic behavior, and of Dasheng Cotton 
Mills’ continued request for suspension. Limited access to up-to-date local news put the 
company in a vulnerable position. The Whitin headquarters were ostensibly at the center of the 
machine business, making small and large decisions, but in reality they were on the periphery of 
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the trade, not knowing what was really going on in China. As an American enterprise, they 
certainly took advantage of extraterritorial privileges, but citizenship did not guarantee 
commercial success in China. Fragmented by competition to obtain more orders from Chinese 





From Modification to Reproduction: 
Hands-On Experience and Technology Transfer on the Ground 
 
While the Chinese cotton industry opened up whole new possibilities for American 
machine firms, it presented them with unforeseen technological challenges. Designed to 
accommodate American upland cotton, American machines failed to process short-staple 
Chinese cotton as efficiently as British machines did. Its performance on the Chinese shop floor 
was subject to modification, particularly in its roller setting, which was a delicate mechanism 
whose efficiency was affected by even the slightest change in cotton staple length. Finding a 
perfect roller setting for a given cotton type thus required the utmost precision as well as a 
considerable degree of knowledge of spinning machines and raw cotton. A variety of 
publications including textbooks, journal articles, and manufacturers’ manuals was available for 
the engineers’ reference, yet reading books alone was not sufficient to solve the problem. 
Modification required them to take into consideration numerous technical and material factors 
beyond the range of data provided in these books, and hence the job could be performed only by 
skilled technicians with rich hands-on experience. 
Hands-on experience refers to all sorts of practical knowledge that the factory workers 
obtained while working with machines and cotton on the shop floor. They gained such 
knowledge by experiencing and observing rather than reading and writing, mostly through their 
bodily engagement with machines, parts, and cotton. In this sense, the nature of their knowledge 
was not greatly different from that of craft knowledge, which has been generally deemed to be 
the preserve of early modern artisans.218 By showing the continuity of “early modern” craft 
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knowledge into the setting of the “modern” factory, this chapter questions one of our general 
assumptions about industrialization: machines deskilled artisans. True as it is that hand spinners 
lost their jobs due to the plummeting values of hand-spun yarn, which in turn was caused by the 
mass production of cheap machine-spun yarn, the factory system created entirely new positions 
that relied on human skills. Efficient operation of spinning machinery hinged on the skill and 
knowledge of engineers, machinists, and operators, who acquired their expertise not only by 
reading books but also through hands-on experience. 
By highlighting the centrality of the Chinese workers’ hands-on experience in the making 
of the factory system, this chapter sheds new light on the Chinese cotton mills as an important 
site of knowledge production. Whitin’s headquarter did not always come up with a better 
solution than their mill clients in modifying their machines to accommodate Chinese cotton. This 
is not surprising as the job required flexible on-site responses to small and large technical issues 
through continued experimentation with the machines and local cotton varieties. New sets of 
knowledge were generated in the course of operating American machines on the Chinese shop 
floor, and they traveled back to the headquarters, culminating in customized machines and 
updated manuals.219 Technology did not necessarily move from the maker to the user and from 
the West to the rest of the world. 
 This chapter starts by investigating the modification of the roller setting for Whitin’s 
drawing frame, with an emphasis on the conflicting views on this issue between Whitin’s 
headquarters and their client mill. Drawing upon a variety of textual sources that, paradoxically, 
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underlined the importance of hands-on experience, the first section highlights the art of roller 
setting as an industrial craft. Emphasizing the experimental nature of cotton mill work, the 
second section discusses how the user could at times come up with a better solution than the 
maker. In doing so, it considers America’s limited experience of short-staple cotton as an 
important factor that determined the direction in which their spinning technology developed. The 
final section rethinks the rampant practice of copying in China as an endeavor to produce 
domestic substitutes that outstripped the foreign originals rather than the making of cheap 
imitations. By approaching copying as an outcome of the copycat’s accumulated hands-on 
experience with the machine, this section explores the ambiguous boundaries between repair, 
improvement, and copying. 
3.1 Endless Adjustment: Chinese Cotton and the Art of Roller Setting  
In March 1920, Lawrence Murray Keeler, the Agent of Whitin Machine Works,220 
received a cable from Whittaker, requesting a change of specifications for a Japanese cotton mill 
by the name of Hattori Shoten.221 Hattori Shoten wished to change the diameter of the bottom 
front rollers for their drawing frames to the specifications called for by Huaxin Cotton Mill, a 
Chinese company to whom Whitin had recently supplied equipment.222 Keeler had to turn down 
                                                 
220 The Agent of Whitin Machine Works was an executive position, distinguished from sales agents or field agents. 
It was first created in 1881 for Gustavus E. Taft in recognition of his contribution to the management of the shop 
floor as a superintendent. When Keeler took up the position in 1906, he was responsible for sales in the entire 
Northern territory including New England. His responsibilities extended to foreign sales later. Navin, The Whitin 
Machine Works since 1831, 124, 287, 480.  
 
221 Based in Nagoya, Hattori Shoten was originally a trading company specializing in cotton products. Later on the 
company itself began to manufacture the items. It was one of the Japanese exporters of finished cotton cloth to 
China after World War I. Kaoru Sugihara, Japan, China, and the Growth of the Asian International Economy, 1850-
1949 (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 91-92. 
 
222 It seems that a cotton mill’s order information easily circulated across national borders through the 




the request, since it was too late to make the change. “Unfortunately,” he wrote back, “16 heads 
of the Hattori Drawing have already been finished.”223  
Although Keeler rejected the call on the grounds that the fabrication was complete, that 
was not the only reason for his refusal. He added brief technical advice about the roller setting, 
pointing out the inefficiency of the roller size requested by Hattori Shoten, which was to reduce 
its diameter from 1¼ inches to 1⅛ inches. He believed the change would cause unsatisfactory 
results, for a small roller would have to run faster to yield the same output as a larger roller. This, 
in turn, would lead to a shorter life span of the leather cots on the roller. His observation of the 
inverse relationship between the roller size and its speed was a fair point, but the following 
comment he made on the link between the roller size and the cotton fiber was at odds with the 
general principle of roller setting:  
On this short China cotton I have always had an idea it was sort of wiry and hard to draw 
and from a theoretical point we could not expect to get as much contact from the small 
roll as a larger one. We have found in this country that the 1-1/4” roll was more 
satisfactory [than the 1-1/8” roll] and unless in your opinion the other gives better results 
and we would prefer to furnish it.224  
 
Given the general principle of using small rollers for short-staple cotton, his suggestion 
was a confusing one. What made it even more puzzling was its inconsistency with the official 
account of his own company, which faithfully followed the general principle. According to 
Whitin’s 1920 catalog, the customary diameter of the bottom front roll was 1⅜ inches; for 
shorter grades of cotton, 1⅛ or 1¼ inches was recommended. “This latter arrangement,” the 
catalog states, “allows the rolls to be set much closer to the length of the staple, and is desirable 
on 1” staple or less. Uneven work coming from wide settings on the drawing frame causes 
                                                 
223 Whitin Machine Works Records,Vol. AC-1, 479.  
 
224 Ibid. The letter was sent to Whittaker on March 27, 1920. 
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trouble throughout the mill.”225 As Agent of the company, Keeler was possibly aware of this 
fundamental principle of roller setting. Despite that, what made him recommend the 1¼-inch roll 
instead of the 1⅛?  One might suspect that he deemed 1¼ inches to be more suitable, since he 
believed Chinese cotton was not so short as to require 1⅛ inches. As Figure 3.1 shows, however, 
Chinese cotton was always categorized as one of the shortest types in the market. He could not 
have mistaken it. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Relative Length of Cotton Staples. (a) American sea-island, (b) Peruvian, 
(c) Brazilian, (d) brown Egyptian, (e) American, (f) Indian, (g) Chinese, (h) Japanese.226 
 
To assess the validity of Keeler’s technical advice, we need to first understand the 
structure of rollers on the drawing frame and its importance for the machine’s optimal 
performance.227 As we can see from Figure 3.2, most drawing frames manufactured in the 1920s 
were equipped with four pairs of rollers, each pair comprising a bottom roller and a top roller. 
                                                 
225 Whitin Machine Works, Illustrated and Descriptive Catalog of Whitin Cotton Card-Room Machinery and 
Handbook of Useful Information for Overseers and Operatives (1920), 124-25.  
 
226 International Library of Technology, Cotton, Pickers, Cotton Cards, Drawing Rolls, Railway Heads and 
Drawing Frames, Combers, Fly Frames (Scranton: International Textbook Co., 1906), section 14, 11-12.  
 
227 For a technical analysis of roller setting, I draw upon ibid., section 20, 1-41; Saco-Lowell Shops, Saco-Lowell 




Several cotton slivers just processed out of the carding machine would go through these four sets 
of revolving rollers in succession from back to front to be combined into one sliver gaining 
further attenuation.228 This process is called drawing; hence the name of the machine. Slivers 
went through the drawing up to three times depending on desired yarn grades. The image in 
Figure 3.3 shows the condition of the sliver just processed out of the drawing frame, where the 
weight of sliver per yard becomes even and the fibers are aligned in parallel and are thus ready to 
move on to the next step: the roving. It is no exaggeration to say that proper operation of the 
drawing frame hinged on the efficient setting of these rollers. In fact, this applied to all other 
machines in charge of parallelizing and attenuating cotton fibers, which included the majority of 
textile machines in the processes of carding, drawing, roving, and spinning (for the processes and 
respective machines, see Table 1.2 in Chapter 1).229 
 
Figure 3.2 Side Sectional View of a Drawing Frame with Four Pairs of Rollers.230  The 
two long arrows indicate the direction in which cotton slivers move.  
                                                 
228 They used the term “doubling” to refer specifically to the process of combining and processing several slivers 
into one finer sliver. They believed drawing (through doubling) would enhance yarn quality, and therefore repeating 
the process up to three times was a general rule. As I will discuss later, this belief turned out to be wrong.  
 
229 Saco-Lowell Shops, Drawing.  
 
230 Whitin Machine Works, Whitin Cotton Card-Room Machinery (Whitinsville: Whitin machine works, 1925), 112. 






Figure 3.3 Cotton Sliver after Drawing.231 
According to a contemporaneous textbook, three mechanical points should be considered 
when setting the rollers: the distance between pairs of rollers, the speed of each pair, and the 
diameter of each roller. One affected the other but, among the three, what determined “one broad 
principle” on the job was the distance between roller pairs, which was determined by the length 
of the cotton to be processed. “[T]he distance between the centers of each pair of rolls,” the 
textbook explains, “must always exceed the average length of the staple of the cotton being used. 
If this were not so, the fiber would come under the action of the forward pair of rolls before it 
was released by the preceding pair…this would result in the fiber being strained and broken.”232  
Once the minimum distance was determined, the speed of rollers came into play. Their 
speed was set to increase as they came nearer the front in order to diminish the volume of cotton 
as it passed through the rollers from back to front. The gradually diminishing volume made it 
                                                 
 
231 Saco-Lowell Shops, Drawing, 3. 
 




easier for the front pairs to draw the cotton fibers, which in turn enabled less space between the 
pairs close to the front than those near the back, although all of them should exceed the minimum 
distance initially set by the cotton length.233 To take an example provided in the textbook, a 
typical set of roller distances for one-inch-long cotton would consist of 1½ inches, 1⅜ inches, 
and 1¼ inches, in order from back to front.  
The distance between rollers had a direct impact on their diameters, which is the key 
factor in Hattori Shoten’s specifications. The textbook clarifies their correlation as follows: “As 
the rolls are set according to the staple of the cotton used, it is therefore evident that the rolls 
intended to run on coarse counts, which is made from short-staple cotton, must be smaller in 
diameter than those intended to work long-staple cotton, in order that the centers of the rolls may 
be brought near enough together. Sometimes the middle roll is made smaller than the front and 
back, where three pair of rolls are used, so that a close setting may be made.”234 To sum up, 
small-diameter rollers were suggested for short-staple cotton to ensure short distances between 
roller pairs. More specifically, according to the textbook’s guideline in Figure 3.4, the 
recommended size of the bottom front roller on the drawing frame for short staple was 1⅛ 
inches, the size requested by Hattori Shoten; Keeler advised 1¼ inches instead.  It seems as if he 
was the only advocate for 1¼-inch rollers for Chinese cotton, believing that the fibers, already 
short, would not be able to have sufficient contact with the reduced roller surface of the 1⅛-inch 
roller.  
                                                 







Figure 3.4 Suggested Roller Settings on Textile Machines for Different Cotton Types.  
The arrow, inserted by the author, indicates the bottom front roller under dispute.235 
 
Keeler’s advice sounds flawed from the perspective of staple length, but we cannot draw 
a hasty conclusion since other qualities of cotton in addition to its length played a part as well. 
For instance, harsh and wiry cotton did not draw as easily as soft and silky cotton and thus 
required a wider setting.236 This is a point particularly relevant to the case of Chinese cotton that, 
according to Keeler’s description, was both short and wiry. In other words, while the short fiber 
of Chinese cotton demanded a closer roller setting and consequently smaller rollers, its wiry 
character needed a wider setting and larger rollers. Between the two variables that required 
contradictory solutions, which one should the engineer prioritize? Deliberations did not end 
                                                 
235 Ibid., section 20, 20. I have modified the figure due to limited space. The original version includes roller settings 
for slubbers, intermediates, and roving frames as well.  
 




there. The diameter of the fiber also had an impact on the setting because bigger diameters would 
decrease the number of fibers in a given volume. Also, fibers were processed en masse, which 
could affect control of individual fibers. All these factors should enter into the work of roller 
setting. 237  
Even if variables were confined to length alone, it was not easy to find the perfect setting 
for a given “staple length” because the term was used indiscriminately to refer to maximum, 
quartile, or average lengths. In addition, staple length provided no information about the degree 
of variation in a given batch.238 Let us suppose, for instance, a cotton mill that purchased several 
bales of raw cotton of which fiber was one inch long. The operatives would set the rollers 
according to the specified length, but the number “one inch” would not tell them the percentage 
of fibers longer or shorter than that. If deviations were found to be larger than expected, 
additional adjustments would be required. As stated in Saco-Lowell Shops’ handbook for 
drawing,239 the relationship between staple length and roller setting was “somewhat indefinite.” 
It was “very difficult, if not impossible, to make positive and all-inclusive formulae establishing 
a relation of staple length to setting distance.”240  
After all, the handbook concludes, roller setting was “an art requiring many years of 
practice and observation.”241 Most commercial catalogs and handbooks, of course, provided the 
readers with useful resources such as formulas, engineering data, and exemplary roller settings 
                                                 




239 Another prominent American machine manufacturer, Saco-Lowell Shops was a rival company to Whitin 
Machine Works in both the American and Asian markets. 
 
240 Saco-Lowell Shops, Drawing, 39. 
 




(Figure 3.5), all of which constituted the body of textual and visual knowledge essential to 
machine spinning. The gearing program in Figure 3.5, for instance, must have served as an 
invaluable visual guide for novice engineers. But as a suggested setting, it certainly required 
modifications to be applied to individual mills. The initial format of the diagram was created by 
the manufacturer, yet its final version, precisely fit to each factory, could be completed only by 
skillful workers who had years of experience in local cotton varieties and suitable machine 
settings. “Again we say,” the Saco-Lowell handbook states, “these are not absolute quantities 
since they must be varied according to the character of the cotton and the atmospheric and other 
local conditions.”242  
  
Figure 3.5 Gearing Diagram and Engineering Data.243 
 
                                                 
242 Ibid., 41.  
 




Similar statements appear in the aforementioned textbook as well, which makes it clear 
that the provided guidelines for roller setting in Figure 3.4 are subject to adjustment depending 
on local situations. An example of actual measurements from a mill producing 32s yarn shows 
that the arrangements of rollers on their drawing frame and slubber were much wider than the 
standard. Those settings, however, were the result of numerous experiments to find the optimal 
combination of rollers for producing good-quality yarn under the mill’s specific 
circumstances.244 One might wonder, then, if this could be the case with Keeler’s suggestion on 
Hattori Shoten’s roller size. In other words, can we understand his contradictory advice as an 
outcome of his and the company’s own experiments that turned out to contradict the general 
principles of roller setting?  
The chances are slim. I argue this on the grounds of the absence of empirical data or any 
proof that validates their experiments with Chinese cotton. Before their entry into the Asian 
market, most of their clients were confined to domestic cotton mills and many of them relied on 
cotton from the American South for raw materials. The machines consequently had evolved in a 
direction that better suited American cotton. When the Asian market emerged with Chinese 
cotton that has an average staple length shorter than American varieties, Whitin and other 
manufacturers’ existing engineering data—a body of accumulated knowledge from the use of 
domestic cotton—failed to address issues peculiar to short-staple cotton.  
Keeler and his team, an expert group in spinning technology, probably knew little about 
short and wiry Chinese cotton or they knew it only in theory.245As he wrote, the suggestion was 
                                                 
244 International Library of Technology, Cotton, section 20, 21. 
 
245 Before taking the position of Agent, Keeler had worked on the shop floor, where he acquired considerable 
knowledge about the machines. Furthermore, the job of Agent, a salesperson that represented the whole company, 
required a thorough understanding of their products to the extent that he could provide technological advice to 
prospective and current clients. Even if he no longer worked on the shop floor, his work required him to keep up 
with the latest engineering trends, and it was unlikely that he gave mistaken instructions simply because he worked 
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formulated “from a theoretical point,” not from firsthand experiments. It might be indeed true at 
a theoretical level that the wiry Chinese cotton could not get much contact from the 1⅛-inch 
roller, but Keeler and his engineering team failed to verify the degree of its reverse effects when 
used on short fibers, which could have been easily confirmed had they tested the setting on 
Chinese cotton. Roller setting was a task that required consideration of the complex interplay of 
multiple factors, with sometimes conflicting mechanical effects; therefore, there always was a 
chance that an exceptional setting could work for a certain mill. However, this did not apply to 
the Keeler’s case; his suggestion was a theory that had not been proven with actual tests on 
Chinese cotton.  
Almost two years after the correspondence regarding Hattori Shoten’s specifications, two 
bales of Chinese cotton were sent to Whitin’s headquarters for experiments. On January 16, 
1922, Keeler wrote a message to the Gaston headquarters in New York notifying them of his 
receipt of a letter from the United States Department of Agriculture (hereafter USDA). The 
USDA granted permission to import two bales of Chinese cotton, under the stipulation that all 
cotton waste generated prior to the carding machine be collected and burned in the company’s 
boiler. The company was also required to send the USDA a sample of the finished product for 
approval. Keeler concluded the letter by saying “[w]e are instructing our experimental 
department to follow these instructions and would ask you to instruct us by letter with reference 
to the experiment you would like to have us make for you.”246 The Chinese cotton arrived in 
                                                 
in the office and not on the floor. More importantly, as the plural pronoun “we” in the letter indicates, he must have 
consulted with the company’s experimental department before sending the letter. For Keeler’s career at Whitin 
Machine Works, see Navin, Whitin Machine Works, 287. 
 
246 This clearly shows that Gaston, rather than Whitin, played a more active role in initiating the import of Chinese 
cotton for experimental purposes. Given Whitin’s great interest in the Chinese market, their somewhat passive 
attitude toward experiments, at least as shown in this letter, is hard to understand. The story of Chinese cotton after 
arrival at the experimental department is unknown. Whitin Machine Works Records, Vol. AC-3, 365. See also pp. 
389, 626.  
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New York in March of the same year and then was sent to Whitin’s workshop in Whitinsville by 
N. Y., N. H. and Hartford R. R.247 All of this happened almost two years after Keeler’s 
correspondence with Whittaker regarding Hattori Shoten’s roller setting. 
Meanwhile, China began to witness an active exchange of knowledge about machine 
spinning through a variety of professional journals and books.248 In October 1922, Chinese 
Cotton Mills Owners’ Association published in its quarterly a short article entitled “The 
Relationship between the Distance of Drawing Rollers and Staple Length.”249 The author was Su 
Yuqing, a second-year student at Nantong Textile School. A close reading of the article reveals 
that it was a translation of an excerpt from the aforementioned American textbook, although Su 
did not indicate it. In particular, the table of roller measurements presented at the end of his 
article (shown at the bottom of Figure 3.6) was an exact translation of a table from the original 
American textbook (at the top of Figure 3.6). According to the original source, the settings were 
actual measurements of rollers from a cotton mill. They were considered wider than the standard 
since they were tailored to meet the mill’s unique circumstances. Su did not translate this part for 
some reason. Omitting a paragraph that provided contextual information, Su rather introduced 
                                                 
 
247 Ibid., Vol. AC-3, 626.  
 
248 This trend needs to be set in the context of emerging professional associations and the development of 
commercial print culture in Republican China. See Xiaoqun Xu, Chinese Professionals and the Republican State: 
The Rise of Professional Associations in Shanghai, 1912-1937 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); 
Joan Judge, Republican Lens: Gender, Visuality, and Experience in the Early Chinese Periodical Press (Oakland: 
University of California Press, 2016). In the cotton industry, Huashang shachang lianhehui 華商纱廠聯合會 
(Chinese Cotton Mills Owners’ Association) was the most influential organization.  
 
249 Su Yuqing, "Bingtiaoji ge luola zhi juli yu xianwei zhangduan zhi guanxi 併條機各羅拉之距離與纖維長短之
關係 (The relationship between the distance of drawing rollers and staple length)," Huashang shachang lianhehui 








Figure 3.6 Tables of Roller Measurements.  
Original text (top) and the Chinese translation (bottom).250 
 
According to Eugenia Lean, practices of translating, adopting, tinkering, and copying 
were widely encouraged in Republican China both as a way of learning and as a means of saving 
the precarious nation in the face of imperialist global capitalism.251 Su’s article needs to be 
                                                 
250 International Library of Technology, Cotton, section 20, 21; Su, "Bingtiaoji ge luola zhi juli," 177. 
 
251 Eugenia Lean, Vernacular Industrialism in China: Local Innovation and Translated Technologies in the Making 




considered in this larger context. Students of vocational schools not only had access to foreign 
publication like American textbooks but also translated and published them in professional 
journals. In this way they served both as consumers and producers of knowledge in 
circulation.252 Original sources were not always properly cited and nor were they accurately 
translated, yet translated texts like Su’s article provided the Chinese readers with a theoretical 
foundation for understanding machine spinning and mechanical engineering. Su neglected to 
mention the authorship, but that was not a common practice. Many translations indicated names 
of authors along with translators. As I will discuss in Chapter 5, when Shao Dexin, a student at 
the University of Nanking, translated J. B. Griffing’s reports on cotton cultivation, he always 
specified Griffing as the author and himself the translator. 
Still in the form of a codification of generalized practice, Su’s article did not offer an 
immediate answer to issues peculiar to individual mills. As the machine went through 
adjustment, the theory had to be modified as well. The table of data, drawn based on as many 
mills in “average” conditions as possible, served as a useful reference, but its true efficacy was 
subject to customization. Su Yuqing, a textile school student who barely began to explore 
theories of machine spinning, possibly did not discern at this stage the limitations of the foreign 
text that he translated. Only after working on the shop floor after graduation, grappling with 
machines and cotton, and going through innumerable trials and errors, would he realize the 
significance of hands-on experience.   
                                                 
252 This phenomenon was not unique to China. Japan also witnessed translation and publication of foreign sources 
through domestic journals. According to Gary Saxonhouse, what made Japan’s early industrialization possible was 
their active exchange of knowledge through professional associations and journals. See Gary Saxonhouse, "A Tale 
of Japanese Technological Diffusion in the Meiji Period," The Journal of Economic History 34, no. 1 (1974). He 
argued no other late developing countries than Japan and India developed the practice of professional journals, but 
China was an exception. Huashang shachang lianhehui 華商纱廠聯合會 (Chinese Cotton Mills Owners’ 
Association) and its quarterly was the Chinese equivalent to Dai nihon boseki rengokai 大日本紡績聯合會(All 




3.2 Chinese Cotton Mills as a Site of Knowledge Production 
Given the experimental nature of machine work, it is no wonder that better solutions for 
technological issues were likely to come from local factories, like Hattori Shoten and Huaxin 
Cotton Mills, the sites where actual experiments with Chinese cotton took place. The following 
two articles clearly show where and how new sets of knowledge were produced in this 
globalizing textile machine industry. In May 1922, the American journal Cotton published an 
article entitled “Solving a Chinese Mill Problem.” Written by an anonymous author under the 
pseudonym “A Chinese,” it tells a story of a Chinese mill that was put into “a helpless condition” 
due to short cotton staple and machines that were not adjusted accordingly. Aiming to produce 
32s yarn, a relatively high count when most Chinese mills focused on 10s and 20s, this company 
imported a thousand bales of American cotton. The cotton was supposed to be 1⅛-inch long, but 
it turned out to be only ⅞ inch, a length almost impossible to spin 32s. For the first few weeks, 
during which proper modifications were not made to machine settings, the company’s daily 
output was low and the yarn quality poor. Yarn dealers complained that their yarn was too weak 
with too much twist, but, the author wrote, “no one could give any suggestion.” Only after the 
analysis of imported Japanese yarn were they able to come up with a solution to fix the problem. 
After trial and error, they lowered the speed of all machines, set the rollers for ⅞-inch staple 
accordingly, and omitted the process of third drawing. Soon after, daily production increased 
from 1,200 to 2,000 pounds.253  
Two months later, the editorial office of the journal published a critical reply to this 
article, submitted by one of their prolific contributors known by the pen name “Wash (Mass.).” 
His critique, entitled “That Chinese Mill Problem,” was a total denial of the feasibility of the 
                                                 
253 "Solving a Chinese Mill Problem," Cotton 86, no. 7 (1922): 528.  
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solutions proposed by the Chinese author. Explaining why the suggested modifications were not 
technologically viable, he refuted the Chinese report clause by clause, finally affirming that “the 
trouble was remedied through good luck, not through discovering the cause.” However, his 
unsparing criticism did not mean that he had any better method than the Chinese when it came to 
short cotton staple; in fact, he did not even have a solution. “Of course,” he conceded, “when 
using ⅞-inch staple we are as helpless as our friend from China, but why state that all rolls were 
set for ⅞-inch staple, when that is an impossibility!” 254 It seemed apparent that this experienced 
American, sought after by numerous readers of the journal for technical advice, did not know 
anything about cotton shorter than one inch. His harsh criticism ironically proved that the 
anonymous Chinese contributor achieved what he deemed impossible: spinning yarn out of ⅞-
inch cotton. 
 “Wash (Mass.)” must have been a knowledgeable person with “practical mill 
experience,” as he claimed, but his grasp of contemporary spinning technology was by no means 
flawless, which was in part related to his ignorance of short-staple cotton. Rebutting the roller 
setting suggested by the Chinese, the issue that he first brought up, he asked the following back: 
“in the first place, I would like to know how the first and second rolls on any spinning frame can 
be properly set to run ⅞-inch stock? The front roll is never smaller in diameter than one inch, and 
the second ⅞ inch.” Contrary to his belief, however, the roller setting attempted by the Chinese 
was hardly impossible. As we can see from the bottom left diagram in Figure 3.4, the 
recommended diameter for the first roller of the spinning frame was ⅞ inch and for the second 
roller ¾ inch, both in the range of sizes he called impossible. Why then was “Wash (Mass.)” so 
                                                 
254 Wash (Mass.), "That Chinese Mill Problem," Cotton 86, no. 9 (July 1922): 728-29.  
113 
 
convinced of the impossibility of this setting? In other words, why did he not know of settings 
for ⅞-inch cotton, which were clearly specified in contemporary textbooks? 
   “Wash (Mass.)” most likely did not read the textbooks. But his limited knowledge of 
cotton, which underlay his ignorance of technology for processing short-staple cotton, was even 
more the result of his limited hands-on experience of different cotton varieties rather than a lack 
of reading, as was the case with Keeler and his erroneous technical advice on Hattori Shoten’s 
specifications. Raw cotton supplied to their domestic mills was mostly confined to those from 
the American South, and the Americans had few opportunities to work with foreign materials 
from China or India, another world-renowned cotton-producing area. Those working on the shop 
floor actively exchanged practical issues and solutions through professional journals like Cotton, 
but the knowledge in circulation was exclusively related to the use of American cotton whose 
average length was longer than one inch. There was no need for them to address the problem of 
short-staple cotton, at least before textile machine manufacturers like Whitin Machine Works 
and Saco-Lowell Shops began to export products to the Chinese and Japanese markets.    
The American case makes a good contrast with that of Great Britain. According to the 
1921 catalog of John Hetherington & Sons, Limited, a major British textile machine 
manufacturer, the company supplied front rollers for the spinning frame in the following range of 
diameters: 13/16, 7/8, 15/16, 1, 1-1/16, 1-1/8.255 Three out of six were below one inch, the sizes 
“Wash (Mass.)” called impossible. Also, the spectrum of rollers to be installed on the drawing 
frame was much broader than that of Whitin. As Figure 3.7 shows, John Hetherington provided 
                                                 
255 John Hetherington & Sons, Illustrated Catalogue of Textile Machinery Made by John Hetherington & Sons, 
Limited (Manchester: John Hetherington & Sons, 1921), 226-27. For comparison, Whitin’s 1923 catalog introduces 
only two sizes for the spinning front roller: 1 and 1⅛ inches. Whitin Machine Works, Illustrated and Descriptive 
Catalog of Whitin Cotton Yarn Machinery: And Handbook of Useful Information for Overseers and Operatives 




multiple ways to combine rollers depending on types of cotton from all over the world, which 
was a striking contrast to American companies whose work had been mostly focused on 
American cotton. In their list of roller settings, the recommneded size of the bottom front roller 
for Chinese cotton was clearly specified as 1⅛, not the 1¼ that Keeler suggested.  
 
Figure 3.7 Roller Settings for Drawing Frames by John Hetherington & Sons.256 Numbers 
in the rectangular shape, inserted by the author, indicate diameters for bottom front rollers. 
 
The relative diversity of British empirical data in roller setting needs to be considered in 
the larger context of economic and technological development of the two countries. Exemplified 
by the British mule and the American ring, the national competition in spinning technology has 
long been a subject of debate among economic historians.257 Building on H. J. Habakkuk’s 
seminal work on the relationship between labor scarcity and American technology, Gary 
Saxonhouse and Gavin Wright have argued that the skill-based mule spinning continued to be 
                                                 
256 John Hetherington & Sons, Textile Machinery (1921), 121.  
 
257 The mule and the ring represented different principles of spinning. Whereas the mule was based on intermittent 
spinning, in which spinning and winding processes alternated, the ring rested on continuous spinning. Their origins 
trace back to the Hargreaves’ Jenny and Arkwright’s water frame, respectively. For a list of relevant studies, see 
Gary R. Saxonhouse and Gavin Wright, "New Evidence on the Stubborn English Mule and the Cotton Industry, 




competitive in Great Britain because of its abundant skilled labor, wherease the ring spinning 
gained ascendancy in the United States due to the relative abundance of unskilled immigrant 
labor.258 The supply of raw cotton also played a part. In Lancashire, which sourced raw materials 
from across the world including India and the United States, the mule had an advantage due to its 
flexbility in fiber control. By contrast, the relatively crude technology of the ring rendered it 
more sutible for New England, in which stable supply of homogenous American cotton made up 
for the machine’s lack of flexibility in the use of raw cotton.259 
The distinct technological traditions that initially revolved around the compitition 
between the mule and the ring continued to define the industries even after British 
manufacturers’ entry into the ring business. After its decades-long development in New England, 
the ring spinning recrossed the Atlantic in the 1870s, and by the 1880s Great Britain had become 
the major supplier of ring frames for the global spinning machinery market except the United 
States.260 In Japan, for instance, the broadscale switch from the mule to the ring in the 1890s did 
not necessarily mean a shift from British mules to American rings; it meant a change from 
British mules to British rings.261 Likewise in China, which adopted the ring spinning from the 
                                                 
258 Gary R. Saxonhouse and Gavin Wright, "National Leadership and Competing Technological Paradigms: The 
Globalization of Cotton Spinning, 1878-1933," The Journal of Economic History 70, no. 3 (2010). 
 
259 For a more detailed analysis of the relationship between the development of the two machines and raw cotton 
supply, see their earlier article, Saxonhouse and Wright, "New Evidence," 513-15.  
 
260 Saxonhouse and Wright, "National Leadership," 540-43. 
 
261 British firms continued to monopolize the Japanese market, this time with rings instead of mules, and as of 1909, 
87 per cent of all spindles in Japan were supplied by one British company named Platt Brothers & Co. Ltd. 
Saxonhouse, "A Tale of Japanese Technological Diffusion," 162. Citing from W. A. G. Clark, Cotton Goods in 




beginning, British dominance continued until the outbreak of World War I, as discussed in 
Chapter 1.262  
The British dominance in these countries can be attributed to its experience with a variety 
of cotton types through the preceding mule system. More specifically, they incorporated the 
long-time emphasis on the flexibility in fiber control into the design of spinning machinese 
through careful adjustment of the rollers. The wealth of empirical data for roller setting presented 
in the catalog of John Hetherington (Figure 3.7) is a proof of such efforts. For American 
manufacturers, who were now poised to fill the void left by British firms during the war, 
providing flexible solutions to short-staple cotton was one of the most urgent tasks. It was in this 
context that the numerous adjustments were made to their machines for Chinese and Japanese 
factories. Saxonhouse and Wright attribute Japan’s successful transition from the mule to the 
ring to its innovative technique of mixing long-staple American cotton with short-staple cotton 
varieties,263 but by focusing on modifications made to the side of raw cotton only, they neglect 
the fact that efforts to achieve better fiber control were made to the end of machines as well.264 
Their inference might be able to provide a good explanation for Japan’s sharp swing from the 
mule to the ring but not enough for Japan’s choice of British rings over American rings.  
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My emphasis on the British tradition of flexible fiber control may imply that the 
American technology sat on the opposite end, but that was not true. What made U.S. technology 
seem relatively rigid and narrow was that they mostly relied on domestic cotton, which 
significantly reduced the range of deviations in cotton quality. American cotton, of course, was 
not free from variations. There always were cotton types that fell above or below the average, 
and machine manufacturers strived to solve the problem by modifying machine parts and their 
arrangements. As discussed earlier, Whitin manufactured three different sizes of bottom front 
rollers for the drawing frame—1⅛, 1¼, and 1⅜—although their suggested settings were mostly 
restricted to the use of American cotton.265  
Saco-Lowell Shops, another major American manufacturer, also expressed through the 
company’s catalog their commitment to producing drawing frames for various cotton grades:  
The Saco-Lowell Shops have given close attention to the development of the drawing 
frame. Each of the principal functions enumerated above, and many other minor but 
essential details, have been the subject of long and close observation, and costly 
experiment, both in our own shops and in various mills using all grades of cotton. As a 
result we are able to offer a frame better adapted to all grades of stock and more free from 
mechanical troubles than any other machine on the market. Not only will our frames do 
their work accurately, but they will do it continuously, which is a primary requisite for a 
large production. 266  
 
Of course, “all grades of cotton” were confined to those classified as American cotton. “Our 
standard Frame,” the catalogue continues, “is best adapted to handle all ordinary grades of 
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American Cotton, but to meet the requirements of mills using long staple cotton we build 
Drawing Frames on which the rolls may be spread to the width required.”267 Flexibility and 
diversity, as well as observation and experiment, were highlighted throughout the catalog, but 
both the publisher and the reader knew that these principles postulated variations that existed 
mostly for American cotton. They had believed so, at least until the company made the first large 
foreign sale in 1915,268 the same year the catalog was published.  
In Saco-Lowell’s updated catalog published in 1920, a new sentence was inserted into the 
page on the drawing frame: “We also furnish special small-diameter rolls and reduce the spread 
as required for very short staple or China cotton.”269 The appearance of Chinese cotton indicates 
a significant change in the readership of their catalogs and the demographics of their potential 
buyers. More importantly, it signals their increasing efforts to address solutions to Chinese 
cotton that, according to “Wash (Mass.), had a staple length impossible to spin yarn.270  
Modifying machines to process this exceptionally short staple was essential to their 
success in the Chinese market, but as the case of the anonymous Chinese suggests, best solutions 
did not necessarily come from the American headquarters; they rather came from the Chinese 
shop floor on which machines were istalled and operated. Accumulated knowledge on the 
ground was then transferred to the headquarters, codified into an updated version of their catalog, 
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the same year that Keeler gave the erroneous advice on Hattori Shoten’s specifications. In general, Saco-Lowell 
seems to have been more active in addressing technical solutions to Chinese cotton, which is confirmed by their 
larger market share in China. 
 
270 Saco-Lowell’s 1920 catalog also introduced a combined form of existing machines, which they called “China 




and disseminated back to local factories. Catalogs in this globalizing industry served as an 
indispensable conduit to disperse knowledge from the center to the periphery, yet its contents 
were nothing less than bodies of knowledge obtained through numerous on-site trials and errors. 
While globalization encouraged American firms to continue with the principle of 
customization, it pushed them to seek standardization to a certain degree. In his reply to Hattori 
Shoten’s request for modifications, Keeler clearly expressed the company’s willingness to 
incorporate such changes into future orders from East Asian cotton mills, saying that they were 
“most anxious to standardize, if possible, all machinery for export to the far East.” He also added 
he could provide small front rollers for future orders and make the change on “all the rest of the 
foreign orders,” although he remained skeptical of its efficacy. 271 Keeler’s eagerness for 
standardization might sound contradictory to the company’s long policy of customization, 
proudly advertised in their catalogs. Before taking his words at face value, however, we must 
first consider under what circumstances he came up with the idea. Ever since they began to 
manufacture machines for East Asian cotton mills, they encountered demands for numerous 
small and large modifications, often beyond the scope of the service they had provided to 
domestic clients. The adjustment of roller settings for Chinese cotton was a case in point. Some 
mills also wished to change the height of machine frames for the convenience of their operators 
who were shorter than American workers. Such a request had not been made by domestic cotton 
mills because the machines were designed to suit the average height of Americans. Indeed, the 
long questionnaire for the fabrication of the drawing frame, presented in Chapter 1, did not ask to 
specify the height of the frame, since height fell into a domain that had been standardized over 
decades of business in the American market.  
                                                 




The list of questions for specifications was thus a codification of boundaries between 
standardization and customization, established by the manufacturer. By presenting which parts 
could be customized, the manufacturer implicitly indicated which parts could not be changed. 
That is to say, many other elements of the frame without specifications belonged to the 
standardized category. When Asian mills began to challenge the borderline by requesting 
modifications of elements that had long been standardized, the headquarters wanted to redefine 
the boundaries for the company’s promising Asian market. That is what they meant by 
“standardization for foreign orders.” 
A decade-long depression swept through the American textile industry in the 1920s and 
the 1930s, but both Saco-Lowell Shops and Whitin Machine Works survived this time of 
hardship. They continued to make improvements on their existing machines and, among others, 
Saco-Lowell Shops’ Graphic Sliver Tester had a particularly significant impact on drawing 
technology. Unlike the conventional testing method that determined work efficiency by 
measuring the weight of sliver per yard, the new tester recorded the volume of the sliver for its 
entire length, which allowed an evaluation of linear irregularities that the old method failed to 
detect.272 In doing so, it disproved an old belief in the field that multiple drawing processes were 
necessary for the production of good-quality yarn; experiments with this new tester revealed that 
the doubling of slivers through continued drawing processes increased variations of irregularities 
instead. 273 When the anonymous Chinese reported their omission of third drawing as part of the 
remedy for the mill’s problem, “Wash (Mass.)” said the Chinese was “dead wrong.” “From the 
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birth of the cotton industry,” he continued, “the slogan has been, ‘double at every opportunity.’” 
The Graphic Sliver Tester proved almost two decades later who was “dead wrong.” 
3.3 Making Imitations Superior to the Originals 
Not long after the establishment of cotton mills, China witnessed the appearance of firms 
specializing in the production of machine parts. In other words, the Chinese began to supply 
replacements for aging accessories and parts by copying the originals. China Iron Works 
(Zhongguo Tie Gongchang, 中国铁工厂) was one such firm. Established in 1922 through an 
association of major cotton mills, including Dasheng, they focused on the reproduction of 
components of spinning machines such as spindles, rings, and gears.274  
The company regularly ran an advertisement in Huashang shachang lianhehui jikan 华商
纱厂联合会季刊 (China Cotton Journal). In the inaugural advertisement published in April 
1922, they gave an overview of their business, proudly touting their “specialists (zhuanjia, 专家) 
in the manufacture of spinning and weaving machines”; “hands-on experience (qinli, 亲历) with 
the original equipment from each foreign country”; “commitment to research (yanjiu, 研究)”; 
“investigation of the actual conditions (shidi, 实地) of Chinese cotton mills”; and “the 
improvement (gailiang, 改良) made on the original spindles.” They also emphasized that they 
“invited engineering specialists (gongcheng zhuanjia, 工程专家) educated in Europe and the 
United States, chose raw materials carefully, and picked artisans( gongjiang, 工匠) 
attentively.”275 All these descriptions suggest a successful copycat’s requirements. First, human 
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resources with hands-on experience with the given machines, as well as knowledge of 
mechanical and chemical engineering, were essential. Second, continued improvement in design 
to suit various local needs was indispensable; hence the need for research and development, an 
activity that we seldom associate with copying.  
In another advertisement, they provided concise technical descriptions of their products. 
An account of the spindles (squared in red in Figure 3.8) reads as follows: “The spindle is one of 
the most important components of spinning machines, on which yarn output depends entirely. 
Since it revolves 10,000 times per minute, it is needless to say that the structure has to be precise 
and the material has to be of the finest quality. Our spindle is fabricated, including its most trivial 
part, using special machines and American steel. All our workers are highly experienced, and 
each spindle is given a test run before shipment.”276  
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Figure 3.8 Advertisement for China Iron Works.277 
 
This somewhat lengthy text typed in a tiny font was inserted into the advertisement with 
a dual purpose. First, far from simply conveying information about the spindle, the text was 
intended to educate readers on the importance of all its technical details. Furthermore, by inviting 
potential buyers to read the text and learn about the technologies, the company effectively 
presented itself as a reliable supplier with good knowledge of the trade, rather than a mere 
copycat making cheap imitations. 
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It is noteworthy that the company highlighted the American origin of raw materials to 
tout the quality of their spindle, apparently contradicting their commitment to the promotion of 
guohuo (national products, 国货).278 Like other Chinese companies that engaged in copying 
imports, an appeal to nationalism through import substitution continued to form an important 
part of their marketing strategy. Defining guohuo, however, was a tricky job, especially in the 
machine industry, where it was nearly impossible to make purely “national products” without 
relying on foreign technologies, parts, or raw materials. Years later in 1928, the newly 
established Nationalist government would promulgate standards to grade “national products” 
according to the combined degree of reliance on foreign capital, management, raw materials, and 
labor. With grade one as the purest and grade seven as the least pure, those that employed 
Chinese capital, management, labor and a small amount of non-Chinese raw materials were 
classified as grade two, and those that primarily relied on foreign materials were grade four.279 
However, this logic—the less foreign materials the better—seemed irrelevant to China Iron 
Works’ stance on guohuo. They rather highlighted the foreign source of raw materials, since, 
they believed, the good quality of American steel would eventually count toward the strengths of 
their spindles as guohuo. Whereas they had mastered the mechanical dimension of copying, they 
recognized that their expertise in chemical engineering did not match that of the original maker. 
Under such circumstances, they probably judged, it was better to make good-quality imitations 
employing American steel than churn out poor-quality copies entirely made of Chinese 
materials.    
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The company did not engage in the reproduction of the main body of a spinning machine, 
and the reason was economic rather than technological. When they started business, the Chinese 
cotton industry had just entered a decade-long post-war depression, as discussed in Chapter 1. 
The number of newly established cotton mills remained small,280 which consequently reduced 
demand for full machine packages for a complete cotton mill. By contrast, demands for parts and 
tools for the maintenance of existing equipment continued to grow, since their lifespan was much 
shorter than the main frames. The emphasis in the spinning machine business thus shifted from 
the fabrication and installation of new equipment to the maintenance and repair of old 
equipment.  
Conditions in the United States were not that different. As the Southern market began to 
reach saturation at the turn of the century, Whitin administration perceived that the era of full 
package orders was indeed over. Even when China suddenly emerged as an attractive market 
with endless potential for growth, the production of machine parts remained an important 
segment of their business, since they could further penetrate the Chinese market by supplying 
spindles and rings to those who were already equipped with British machinery (Figure 3.9). 
Therefore, when China began to produce imitations of these parts, especially spindles that were 
interchangeable with both British and American brands, it posed a threat to Whitin, which was 
already struggling against shrinking volumes of new orders. 
                                                 




Figure 3.9 Whitin’s Catalogue of Rings.281 The rings were touted as 
“Unsurpassed For Roundness, Smoothness, Hardness, and Durability.” 
The story of the reproduction of the weaving loom unfolded quite differently. As 
mentioned in other chapters, the mechanization of cotton weaving in China did not follow the 
same path as cotton spinning. During the first three decades of machine spinning, China’s hand 
weaving industry was actually revitalized thanks to the growing supply of cheap machine-spun 
yarn. Beginning in the 1920s, however, existing cotton mills increasingly added a weaving 
department to their production line. As opposed to spinning machines, whose market had been 
saturation by that time, demand for power looms continued to increase. While the Chinese cotton 
mills primarily relied on imported weaving looms, especially Toyota power looms from Japan, a 
number of Chinese firms quickly began to produce imitations.282   
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established its own machine factory after the launching of the cotton production, where it produced imitations of the 
Toyota weaving loom. In the knitting industry, for instance, the automatic hand-knitting machine was first 
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Oriental Engineering Works (Dalong Jiqi Tie Gongchang, 大隆机器铁工厂) was a firm 
that specialized in parts and tools for general machine work as well as weaving looms. Aiming at 
a broader machine market beyond cotton mills, the scope of their metal products was wider than 
that of China Iron Works. Despite that, their main product remained weaving looms. In his 1929 
report on the industrial inspection of Chinese textile factories, Arno Pearse, General Secretary of 
the International Federation of Master Cotton Spinners and Manufacturers’ Associations, vividly 
described the company’s copying job. When he visited their factories in Shanghai, the seven 
hundred workers were “faithfully” copying the Toyota plain loom and winding machine, relying 
on crankshafts imported from Great Britain. The daily output was four looms per day, which the 
company expected to increase with government subsidies. Still in the incipient stage, the 
enterprise was not financially successful, yet Pearse saw it as having good potential for 
success.283  
Oriental Engineering Works started business in 1902, well ahead of China Iron Works, 
originally as a repair shop for cotton mill machinery.284 In 1928, after 26 years of repair work, 
they began to manufacture textile machines and parts as well as other types of industrial 
equipment. The transformation of a repairman into a maker (or a copycat) was not a mere 
coincidence. It is not hard to surmise that in the course of repairing a machine, the repairman 
mastered all its hidden operational principles through reverse engineering, and that the 
accumulation of such hands-on experience eventually equipped him with the full capacity to 
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reproduce the given machine for himself. This shift could occur in any manufacturing sector that 
involved repair. In his study of China’s printing industry, for instance, Christopher Reed has 
presented a fascinating case study of repairmen who succeeded in reproducing the foreign 
printing machines they used to repair.285 
Copying through reverse engineering was by no means a task that could be done in one 
sitting. As opposed to its conventional association with unlabored achievement, reproducing a 
machine without any formal instructions or written specifications required considerable time and 
effort. The copycat had to first grasp the principles of operation hidden in the machine and then 
obtain the techniques needed to transform the raw materials, usually iron and steel, into an actual 
machine with the desired strength and durability. Even if he figured out all the “secrets,” he still 
had to go through a lengthy process of trial-and-error in order to make an imitation that 
performed as well as or better than the original. There was indeed a good reason that Oriental 
Engineering Works made four looms a day at most, since having a machine in one’s hand did not 
necessarily lead to its immediate and successful reproduction. As China Iron Works underscored 
in its advertisement, “commitment to research” was crucial to this process. Setting aside the 
controversy surrounding ethical concerns, copying was technologically challenging work that 
demanded mastery of both mechanical and chemical engineering.  
Contrary to the general assumption about copying as the making of cheap imitations, the 
Chinese were interested in producing domestic substitutes that outstripped the foreign originals 
in terms of quality. In other words, they were not interested in copying the originals in every 
minute detail. They rather wished to make improved versions that better suited local needs at a 
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lower cost; hence, China Iron Works began to fabricate weaving looms with a shorter height for 
the convenience of shorter Chinese workers.286 The boundaries between copying and improving 
were deeply intertwined and interdependent in this way. More importantly, as Eugenia Lean’s 
recent study shows, the practices of copying, tinkering, and improving were promoted as a 
means of protecting national industry against the encroachment of imperialist global capitalism 
by the proponents of the National Products Movement (hereafter NPM), as well as the 
Nationalist government.287 “In an era when the ideal of patriotic manufacturing and an ethos of 
nativist industrialism defined the NPM,” Lean argues, they “hailed copying, experimenting, and 
improving as skills that were exemplary in virtue.”288 
In the absence of official “recipes,” the success or failure of copying hinged on the 
copycat’s previous hands-on experience with the given machine, defined as all sorts of practical 
knowledge obtained while working with the machine at the stages of installation, modification, 
operation, maintenance, and repair. The copycat would have gained such knowledge while 
assisting foreign engineers dispatched by the manufacturer for the installation of new equipment; 
while experimenting with roller settings on the drawing frame or by watching others perform the 
job; and while exchanging broken spindles, rings, and rollers or by observing technicians from 
the manufacturer or the agent company fix problems that were beyond the copycat’s capacity. 
These technicians, as part of their repair service, probably gave follow-up instructions on how to 
respond to similar problems in the future or how to maintain the parts more efficiently. Ways of 
learning by doing and observing were endless indeed, and the copycat’s knowledge deepened in 
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this way. He gained such hands-on experience possibly as a machinist. Or, as I will discuss 
further in Chapter 4, there was a good chance that he was once a machine operator. Whatever the 
official title of his previous job was, the work experience now qualified him as an “industrial 
artisan” whom companies like China Iron Works were eager to hire. His craftsmanship was 
valued more than ever in an era when China was striving to build robust “modern” industry by 
substituting foreign machines and technologies with their Chinese imitations. 
Engineers who received formal engineering education, like Su Yuqing in this chapter and 
Yang Sih-zung from Chapter 2, were also sought after by a range of machine companies, either 
Chinse- or foreign-owned. Called gongchengshi (engineers) or gongcheng zhuanjia (engineering 
experts), they formed a new, privileged social class that was distinct from those classifiable 
under the category of gongjiang (工匠，artisans). True as it is that their expertise in engineering 
drew upon a different mode of knowledge acquisition, drawing a hasty line between them and 
other technical experts runs the risk of creating a false dichotomy between theory and practice. It 
could also consolidate the hierarchy of mind versus body or head versus hand, an analogy that 
contemporary engineers casually cited in their discussions of engineering and machine work.289 
Although college-educated engineers were an invaluable asset to industrializing China, the 
nature of machine work on the shop floor, which required flexible responses to various local 
problems, did not allow them to stand as a mere vanguard of theory. A fresh graduate in 
mechanical or chemical engineering was not necessarily more knowledgeable about factory work 
than a machinist with years of experience. In order for his textbook engineering knowledge to 
bear fruition in the field, hands-on experience with machines, metal, and cotton was essential. 
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Flexibility and intuition, the qualities required of technical experts to deal with numerous case-
by-case technical issues, were not something that could be learned by reading books; they were 
rather an outcome of one’s deep knowledge of the shop floor—i.e., hands-on experience.  
The ubiquitous practice of copying in China was a concern shared by many foreign 
businessmen. Pearse wrote in his report that there was “no compunction about imitating 
anybody’s patent, unless it ha[d] been registered in China.” Even if that was the case, he 
cautioned, it was very difficult to fight to protect one’s patent in China.290 The official handbook 
of the U.S. government addressed the same issue, noting that there was no formal patent 
institution in China as of 1926. As China was only “at the inception of modern industrialism,” it 
stated, “the question of protection of patents ha[d] not become one of commanding importance.” 
The only way to protect one’s devices from infringement was to make an application to an 
American consulate in China with certified records of the patent granted by the U.S. government, 
although its efficacy is a subject of inquiry.291 
These voices, however, represented only some stances on copying in the global market. 
Whitin, for instance, maintained a somewhat lenient attitude toward the practice. When the 
company received letters of complaint about delayed deliveries of machines and parts, the 
headquarters advised that the Chinese procure minor parts locally if possible. In other words, 
they encouraged their clients to copy their own products, possibly out of confidence backed up 
by the unprecedented volumes of new orders for full machine packages. Their leniency was self-
consistent, since later on they themselves contemplated copying spinning frames from Platt 
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Brothers when competition to obtain new orders became increasingly fierce.292 As David 
Edgerton has argued, “all countries, firms, individuals, with rare and unusual exceptions, have 
relied on others to invent, and have imitated more than they have invented.”293 Copying was 
indeed a global practice. Alter all, Paul Moody and Francis Lowell’s patented weaving loom, a 
key component of America’s integrated cotton mill system, also started as an imitation of the 
British model.294 
3.4 Conclusion 
A plethora of publication including catalogs, journals, and textbooks allowed technical 
experts easy access to practical knowledge, but what made their knowledge truly practical was 
hands-on experience. Furthermore, due to the experimental nature of machine work, solutions to 
fix mechanical problems did not always come from the headquarters of machine manufacturers. 
It was Hattori Shoten, not Whitin Machine Works, who requested the change of the bottom front 
roller to 1⅛ inches, presumably after hearing positive results with the same setting from another 
factory, Huaxin Cotton Mills. It was the anonymous Chinese author and the desperate Chinese 
mill that were finally able to spin good-quality yarn out of ⅞-inch staple after trial and error, 
when “Wash (Mass.)” called it impossible. Machines moved from the manufacturer to the client 
mill and from the United States to China, but knowledge for adjusting them to local conditions 
did not necessarily move in the same direction. In the course of installing, modifying, and 
operating them on the shop floor, new sets of  knowledge were produced by the workers who 
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grappled with the machines and Chinese cotton. And the accumulation of such knowledge often 
culminated in the reproduction of the foreign originals.  
If experience and experiment were of such importance to the machine work, what was the 
use of handbooks and manuals after all? In her study of practical how-to books written by 
craftsmen of early modern Europe, Pamela Smith argues that those books were not written 
merely to enhance the intellectual and social status of authorship.295 Their goal was rather to 
convey attentive attitudes and actions that fostered artisanal practices and, ultimately, “to instruct 
in the ability to improvise, that is, to respond to new situations intuitively.”296 It indeed seems 
that the craftmen’s practice that valued intuition and improvisation, and observation and 
experience, had come alive in the early twentieth-century handbooks for engineers, machinists, 
and operators, who, according to our historiography, worked in a work setting that was 
distinguished from the artisan’s workshop. However, if the readers found these “modern” books 
useful, it was not because the handbooks taught them the importance of hands-on experience; it 
was because they offered all the textual and visual knowledge such as formulas, engineering 
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Maintenance: Female Machine Operators on the (Re)Productive Shop Floor 
 
While the mechanization of cotton spinning gave rise to new professions such as 
engineers and machinists, it devastated the sector of hand spinning, a vital handicraft that had 
long been performed by Chinese mothers and daughters in peasant households. In doing so, it 
brought about several important social changes: the site of yarn production shifted from 
household to factory; it was made exclusively for market sale rather than for domestic use; and 
wageworkers replaced female family members who were seldom remunerated for their spinning 
work. All these changes ostensibly point to a radical transition of cotton spinning from the 
domain of reproduction to that of production. However, a close examination of the course of 
mechanization reveals that this process was far from linear. True as it was that industrialization 
caused a series of ruptures in China, some of its old practices persisted under the new system, 
and boundaries between public and domestic and production and reproduction were not always 
clear-cut. 
Our notion of these antithetical categories is relatively recent, mostly derived from the 
experience of Western, industrialized societies, and hence they are not cross-culturally universal, 
as feminist scholars have argued.297 Francesca Bray, for instance, has shown that the spatial 
distinction between “inner” and “outer” in late imperial China was not as rigid as that of 
domestic and public in the industrial West, because in China “the house was not a separate, 
private domain, but formed a political and moral continuum with community and state.”298 Thus, 
                                                 
297 Scholars who work on gender and kinship have long challenged the validity of these analytic distinctions. For a 
review of the scholarship, see Susan Mckinnon and Fenella Cannell, eds., Vital Relations: Modernity and the 
Persistent Life of Kinship (Santa Fe: SAR Press, School for Advanced Research Press, 2013), 12-14. 
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as Susan McKinnon and Fenella Cannell point out, “the separation of domestic (kinship) and 
public (political and economic) relations should not be presupposed but rather should be a matter 
of historical and ethnographic inquiry.”299  
By approaching female machine operators of Dasheng Cotton Mills as the maintainers of 
both the household and the factory, this chapter illuminates the entanglements of production and 
reproduction on the Chinese shop floor, where all the “modern” boundaries began to be drawn, 
but not necessarily in a way intended by its industrialists or as practiced in the West. During the 
first ten years of Dasheng’s business, the number of male workers was greater than that of 
female workers. Contrary to the general association of women’s “delicate hand” with spinning 
work, Dasheng’s skillful male machine operators proved that men could be as good as women at 
piecing broken threads and tending spinning machines. Beginning in the 1910s, however, female 
workers rapidly came to outnumber their male counterparts. One of the factors that facilitated 
this change was the duty of childcare, which always fell on mothers. If female workers had to 
accompany young babies who required constant care, what positions other than the machine 
operator, which did not require them to move beyond the operational radius of the machine, 
would better suit that need? Since machine operators constituted the majority of the workforce of 
a cotton mill, this shift led to the feminization of the entire workforce.  
The presence of baskets with crying babies standing near fast-revolving machines sounds 
shocking today. It was not only dangerous, but also strays far from the familiar image of the 
factory as a “modern” workplace in which family and work are supposed to remain separate. But 
this unfamiliarity forces us to rethink the meaning of industrialization to these female workers. 
Although the new production system brought about numerous social and economic changes, it 
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did not really change the gynocentric landscape of cotton spinning. It rather perpetuated the 
notion that spinning was women’s work that could be performed along with childcare, and thus 
the long-standing women’s work of spinning and rearing had been perfectly transplanted from 
household to factory, now with the noise of textile machines and the floating cotton lint that 
filled the entire building.  
The inseparability of reproduction from production was crucial to the maintenance of the 
new production system. By reluctantly allowing the babies into the mill, the company was able 
to secure a constant supply of female machine operators. If the babies were forbidden from the 
shop floor, their mothers would quit their jobs. A strict separation of reproduction from 
production was thus likely to cause a shortage of labor. The job of these female machine 
operators was, then, to take care of their babies and spinning machines for twelve hours a day, a 
task that required multiple skills. Despite that, they were never appreciated as skilled workers, as 
we can see from the stigma of “unskilled labor.” By shedding new light on their skill as a 
machine operator, which required not only delicacy and quickness but also a good mechanical 
understanding of the machine, this chapter argues for female machine operators, the most 
underrepresented professionals in the field, as the true maintainers of the factory system. 
The paper starts by contextualizing the primary sources: Dasheng’s factory regulations 
and interviews with its former workers. Paying attention to discrepancies between the two 
sources, the first part examines how the ideal of productivity codified in the factory regulations 
was constantly challenged and negotiated on the shop floor. One of the inconsistencies was the 
presence of male machine operators; the position was intended for women from the beginning as 
the factory regulations denominated its official title as “nügong,” which means a “female 
worker.” Following the career of an exceptionally skillful male machine operator, the second 
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part shows that the job required a considerable degree of skill. The third part charts the 
feminization of the workforce, accompanied by the presence of babies on the shop floor. By 
showing how tending spinning machines became women’s work, compatible with childcare, it 
highlights the historical continuity of spinning as women’s work and of its marginal status in the 
hierarchy of knowledge system in textile production. The chapter concludes by analyzing the 
operators’ struggle to maintain aging machines by making up for the machines’ mechanical 
defects with their handwork.  
4.1 Written Regulations, Lived Experience: Sources and Discrepancies 
Produced in the 1900s and the 1960s respectively, Dasheng’s factory regulations and 
interviews with its former workers are rare sources that provide all specific descriptions of mill 
jobs, allowing us to reach a concrete picture of the shop floor of a cotton mill. When read 
together, however, they show discrepancies, disclosing that the ideal workplace meticulously 
specified in the official regulations was hard to realize on the actual shop floor. The founder 
Zhang Jian envisioned his factory as a place for production only, but it was not easy to draw a 
clear line between production and reproduction in the early twentieth century, when China had 
barely begun to experiment with industrialization. 
The interviews were conducted in 1964 under the command of Mu Xuan, a local 
historian in Nantong. When Mu finished a draft of his book manuscript, entitled “A history of the 
struggle of Dasheng No.1 Mill workers” (Dasheng yichang gongren douzheng shi 大生一厂工人
斗争史), China Youth Press proposed to publish it on condition that he include supplementary 
materials on the “oppression” and “exploitation” of the workers employed before 1949.300 Such a 
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demand from the publisher was not irrelevant to the Socialist Education (shejiao, 社教), also 
known as the Four Cleanups, which swept through the country from 1963 until 1965, eventually 
leading to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (hereafter Cultural Revolution). It was a 
campaign launched by the Chinese Communist Party to “clean up” corrupt cadres who had 
colluded with former landlords and rich peasants.301 Mu himself was also involved in the 
movement. The municipal Party committee of Nantong dispatched an organization to Dasheng 
No. 1 Mill as part of the campaign, of which Mu was a member.302 With support from the 
committee, he formed a team with Dasheng’s two current workers, Xu Yonghe and He Lianqing, 
who conducted interviews with approximately 300 former workers from March to June in 
1964.303 
Many interviewees portrayed their experience as full of hardship and suffering, but we 
cannot take their answers at face value, since the project was initiated with the explicit goal of 
highlighting the “oppression” and “exploitation” of the workers among their variegated work 
experiences. It is not that factory work was easy, but the overall direction and tone of the 
interview questions must have guided the interviewees to highlight the dark side of their work 
and lives before 1949. Most of them narrated their stories in a particular order, which allows us 
to reconstruct a set of possible interview questions as follows:  
When did you start to work? 
What was your job and how much did you earn?  
How were the conditions of meals and childcare? 
Have you experienced any unfair treatment by senior workers or fore(wo)men? 
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How did you manage to get to work by 6 AM in the absence of timepieces?304  
What did you do after work (or did you have a good rest after work)?  
What was your life like under the Japanese rule? 
 
Given that all these questions were asked expecting negative answers in comparison with the 
post-1949 circumstances, it was unlikely that the interviewees were asked to tell about “the most 
fulfilling moment they had while working as machine operators” or “the work or skill they took 
particular pride in,” although some of them alluded to it. The highly personal nature of 
biographical sources also undermines the value of these interviews as a reliable primary source. 
The workers tended to describe melodramatically, often in vivid detail, how they suffered from 
evil-minded fore(wo)men, aging machines, avaricious mothers-in-law, and lack of sleep, food, 
and proper compensation.  
Unaware of their political bias, Mu and his team simply believed that they could maintain 
neutrality by recording exactly what the workers told, by preserving the original spoken 
language, and by never adding their own perspectives or wording.305 Yet, their commitment to 
neutrality was sincere. Those who worked for Dasheng during the first ten years generally 
described their experience in a more positive way than their successors, suggesting that the 
factory system under capitalism was not always exploitative or oppressive. Mu did not attempt to 
erase their voices, despite possible political consequences under increasingly strict Party 
censorship.306 The project was completed in 1964, but the interview materials were taken for 
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inspection at the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 and were returned to Mu in 1979, more 
than ten years later. They were finally published in 1993.307  
Despite all these limitations, when read in conjunction with the factory regulations, the 
interviews provide otherwise unavailable information about the realities of cotton mill work. 
Interviews with workers from the earlier period provide particularly revealing insights into the 
gendered division of labor on the shop floor. Not a few male workers said that they“pieced yarn 
ends” (jieshatou, 接纱头) , which was a task generally deemed for female workers. According 
to the factory regulations, the official title of the position in charge of joining broken yarn ends 
was nügong, the literal meaning of which is a female worker.308 How can we make sense of this 
discrepancy? Nügong began to appear in the earliest version (1899) of the factory regulations 
under the sections of the roving and spinning departments. Their primary job was tending 
machines in these departments. More specifically, they were responsible for maintaining 
continuous operation of roving and spinning machines by piecing broken yarn (jiesha, 接纱)  or 
by joining a thread from the previous process to the roller of the current machine (shengsha, 生
纱).309  
The term nügong indicates that Zhang Jian was already envisioning female machine 
operators when drafting the regulations. Elisabeth Köll presumes that when Zhang drew up the 
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factory regulations in late 1897, he did not consult any Western or Chinese precedents, but was 
rather influenced by regulations for government-sponsored military enterprises such as the 
Beiyang Navy.310 Her assumption, however, is hard to affirm; the documents were too specific to 
be considered as written by someone who did not refer to existing cases. The responsibilites of 
each job were specified in great detail, which implies that Zhang Jian drafted them with a 
thorough understanding of work processes on the shop floor, possibly after learning about 
instances of well-established cotton mills in the West or in Japan where most machine operators 
were women. 
The discrepancy then indicates that Zhang Jian failed to recruit female machine operators 
as intended, at least during the initial period. According to statistics taken from the interviews, 
the gender ratio of newly employed workers during the first ten years (1898-1907) stood at 1:1. 
Yan Xuexi estimates that the actual percentage of male workers might have been even higher, 
given men’s shorter average life expectancy; many of the male workers employed in the early 
days would have passed away by the time the interviews were conducted. It was during the 
second ten years (1908-1917) that female workers began to outnumber their male counterparts at 
the percentage of 66.1%; from 1918 to 1927, it rose to 88.89%; and from 1928 to 1937, to 
96.55%.311  
Zhang Jian chose Nantong as the factory site in anticipation of easy access to the 
abundant female rural workforce with unbound feet,312 but the local people were not as 
enthusiastic about working for a cotton mill as he expected. There was a general tendency to 
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look down on factory work,313 as a former worker Zhao Xiuzhen recalled: “…people said if one 
worked at a factory, she had to do the same even after death with nothing to eat but dung. My 
family suffered hardship, and I did not care what to do in this life and what to do in the other 
life…I just went to work.”314 Moreover, the incipient shop floor was crowded with machinists 
and experienced machine operators from big cities like Shanghai, Wuxi, and Ningbo who were 
recruited to facilitate smooth mill operation, as well as British experts to install the equipment. 
With the presence of strangers, combined with the conditions in which men and women worked 
in the same space, the factory was considered a far from desirable workplace.315  
This negative perception of factory work was not necessarily associated with the 
emphasis on the spatial seclusion of the inner quarters, a centuries-old custom that was still 
prevalent in China with regional variations.316 A good number of female workers said that they 
did fieldwork after the night shift, which the local people did not seem to view with disdain.317 
Qin Cuiying began to work for Dasheng’s roving department in 1925, when she was eleven years 
old. After working for a year, she quit the job due to her maternal uncle’s dissuasion, who was 
concerned that “nobody wants a factory girl (做工的女人是没人要的).” She then worked in the 
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fields.318 Qin’s case confirms that the local people’s view of farm work was not as negative as 
that of factory work, despite the fact that both took place outside of the inner quarters. It also 
suggests that the contemptuous attitude toward factory work persisted even decades after the 
opening of Dasheng’s first cotton mill. Widowed at age 29, Qin had to return to the factory in 
1943, when an increasing number of existing workers quit the job in fear of the occupying 
Japanese forces.319 The shop floor was thus staffed by those with no option but the factory to 
make a living. 
The balanced initial gender ratio of the workforce was not peculiar to Dasheng. Mills in 
Shanghai, the industrial capital of China, also had initial difficulties in recruiting women 
workers.320 Even as late as 1930, the demographics of Chinese cotton mill workers showed 
varied gender ratios depending on region. On the whole, female workers certainly outnumbered 
male workers at 61.8%. In Wuhan, however, the number of male workers exceeded that of 
female workers at 53.0%, and in Qingdao the percentage stood at an overwhelming 93.6%.321 
These all indicate that female dominance was not an inherent feature of cotton mills. Gender 
ratios could vary depending on social, cultural, and economic circumstances of regions in which 
cotton mills were located, and even in the same region, they changed over time.  
The inconsistency created by the presence of male nügong seemed to be mitigated by a 
growing number of female workers, but this change brought about another rupture: the presence 
of babies on the shop floor. Many female workers said that they had to bring their babies into the 
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factory, as there was no one at home to entrust with childcare. The duty of child rearing without 
exception fell on mothers, forcing them to shoulder the duties of childcare as well as already 
overloaded factory work. When Zhang Jian conceived the idea of cotton mills with an 
anticipation of easy access to the rural female workforce, he probably did not foresee babies 
having to accompany their mothers. Nonetheless, he and the company had no choice but to turn a 
blind eye to the practice, especially during the early years when they had difficulty in recruiting. 
The practice continued even after the company began to have a good labor supply, since most of 
the newly hired machine operators were now women. A “modern” workplace envisioned by 
Zhang Jian with clear boundaries between production and reproduction could therefore exist only 
in the form of written text.  
4.2 Male Machine Operators: Gender, Skill, and Cotton Spinning  
Zhang Ruiqing entered Dasheng No. 1 Mill at the age of twelve in 1898, when the factory 
building was still under construction.322 His first job was cleaning secondhand spinning 
machines that were transported from Shanghai after sitting for years on a shoal of Huangpu 
River. When the factory started operation the next year, he was appointed to the spinning 
department as a tonggong, which means a “child worker.” The position was mentioned in 
Dasheng’s 1899 regulations with a brief job depiction, and the subsequent 1904 regulations 
stipulated its full responsibilities.323 In many ways, it was similar to the doffer, a typical mill job 
for child workers with the task of doffing, i.e. replacing full bobbins with empty ones. As was 
the case with nügong, Zhang Jian opted for a title that represented the gender or age of workers 
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to be assigned to the job over one that encapsulated its specific duties; hence “nügong” instead of 
“machine operators” and “tonggong” instead of “doffers.”324  
Assigned to each spinning frame, the tonggong was required to pull out bobbins full of 
spun yarn from the machine as soon as hearing the signal for doffing (luosha, 落纱) and then 
replenish it with empty bobbins. The frequency of bobbin exchanges differed depending on yarn 
quality. For 12s (a very course type), bobbins were exchanged ten times during an eleven-hour 
shift, both night and day; for 14s (still coarse but one grade higher than 12s), eight times was 
sufficient.325 In theory, the tonggong should have considerable free time during the intervals 
between bobbin exchanges. As Lucy Larcom reminisced about her experience as a bobbin-doffer 
at the Lowell cotton mill, the intervals were her playtime, during which she would run home or 
listen to a funny story from a waste-picker,326 or repeat verses and sing songs.327 Such a luxury 
was not available to Zhang Ruiqing. In addition to doffing, Dasheng’s tonggong were 
responsible for gathering any bobbins left in the lanes between spinning frames, as well as 
sweeping cotton lint. They were also required to collect cotton waste lying on the ground. It was 
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important to segregate oil-stained waste from clean waste, since the latter could be recycled.328 
With all these miscellaneous tasks, Zhang had no idle moments in his schedule. 
 After working as a tonggong for a certain period of time, Zhang Ruiqing began to piece 
broken threads on a spinning machine.329 In doing so, he finally became a machine operator. 
Now part of the nucleus of the labor force with a direct impact on the productivity of the 
company, he received higher wages than when he was a tonggong. “Machine operator,” 
however, was not the official title of his new position. Ironically, Zhang Ruiqing was promoted 
to become a “female worker,” since, as discussed earlier, the post in charge of piecing broken 
threads was denominated as “nügong.” As a novice nügong, he would have first learned to grab 
the two loose ends of broken yarn, twist them around his index finger, and then roll them against 
his thumb to make a knot. The procedure was completed by snipping away the extra threads. 
Although seemingly simple, it was a task that required a considerable degree of skill. The 
knot had to be very small so as not to make the yarn defective and the job had to be done as 
quickly as possible since the machine should not be stopped while the task was being performed. 
It took a full minute for a novice to complete the task, but an experienced worker was expected 
to be able to join six threads in a minute, as threads were likely to snap in quick succession on 
fast-revolving machines.330  Those that were not immediately repaired turned into cotton waste, 
which the operators were required to collect for recycling in sacks carried on their chests.331 As 
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this skill had a direct impact on the machine’s performance, it often became a subject of 
technical analysis, and the findings were shared in professional journals. Ironically, the 
significance of this embodied skill became visible and valuable only when it was written down 
into such texts, mostly authored by male engineers.332 
Wages for each operator were determined by their daily output, set on the basis of the 
amounts of spun yarn and cotton waste. With more yarn and less waste, wages would increase, 
and with the reverse, they decreased.333 Each frame could be tended by two to six operators, and 
their combined daily wages did not exceed fifty cents (wu jiao, 五角). For instance, if a frame 
was tended by two fully experienced workers, called shushou, the two would divide up the fifty 
cents depending on their day’s output ;if tended by five or six less-skilled workers, they would 
earn much less.334 All operators worked the same hours but were paid differently depending on 
their performance.  
The message delivered through this piece-rate system was clear: workers would be 
rewarded for their skill. “All workers,” the company’s 1904 regulations specified, “are rewarded 
with varying wages depending on their craftsmanship (shouyi, 手艺) and diligence.”335 This 
stipulation clearly shows that the company understood factory work as a job that required skill, 
hence problematizing the conventional understanding of cotton mill workers as unskilled 
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laborers. By differentiating novice workers (shengshou, 生手) from skilled workers (shushou, 熟
手), they also recognized varying degrees of skill that existed among the workers. Not all 
machine operators were considered unskilled simply because they did not receive formal 
education or vocational training before entering the factory. They were expected to become 
skilled by gaining hands-on experience on the shop floor, and experienced workers were 
encouraged to be even more skillful under the piece-rate system. They learned while working. 
Work in this sense did not only serve as a means of earning wages; it was also a means of 
obtaining skills to earn more wages. 
The dual nature of work urges us to rethink the shop floor as a site for both production 
and reproduction, on a different level than that represented by female machine operators who 
tended both machines and babies. Machine operators produced surplus value by doing the job, 
but in order to have a full capacity as part of the production system, their labor as a commodity 
had to be produced first. The place for such social reproduction was not necessarily limited to 
households where they were born, raised, fed, clothed, and sheltered to grow into capable 
workers. By taking over the role of households and schools to a certain degree, the factory also 
served as an important site of social reproduction, by transforming newly employed, 
inexperienced workers who barely produced surplus value into a full-fledged labor force. This 
was especially true of child laborers. In arguing for the integrated relations of production and 
reproduction in the capitalist system, social reproduction theorists point out the “superficial 
nature of the neat spatial divisions between production (public) and reproduction (private),” but 
they still tend to uphold the view that labor power is produced “outside of the circuit of 
commodity production.”  A close reading of Dasheng’s wage system reveals that the production 
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of commodities and the social reproduction of labor forces were actually taking place 
simultaneously on the same shop floor.  
However skillful the machine operators became, the company did not have to compensate 
them beyond the combined wages of fifty cents per spinning frame. In some way, this system 
was likely to turn into a zero-sum game, driving the workers into limitless competition. In order 
for one experienced worker to earn more, the other equally experienced worker had to earn less 
that day regardless of his or her absolute output, because the maximum wages were fixed at fifty 
cents. The only way to get out of this vicious cycle was to transfer to a job that paid better or to 
be promoted to a higher position—i.e., the fore(wo)man.  
Some of the most experienced machine operators were rewarded with a promotion to the 
position of nügongtou, which means a forewoman. Here, we see another discrepancy in gender 
between official job titles and the actual shop floor. According to the factory regulations, 
nügongtou were supposed to be all women because they were chosen out of experienced nügong 
(female workers). But since there were already many male nügong, it was not uncommon to have 
male nügongtou. Due to his excellence in the piecing job, Zhang Ruiqing became a nügongtou at 
the age of seventeen.336 He was, on one the hand, lucky in terms of timing. Having started to 
work even before the factory began operation, he became a skilled worker when the company 
was undergoing rapid growth and was still in need of more operators, both experienced and 
inexperienced. Those who entered the factory a decade later would not have had as good a 
chance of becoming a fore(wo)man as Zhang did within such a short time. Nevertheless, he was 
arguably one of the most skillful operators and the quickest learners, as it was rare in any case 
for a worker who started his or her career as a tonggong to become a fore(wo)man within five 
                                                 




years at work. His successful career as a machine operator clearly shows that men could be as 
good as women at handling cotton yarn and tending spinning machines. Delicacy and quickness 
were not the exclusive preserve of women.  
After four years of serving as a nügongtou, Zhang requested a transfer to a different 
position, complaining that “it is a little inconvenient for a male worker to supervise female 
workers.”337 His reason for the transfer request indicates that the feminization of the workforce 
had been progressed to a noticeable degree by the time he decided to quit the job as a nügongtou, 
and that skill per se was not a driving force of the gendered division of labor. He decided to quit 
the job not because he lacked allegedly feminine skills, but because he felt uncomfortable 
working with a growing number of female workers. After leaving the spinning department, 
Zhang briefly worked as a machinist (jijiang, 机匠) and then transferred to the baling 
department.338 Qian Dingyuan, another male operator in the spinning department, followed a 
similar career trajectory. After piecing threads for six to seven years, he left the job around the 
same time as Zhang did and worked in the reeling department for a couple of years. After that, he 
became a machinist. He would now tend the machines by repairing and lubricating parts instead 
of piecing broken yarn ends.339  
Yan Xuexi’s statistical analysis of the interviews shows that male machine operators 
changed positions more often than female operators, and many of them ended up working in the 
machine department. The majority of female operators, by contrast, hardly changed their positon 
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or department.340 Most significantly, none of them were found in the machine department. 
Dasheng had abundant male machine operators, but no female machinists.  
4.3 Tending Machines and Babies: The Shop Floor as a (Re)Productive Workplace 
The mobility shown in the career trajectories of Zhang Ruiqing and Qian Dingyuan 
makes a contrast with the sedentary tendency of most female machine operators. Men not only 
transferred from one department to another, but, more importantly, their job required them to 
move around physically from one place to another. As a machinist, they had to visit here and 
there to fix broken machines or to lubricate gear teeth, as opposed to machine operators who 
seldom left the area of the assigned machine. Such physical mobility and/or immobility inherent 
to each job was an important factor that drove the feminization of the shop floor, given that not a 
few female workers had to bring their babies into the factory. Initially employed as tonggong, 
these women grew up, married, and gave birth to children as the years passed. Under the 
financial circumstances that forced them to continue working with the full responsibility of 
childcare, the restricted mobility of the machine operator served as an advantage, attracting more 
women with babies to the position.   
Miss Qinling had made a living out of hand spinning, at least until the influx of foreign 
machine-spun yarn devastated the local hand spinning industry. In 1899, when Dasheng just 
started operation, she quit the work and entered the factory’s roving department at age 28. She 
had a young son, but having no one at home to entrust with childcare, she had to bring him to the 
shop floor. “At that time,” she recalled, “there were more than ten baskets placed near machines, 
                                                 




which were taken care of by a woman who was paid for the job.”341 Called shahuanzi (纱换子) 
or huanzi (换子), the basket she referred to was originally intended for the storage of yarn, but 
due to its size that was large enough to accommodate a baby, it was preferred as a make-do 
cradle (Figure 4.1). One day, the fourth brother of the founder Zhang Jian, hence called sidaren 
(四大人), visited the shop and asked: “Whose are these? Is it proper to place them here?!” The 
baby sitter answered: “Their mothers all work here. There is no one taking care of them at 
home.” He frowned but left without further comment.342 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Shahuanzi. At the bottom of the photo.  
Nantong Textile Museums. Photography by the author. 
 
As we can see from the Zhang brother’s reaction, the Dasheng management did not 
encourage their workers to bring babies inside the mill. Yet, the practice continued for decades 
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under their tacit approval, allowing female workers like Miss Qinling to continue to work after 
giving birth. Although she had to raise her son in the noisy and dusty factory building, the 
presence of a baby sitter at least relieved her of the guilt about neglecting crying babies, a 
privilege not allowed to her successors. 
Miss Chenyou entered the factory in 1917 when she was sixteen years old. Employed as 
an apprentice in the roving department,343 she was initially assigned the task of arranging empty 
bobbins, earning eight cents a day.344 She wished to learn how to operate the machines and 
thereby earn more money, but the senior worker who was supposed to supervise her was not 
willing to teach nor allocated proper work to her. “I could learn no skill whatsoever,” recalled 
Miss Chenyou. She decided to teach herself by secretly observing the movement of the senior 
worker, and after doing so for one or two weeks she learned the basics of how to piece and 
change yarn. About a year later, she finally began to operate intermediate frames, earning twelve 
cents a day, maximum eighteen cents. After giving birth to a son at age twenty, she stayed at 
home for two years and then resumed factory work to make a living. Along with many other 
female workers, she had to bring her son to the mill. She would place him near machine heads in 
the same basket used by Miss Qinling two decades before, but now without an on-site baby 
sitter. In an effort to protect him from cotton lint, she kept the basket covered, but the child cried 
right away from feeling stifled; if uncovered, he also cried due to the lint. Busy tending the 
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machines, she did not have enough time to take care of her son. Whenever she heard him cry, she 
felt distressed.345  
The situation of Zhao Hongying was no better than that of Miss Chenyou. Zhao entered 
the factory at age eleven in 1912. She always felt deprived of sleep, since her mother-in-law 
forced her to work in the fields after she came back from the night shift. Under such conditions 
she had an accident one night, in which her clothes got caught between the fast-revolving rollers 
of a roving machine. She would have lost her life had a senior worker not turned off the machine. 
Operators were not allowed to stop machines arbitrarily, and lunch time was no exception; she 
had meals while watching her machine. Each shop was equipped with a vat filled with hot water 
for heating up cold rice, which, despite being dirty and smelly, was always crowded with people 
competing for a spot. One day, she was heating her rice with one hand, holding her baby in the 
other. Somebody splashed boiling water onto her hand, and she in fright dropped the lunch box 
into the filthy water. “I had to go without food all day long,” recalled Zhao.346  
The experiences of Miss Chenyou and Zhao Hongying were in many ways representative 
of the lives of Dasheng female workers. They also shared a lot of similarities with their male 
counterparts in that all of them, after all, had to bear a heavy workload both in the factory and at 
home, undergoing a constant lack of sleep, rest, and proper diet. However, what made the 
women’s experiences distinct from those of the men was the responsibility for rearing children, 
which without exception fell on mothers. Their multitasking ability, however, was never fully 
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appreciated. Tending both machines and babies for twelve hours a day was a job that required 
multiple skills, without which neither the factory nor the household could be maintained. 
The presence of babies on the shop floor shakes our most fundamental assumption about 
the factory as a “modern” place with clear boundaries between work and family, public and 
domestic, and productive and reproductive. With crying babies in the baskets and smelly vats for 
heating up rice, the factory was a rather messy space where demarcations we now take for 
granted were not clearly drawn. Although it is unthinkable from our perspective that one could 
bring babies into the factory, such a notion is relatively recent. The Chinese workers were aware 
of the hazardous environment of the shop floor, but their sensitivity to safety regulations and 
child rights was different from our own, and therefore they might have found the practice 
undesirable but not unimaginable. Their idea about child labor can also be considered in this 
context. In pre-industrial China, children were expected to help their parents with house chores 
and farm work, and for this reason, they were not as hostile to the practice of child labor as we 
are today.347 Girls were especially urged to participate in work at an earlier age than their 
brothers, by learning spinning from their mothers.348 
Industrialization in this regard did not necessarily sever the old from the new. The initial 
male-dominance in cotton spinning mills indicated an experimental moment when the long-held 
association between women and spinning work was disrupted by the new production system, but 
it was soon recovered with an increasing number of female machine operators accompanied by 
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babies. The factory system in this way perpetuated the notion of spinning and rearing as 
women’s work. 
What continued alongside this notion was the insignificant status of spinning work in the 
hierarchy of knowledge system in textile production. According to Francesca Bray, under the 
agrarian ideals encapsulated in the saying “men till, women weave” (男耕女织), women’s textile 
work in China was highly valued as “womanly work” with not only economic but also moral 
value attached to it. However, with the commercialization of the economy during the Ming and 
Qing periods (1368-1912), the existing gendered division of labor began to be reconfigured, as 
an increasing number of men took on weaving work. After handing over the looms to their 
husbands, the wives’ role in textile production was reduced to spinning and other preparatory 
work, which were “the worst rewarded and technically least demanding tasks.”349 Since it was 
the final product—woven cloth—that brought in cash, it was always the weaver who was 
considered the true income earner. Women’s contribution to the production of textiles at the 
preliminary stages was masked and “women’s work” was thereby marginalized.350 With the 
diminishing value of their productive work, their reproductive role with the responsibility of 
child rearing became more dominant.351 
As wageworkers, the position of female machine operators was different from that of 
hand spinners in an important way. Their productive work began to be remunerated and their 
earnings made an important and visible contribution to the household income. This even allowed 
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some unmarried female workers to enjoy a considerable degree of independence and autonomy. 
Nevertheless, their social and economic status remained low. Although there was a recognition 
of the importance of their skill, as discussed in the previous section, it was never socially valued 
as the continued stigma of “unskilled laborer” suggests. Nor was it fully rewarded economically 
as the lowest level of their earnings in Dasheng’s wage structure shows.352 Whereas their 
predecessors were marginalized by the male weavers who sat at the looms, their undervalued 
position was determined by the relatively higher status of their male fellows. Mostly machinists, 
the male workers’ job was also tending the machines, but they did so by lubricating gears or 
changing parts rather than piecing broken yarn ends. More importantly, they performed the task 
without being accompanied by babies. Despite the low economic and social status, however, 
impoverished women were willing to take the job, since it enabled them to carry out the 
responsibilities of childcare, which, in a way, further consolidated their marginal status as a 
machine operator. The “modern” factory system was maintained thanks to these women who 
were allowed or even tacitly encouraged to perform both productive and reproductive work on 
the shop floor.  
4.4. Malfunctioning Machines, Skillful Operators 
Yu Guangquan entered the factory at age nine in 1905. He was initially assigned the task 
of sweeping floors in the spinning department and later transferred to the roving department, in 
which he learned how to operate roving machines.353 As with other departments, roving machine 
operators were paid based on their output. The company’s 1899 regulations specified that those 
who produced more than 550 pounds on a roving machine for a week would be paid a reward, 
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and those who produced below 400 pounds would be penalized.354 “The word ‘reward’ might 
sound good,” Yu recalled, “but there were only a few who were rewarded. The majority of 
workers were punished. Since my machine was not good, I was punished as often as twice a 
week.”355  
Yu was not alone in complaining about bad machines and the consequent poor output and 
punishment. Chen Jinzhen, who likewise worked in the roving department, recollected that “Poor 
people did not have money to send a gift [to the foreman], so they did not hope to work with 
good machines. I did not have money to send a gift and was assigned bad machines all the year 
round. The production was low, and I was just beaten [by the foreman]. In addition to that, I was 
often penalized.”356 Another worker, Lu Xiaomei, also remembered that there was a foreman 
who always assigned her bad machines. “Such shameless foremen,” said Lu, “turned obliging 
once you sent a gift, but if not, you had a hard time.”357  
The cases of Yu, Chen, Lu, and possibly many other workers who had to deal with aging 
machine provide revealing insights into the relationships between the machine and the operator 
and between capital and labor. First of all, their ability to discern bad machines from good ones 
confirms that they had a basic mechanical understanding of the machine. From the changing 
quality of yarn, frequency of breakage, degree of twist, and the amount of roller waste, they were 
able to tell when certain parts of the machine were not working properly. They were even able to 
manipulate the machine to slow down its speed, thereby decreasing the frequency of yarn 
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breakage. The workers’ labor songs capture some of these moments. Full of tropes, these songs 
cannot be taken at face value, yet when read with caution, they reveal rich technical and material 
details about the shop floor that we cannot learn otherwise.358    
One of the songs describes how Dasheng’s machine operators attempted to decrease the 
rotation speed of the leather belt and the axle wheel (Figure 4.2) by placing vege-rice cakes 
between them:   
The machine is revolving spurting sparks, 
The little girl is starving with her face blue, 
The two vege-rice cakes are very hard, 
[She] still chooses to put them on the leather belt.359 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Leather Belts and Axle Wheels.  
Nantong Textile Museum. Photography by the author. 
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The vege-rice cake, called caituan, was a mixture of cheap vegetables and rice, or wheat, 
that the workers brought to the factory to allay their hunger. Due to the starch contained in rice, it 
could make the leather belt sticky, thereby decreasing its running speed. The workers compared 
the leather belt covered with the debris of the cakes to a hairy tongue (shetai), as we can see in 
an excerpt from another song:  
“The leather belt is [covered white] like a hairy tongue,  
The foreman came and got furious.”360  
 
The furious foreman would order machinists to clean the leather belt to restore the machine’s 
running speed, and now the operator would have to work faster to catch up with it:  
The belt has been brushed and the machine runs fast， 
The little girl anxiously works on the machine, 
The foreman’s whistle grates on the ears， 
The supervisor’s face frightens ghosts.361  
 
The employment of such subversive techniques was not unique to Dasheng. A survey of 
Shanghai cotton mills shows that workers there also devised their own method—secretly 
spreading sand on the leather belt— to slow down the machine speed.362 Once developed in one 
cotton mill, the trick must have spread easily throughout the whole city. In Tianjin, it was even 
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reported that weaving loom operators covertly changed the setting of gears to lighten their work 
load.363  
Their behavior was clearly deceitful from the perspective of management, as their 
unauthorized intervention would have a negative long-term impact on the equipment as well as 
an immediate adverse effect on the quantity and quality of the spun yarn. After all, it was not of 
great help to the operators either, since under the piece-rate system their daily wages were to be 
determined by the daily output of yarn. When detected, they could also be imposed fines. Despite 
all these risks, they were tempted to rely on the covert tricks, since many of them were not able 
to catch up with the speed of the machines or, more precisely, the rate of yarn breakage. Broken 
yarn that was not immediately repaired turned into cotton waste and, as discussed earlier, with an 
increase in cotton waste, their wages would decrease. Under such circumstance, the operators 
presumably judged that it would be for the best to slow down the speed of the machine, thereby 
putting the frequency of yarn breakage under their control. 
Setting aside the ethical judgement of their behavior, what is revealing about these cases 
is that the operators had a good grasp of the relationship between the rotation speed and yarn 
production, a key operating principle of any kind of spinning machine. Although they were not 
allowed to adjust the speed through an official remedy—changing gears—they knew how to 
have a similar effect by manipulating the machine with a variety of improvised techniques. They 
understood that the power was transmitted from the steam engine to each machine and that the 
leather belt was a key mechanism that enabled the transfer. They also grasped that the 
transmission could be interrupted by altering the frictional force between the leather belt and the 
axle wheel with the insertion of alien substances like vege-rice cakes or sand. Presumably they 
                                                 




were not able to explain theoretically how all those interventions worked, but that does not deny 
the fact that they had a command of the operating principle of the machine and the power 
transmission system in the factory, an outcome of their hands-on experience on the shop floor.  
Their attempt to change the pace of the machine, rather than accommodating themselves to its 
pace, leads to a different picture of machine operators as passive and unskilled. 
The operator’ possession of knowledge of the machine was also presumed by 
management. The factory regulations specified that “in cases when shafts give out heat and the 
tightness of gear teeth and leather belts is not in a proper condition, [workers should] at all times 
inform machinists to fix them.”364 They also called for special attention to the care of rollers, 
stressing their significance in the process of cotton spinning. For instance, when cotton yarn was 
found entangled with the rollers, the operators were required to get rid of it using a specially 
designed hook and with great caution so as not to damage the rollers.365 The workers in this 
manner were continually encouraged to engage in the maintenance of the machines, despite their 
official assignment being fixing yarn breakage, a task that seemingly did not require any 
mechanical understanding.  
As the machines aged, however, even the most assiduous maintenance could not prevent 
them from malfunctioning. After several failed attempts at repair, the operators would have to 
accept that certain parts of the machines, or even the entire machine set, could never be restored 
to their original state because they were simply too old. Then the most feasible way to make the 
best of their malfunctioning machines would be staying attuned to each machine part as much as 
possible. Now they would have to be more attentive to the defective components, such as 
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particular rollers that were prone to yarn breakage and roller waste, rather than randomly 
watching all the rollers installed on the machine. By doing so, they could respond to broken 
threads more quickly and efficiently, thereby avoiding or minimizing penalties, although earning 
rewards with these machines would be a near impossibility. Working with aging machines 
obviously required know-how, a set of practical knowledge about specific parts of the machine 
that those working with brand new ones would not need to obtain. And yet the operators were 
not rewarded for such knowledge because being assigned bad machines was already a 
punishment in itself. 
As Yu, Chen, and Lu recalled, the foremen easily got the blame for the bad machines, 
since machine assignment was one of their responsibilities. And some of them did abuse their 
position by assigning faulty machines to those who did not send gifts to them, as Chen and Lu 
complained. However, even under the supervision of the fairest foreman, somebody had to take 
over defective machines in order for the factory equipment to be in full operation. This problem 
was not something that could be remedied by the foremen’s morality. It could be solved only by 
management who was committed to proper investment in equipment maintenance.  
The average lifespan of textile machinery was considered 30 years, but this was 
guaranteed only under good maintenance. Each machine required daily lubrication and each part 
required regular updates, all of which incurred substantial expenses. Workers in Shanghai, for 
instance, complained about frequent yarn breakage in Chinese mills vis-à-vis Japanese ones, in 
which yarn was allegedly stronger due to the owners’ generous investment in superior raw cotton 
and proper equipment maintenance.366 What was worse, the machinery for Dasheng’s first two 
mills was not even brand new. For its first mill, Zhang Jian acquired secondhand machines from 
                                                 




Zhang Zhidong, who initially purchased them from a British machine manufacturer, John 
Hetherington & Sons, but was not able to use them as his plan for a cotton mill fell through.367 
After sitting on a shoal of Shanghai’s Huangpu River for three years, the worst environment for 
any metal-made product, the machines arrived in Nantong dusty and rusty. It was no wonder that 
the first job of Zhang Ruiqing, the skillful male operator, was cleaning them to get them ready 
for operation.  
The damage caused by the total neglect on a riverside turned out to be deeper than 
anticipated, as it did not even take a full decade for the machines to develop troubles. In 1906, 
the company had to spend approximately 9,000 liang to replace existing wire cloths with new 
ones; since the existing cloths were too blunt, they were causing unevenness in yarn quality. A 
brief justification for the expense was provided in the company’s annual financial report, 
indicating it was a substantially large expenditure.368 The next year, in 1907, they spent another 
large sum of money for the repair and maintenance of the equipment. Again, they provided a 
separate justification for the spending:  
Under the category of repair, expenditure from the last year was larger than previous 
years, and newly replenished machine parts during this year are far more than the last 
year. Before the government machines were sent to Dasheng, they had been neglected in 
a heap on a shoal of Shanghai for a long time and were by no means comparable with 
brand new machines. Parts like wire cloths and rollers are prone to damage, and since 
they are repaired as soon as damaged, large expenses have been incurred.369 
 
Dasheng continued to invest in maintenance and repair, but the workers’ interviews 
suggest that their efforts were barely made at the minimum level. Their first-ever machines, the 
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secondhand ones originally manufactured in 1895, were in use until the 1970s.370 In operation 
for almost 80 years (well beyond the average life expectancy) and now on exhibition at Nantong 
Textile Museum, they attest to the degree of miserliness that the company showed in equipment 
investment (Figure 4.3). Small components such as rollers, spindles, gears, and leather belts were 
replaced with new ones when necessary, probably supplied by firms like China Iron Works 
discussed in Chapter 3. But the basic structure of the machines remained unchanged, meaning 
spinning technologies embedded in them were barely updated for decades. More importantly, 
although repair might have helped to prolong each machine’s life, it could never restore them to 
the original state. The equipment continued to age over time, and now its decreasing efficiency, 
exacerbated by management’s insufficient fixed capital investment, had to be made up for by the 
operators with their handwork.  
 
Figure 4.3 Hetherington & Sons Roving Frame (manufactured in 1895).  
Nantong Textile Museum. Photography by the author. 
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Working on a bad machine was a sort of Sisyphean labor. After piecing all the broken 
threads, which were being generated beyond normal ranges because of the machine’s small and 
large failures, the operator still earned less than those working with good machines, and in the 
worst case, she was penalized for her “poor” work. What made this irony possible was the piece-
rate system, more specifically a piece-rate system by weight of spun yarn. Industrious workers 
who were assigned great machines certainly benefitted from this “reward” system, but as Yu 
recalled, such cases were few.371 Most workers had fallen into a trap of the “punishment” 
system, under which their labor was never fully rewarded. 
Paying by weight or length of spun yarn might have been a convenient way to remunerate 
one’s labor, but physical dimensions of a product did not always serve as an accurate or natural 
measure of one’s labor input. Cultural categories intervened in creating forms of measurement, 
as Richard Biernacki has argued in his study of wool weaving industries in Great Britain and 
Germany. Whereas mill owners in Great Britain preferred to pay weavers by length of fabric 
woven, those in Germany preferred to pay by the number of the “shots” of the shuttle. The shot 
means an acting of moving the shuttle back and forth. German managers believed that pay by 
shot could provide a more direct measure of one’s labor input. The difference lay in their 
different perceptions of the relationship between labor and the product. Whereas the British saw 
woven fabric as a materialized form of labor, the German put more emphasis on the workers’ 
“action” and hence did not see the product as the object of payment itself.372  
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If Dasheng had adopted the German method, the operators would have been paid by the 
frequency of their action of joining yarns ends or by the number of knots made, instead of the 
weight of spun yarn. The German method seems like a more accurate way to measure the 
operators’ actual labor input, especially when many of them worked with bad machines. 
However, one critical drawback of this method in cotton spinning was that in order to count the 
number of knots, one had to unwind the whole spun yarn, which was by no means a sensible way 
of measurement.   
Dasheng’s piece-rate system in this way created an effect of exploiting labor, whether 
intended by management or not. Combined with aging machines, it created a kind of system in 
which the company could save expenses on wages by keeping old equipment, as those working 
on bad machines were likely to get penalized, thereby forfeiting their wages. This does not sound 
favorable to the company either, since poor facilities would inevitably cause deterioration of both 
quantity and quality, having a negative impact on sales. Despite that, if the mechanical failures 
manifested in the form of broken threads could be fixed any time by the operators, keeping old 
machines was not necessarily a bad idea, especially when the company was in bad financial 
straits. If management was willing to accept a minor compromise on quantity and quality, the 
slight loss of sales could be compensated by great savings on equipment investment and wages, 
and their profits could thus remain unaffected. However, this system could be maintained only 
by the undervalued handwork of the operators, many of whom were the most impoverished 
workers who could not even afford a gift for the foremen.   
4.5 Conclusion 
In a way, the mechanization of cotton spinning meant its transformation into a male 
enterprise. With most decision-making positions filled with men, now it became men’s work to 
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decide on the types and volumes of cotton yarn to be spun. The industry was also masculinized 
on a material level. Metalwork began to constitute an important component of cotton spinning 
with the introduction of iron-made machines, which led to an increasing demand for male 
machinists. Yet, the shop floor was a gynocentric workplace. Despite the initial experimental 
period, when the number of male workers equaled that of female workers, Dasheng’s shop floor 
was soon feminized with an increasing number of female machine operators accompanied by 
babies. Spinning work once again became women’s work, compatible with childcare, and the 
boundaries between production and reproduction remained unclear on the factory shop floor. As 
the stigma of “unskilled labor” persisted, the economic, social, and technological positions of 
female machines operators remained low. Ironically, it was only through male authors’ writings 
on machine operation that their craftsmanship was fully appreciated.  
As we can see from an increasing emphasis on the balance between work and family 
responsibilities,373 the rigid boundaries drawn between production and reproduction under 
industrial capitalism seem to be reconsidered in a postindustrial society like today’s United 
States. Yet, in countries where a growing number of women have entered the workforce, it is still 
working mothers, not fathers, who are expected to take the role of a primary caregiver. Women’s 
reproductive labor remained unrecognized in China even after the socialist revolution, despite its 
meaningful contribution to the formal economic sector.374 The situation was not that different in 
the United States. As Ruth Schwartz Cowan wrote in her 1983 book, the title of “working 
mother” in the United States was a “guarantee of being overworked and perpetually 
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exhausted.”375 Demands on women to be both productive and reproductive are so high that the 
younger generation of East Asian countries have begun to abandon reproductive responsibilities 
altogether, rather than balance the two domains, by resisting or forgoing marriage.376 In a way, 
Dasheng’s female workers stood at the starting point of the long process into the “ultra-low-
fertility East Asia.”377 
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Raw Materials: Cultivating American Cotton in Industrializing China 
 
Cotton has been grown as a staple crop in China since the thirteenth century, when 
gossypium arboreum, a species that originated in India, began to spread across the country.378 Its 
varieties, acclimatized to the diverse environment of China, were made into a range of local tubu 
(a Chinese term for handwoven cloth), which soon became indispensable material to common 
people who could not afford the luxurious silk. Centuries later, however, the native varieties 
began to be considered problematic, as they were too short to be spun on imported spinning 
machines. The bumpy road toward mechanization revealed not only the unsuitability of 
American machines to Chinese conditions but also the incompatibility of Chinese cotton with 
machine spinning.  
While modifying the machines to accommodate short-staple Chinse cotton, the Chinese 
attempted to secure a supply of long-staple cotton by importing upland cotton from the United 
States, commonly known as meimian (美棉) or meiguomian (美国棉), both of which are 
Chinese translations of American cotton. Also known by its scientific name gossypium hirsutum, 
upland cotton is the most widely planted cotton species in China and the world today due to its 
fiber, which is long enough for machine spinning.379 Yet its initial cultivation was not easy 
because it continually failed to acclimatize, often degenerating into rogue species. In the long 
course of experiments and research into its acclimation, upland cotton brought together 
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concerned Chinese industrialists and American cotton experts, as well as Chinese agriculture 
schools, their students, and local farmers, creating “cropscapes” where they exchanged 
knowledge and skills.380 This chapter examines their prolonged endeavors to grow American 
cotton in industrializing China.  
Cotton improvement work, all driven by the goal of producing better-quality yarn in 
cotton factories, confirms that industrialization was not only about mechanization; it was also 
about biological innovation and improvement. In their study of American agricultural 
development, Alan L. Olmstead and Paul Webb Rhode argue that biological innovations were as 
essential as mechanical innovations were to British industrialization and nineteenth-century 
American economic development. Contrary to the conventional narratives that have focused on 
the inventions of spinning and weaving machines, they shed new light on the numerous 
improvements made to American cotton varieties by farmers and plant breeders. The 
industrialization of cotton textile production was unsustainable, they argue, without the efforts to 
create superior cotton varieties suitable to new spinning technologies and the North American 
environment.381  
Since the cultivation of American cotton on a commercial scale required the wholesale 
participation of Chinese farmers, the transition was not only biological but also agrarian. The 
laboratory work for the acclimatization of American cotton was a demanding task, but what was 
equally challenging was to distribute acclimatized cotton seeds beyond the cotton experiment 
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stations. Chinese farmers were unwilling to switch to the foreign commercial crop for a 
combination of reasons. Due to the unstable political conditions in China at that time, investment 
into the cultivation of American upland cotton mostly depended on the role of cotton mills, 
reformist local elites, and professional societies, who were not equipped with a legal force to 
enforce the farmers to grow American cotton. Without support from a strong central government, 
the progress was made very slowly. Cultivating American cotton was thus not a mere 
technological or material issue but also a social and political one.   
By driving reluctant farmers to convert from native cotton or food crops to American 
cotton, the factory system forever changed, if slowly, the landscape of rural China. This chapter 
argues that industrialization, often considered as an urban phenomenon restricted to 
manufacturing, had a profound impact on China’s rural and agricultural sector with an ever-
increasing demand for raw materials—i.e., raw cotton. In doing so, it emphasizes the interactive 
relationship between the mechanical and the biological, urban and rural, and manufacturing and 
agriculture.382 Chapter 3 has shown how long-staple American cotton determined the direction in 
which American spinning machines developed. This chapter examines how the introduction of 
these machines, which emphasized staple length as the single most important barometer of cotton 
quality, set a new standard for “good” and “bad” cotton in China. Short fiber did not pose any 
special problems in hand spinning; in fact, long staple was a hindrance because it tended to get 
entangled with the bow during the carding process.383 The foreign machines, however, showed 
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the best performance only when fed with long-staple cotton. Chinese native varieties were 
suddenly labelled as “inferior”, when fully acclimatized American cotton began to be sought 
after by cotton mills, their engineers, and agronomists.384  
The first section of this chapter examines China’s early failed efforts to cultivate 
American upland cotton initiated by Zhang Zhidong, a government official and a well-known 
advocate of the Self-Strengthening Movement. After decades of failure, the project entered a 
new phase with a three-year acclimation program organized by the University of Nanking and 
directed by American cotton expert J. B. Griffing. Drawing on Griffing’s agricultural reports, the 
second section investigates the technical details of his acclimation work. While highlighting the 
importance of observation in the work, it sheds new light on the photographs of exemplary 
cotton plants as “immutable mobiles” that facilitated knowledge transfer for efficient observation 
of the plants. The final section turns to the challenging process of cotton extension work beyond 
the experiment stations. It situates the Chinese case in the larger global debate on the entangled 
relationship between land, labor, cotton, and industrial capitalism to show that the factors that 
hindered the distribution of American cotton beyond the laboratory were not mere technological 
challenges but complicated social barriers. 
5.1 “Too Short to Spin”: Initial Efforts, Continued Failures 
 
The initial attempt to cultivate American cotton was made by Zhang Zhidong, the 
governor-general of Huguang.385 As a well-known reformer who advocated the Self-
Strengthening Movement along with Li Hongzhang, he initiated a variety of military and 
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industrial projects once he was appointed to the post in 1889. The Hubei Weaving Mill (湖北织
布局) was one such effort. The company began to generate modest profits soon after it began 
operation in 1892, but its yarn quality did not come up to scratch, since the native cotton of 
Hubei was too short to be spun on the imported machines. One of the British engineers employed 
by the factory recommended cultivating American cotton, and the proposal was immediately 
accepted by Zhang Zhidong. He wired the Chinese minister stationed in the United States to 
select and ship American cotton varieties most suitable for Hubei’s climate. Two varieties were 
chosen, and 3,700 pounds of seeds were sent to China in 1892.386  
Zhang distributed the seeds to cotton-growing peasants in fifteen counties and districts of 
Hubei, with a promise that his factory would purchase the harvests at generous prices. The seeds 
collected in the fall would be redistributed to other households, and in this way, he envisioned, 
the spread of the new varieties would be expedited year by year. His confident plan did not come 
to fruition, however. The best time for planting had passed by the time of distribution, and the 
Chinese farmers, unfamiliar with the new crop, sowed the seeds too closely. The first attempt 
ended up as a poor harvest. Zhang ordered another batch of seeds the next year, this time with 
printed instructions for planting. Pamphlets with detailed instructions on soil preparation, proper 
planting, insect control, and use of fertilizers were distributed to the peasants, but their 
effectiveness was marginal, in part because they were written in classical Chinese. Another year 
of failure passed, and further experimental planting was suspended with the outbreak of the Sino-
Japanese War in 1894.387 
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After the humiliating defeat of Qing China and the subsequent signing of the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki in 1895, Zhang submitted a reform package to the court in which he proposed a 
school specializing in agricultural education. The proposed school was established in the 
following year, but it was soon reorganized for training translators. Still committed to 
agricultural improvement and education, Zhang continued to pursue his goal, this time by 
inviting American experts to China. An official invitation was sent to the president of Cornell 
University through Sidney Partridge, an Episcopal missionary stationed in Wuchang. Cornell 
accepted the invitation, which heralded the long-term collaboration between Cornell’s College of 
Agriculture and China’s agricultural institutions, in particular the University of Nanking. Gerow 
D. Brill, an 1888 graduate of the College of Agriculture, showed interest in the project and 
arrived in Wuchang in 1897. He was immediately assigned an agricultural survey of the nearby 
hills.388  
In the following year 1898, the Guangxu emperor issued an edict establishing agricultural 
schools across the country as part of the Hundred Days’ Reform. Although the Reform ended in 
disaster, and ending with the Guangxu emperor under palace detention, China witnessed a surge 
of interest in agricultural reform and education during this period. Experiment stations and 
schools for agriculture, sericulture, and forestry began to be established by reform-minded 
scholars and high-ranking provincial officials.389 Zhang Zhidong’s long-cherished dream was 
finally realized with the opening of an agricultural school in 1898, which was to be run under 
Brill’s supervision.390 
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Brill’s tenure did not last long, however, as he did not see eye to eye with Zhang about 
how the school should be managed. He wanted to work with students with rural backgrounds, 
but most of the enrolled students were sons of officials, gentry, and merchants. He also wished to 
have an experimental farm, since he valued hands-on experience on the field, but the request was 
not honored by Zhang. After years of continued discord and frustration, Brill left Wuchang in 
1900 and then worked in the Philippines for several years before returning to the United States. 
Japanese experts were invited to take over from Brill, and they stayed until 1911.391  
Efforts to grow American cotton were taken up in other places. Students of Nantong 
Agricultural School in Jiangsu province conducted experiments from 1914 until 1919 on 
approximately one hundred types of cotton from both China and abroad.392 Research data from 
four outstanding varieties were published in the 1925 edition of Nantong County Local 
Gazetteers, which included Trice cotton, a variety of American upland cotton, and three regional 
varieties including Qingjing jijiao mian (青莖雞脚棉), Yaguo mian (椏果棉), and Qingjing mian 
(青莖棉).393 As we can see in Table 5.1, they relied on two criteria to evaluate progress: fiber 
length for quality and lint percentage (the proportion of lint to seed cotton) for quantity. A close 
reading of the data reveals that Trice cotton, one of their “outstanding” varieties, in fact showed a 
                                                 
 
391 Ibid., 47-49. 
 
392 Nantong Agricultural School was initially established in 1906 as an agricultural department affiliated to Nantong 
Normal School. The founder Zhang Jian, who was also the founder of Dasheng Cotton Mills, was well aware of the 
importance of an uninterrupted supply of good-quality cotton for his cotton mill business. For a brief history of the 
school, see Wang Fei and Ji Yuedong, Zhang Jian zhiye jiaoyu sixianglun 张謇职业教育思想论 (On Zhang Jian’s 
Vocational Education Thoughts) (Nanjing: Nanjing Daxue Chubanshe, 2011), 15-16. 
 
393 Nantong xian tuzhi 南通县图志 (Nantong county local gazetteers), quansan wuchanzhi 券三 物产志 (Vol. 3 




tendency to degenerate.394 Its fiber length remained the same throughout the experiment period 
and slightly shortened in the final year. The results might not seem bad given the average length 
of one inch for the variety,395 but later improvement would show that successfully acclimatized 
Trice cotton could yield longer fibers. The lint percentage was indisputably problematic. 
Whereas a higher percentage is desirable, the lint percentage of the trice cotton gradually 
decreased, setting a lowest record of 29.5 % in the final year, much lower than the initial 33%. 
As an index of productivity of a given cotton plant, a decrease in lint percentage meant a 
consequent decrease in total output.396 Chinese cotton, by contrast, showed considerable 
progress. The fiber of Qingjing jijiao mian lengthened from 0.9 to 1.2 inches, surpassing that of 
Trice cotton. Its lint percentage likewise increased from 37.5% to 42%, much higher than that of 
the Trice cotton.  
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Table 5.1. Cotton Experiment Data from Nantong Agricultural School.397 
 




American Trice cotton  (Tuolisi mian, 脱里斯棉) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 
Chinese 
Qingjing jijiao mian  
(青莖雞脚棉) 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.92 0.95 1.20 
Yaguo mian 
(椏果棉) 0.90 0.85 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.90 
Qingjing mian 
(青莖棉) 0.70 0.77 0.80 0.85 0.91 0.80 
Lint 
percentage 
American Trice cotton  (Tuolisi mian, 脱里斯棉) 33.00 33.00 33.00 31.33 29.59 29.50 
Chinese 
Qingjing jijiao mian  
(青莖雞脚棉) 37.50 43.75 42.66 41.66 40.00 42.00 
Yaguo mian 
(椏果棉) 37.50 43.39 40.81 39.10 39.00 41.30 
Qingjing mian 
(青莖棉) 34.00 41.46 42.50 38.63 39.00 41.10 
 
In the late 1910s, China began to take a more systematic approach to cotton improvement 
work under the strong initiative of the University of Nanking (also known in Chinese as Jinling 
University, 金陵大学). Originally established as a mission school in 1888, the University of 
Nanking developed into the center of research for cotton improvement and other agricultural 
projects, with an active exchange program with Cornell University. Since 1915, the university 
had conducted cotton experiments with an emphasis on American varieties and had demonstrated 
the potential for their successful cultivation in the Nanjing area.398 In 1919, they were offered 
$600 by the Chinese Cotton Mill Owners Association for additional experimental work, which 
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allowed them to conduct cotton variety tests in twenty-six experiment centers beyond the 
Nanjing region. Mostly mission stations, these centers were dispersed across eight provinces, 
including Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Anhui, Zhili, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan.399 For these 
variety tests, the university secured fresh sets of American cotton seeds from the United States 
Department of Agriculture (hereafter USDA) through Julean Arnold, the United States 
Commercial Attache stationed in Beijing. The sets consisted of seeds of eight American cotton 
varieties, each of which was of the best quality in its group.400  
Walter T. Swingle, Head of the Office of Crop Physiology, Bureau of Plant Industry, 
USDA, visited the University of Nanking around the same time. After observing its cotton 
experiments, he showed a great interest in the need for cotton improvement in China, 
encouraging a more rigorous procedure of acclimation and pure seed production of several 
suitable types.401 Upon returning to the United States, he persuaded two leading American cotton 
experts to visit China for the survey of cotton varieties, including not only those of American 
origin but also Chinese native varieties. O. F. Cook, Head of the Office of Crop Acclimation in 
USDA, was the most recognized authority on cotton at that time.402 A prolific author, he left 
copious reports and books on cotton cultivation, and one of his books, Arrangement of Parts in 
the Cotton Plant, co-authored with Rowland Montgomery Meade, was later translated into 
Chinese and published in the journal Mianye huikan (棉业汇刊).403 The other figure was J. B. 
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Griffing, who was previously engaged in the pure seed production of Pima cotton in Arizona. 
Griffing would eventually lead a cotton acclimation project based at the University of Nanking, 
authoring numerous agricultural reports for Chinese audiences.404  
In the summer and autumn of 1919, after the new batch of cottonseeds secured from 
USDA had been planted in the twenty-six experiment centers, Cook, Griffing, and J. H. Reisner 
of the College of Agriculture and Forestry at the University of Nanking formed an expedition 
team for field research.405 Their extensive survey conducted across the experiment stations 
confirmed that no acclimation of American cotton had been made. No pure uniform variety of 
American cotton existed in the areas, and very degenerate types of American cotton were found 
in nearly all fields of Chinese cotton.406 “Each field,” Griffing wrote, “resembles no particular 
variety and yet shows the characters of many. Each type of boll-form, leaf shape, plant structure, 
and other character may be found, and, worst of all for the spinner, every type of lint.”407 Figure 
5.1 clearly shows the condition of deteriorated American cotton. The fuzzy lint of No.3, an 
outcome of three years of cultivation, disqualified American cotton for machine spinning, even 
inferior to Chinese cotton.  
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Figure 5.1 Cotton Fibers of Variable Quality. No. 1 and No. 2, American 
cotton from seed just imported. No. 3, degenerate American cotton. No. 4, 
Chinese cotton from selected seed.408 
 
What caused the deterioration? According to Griffing, most cotton varieties came with 
complex origins and had been artificially raised to maintain a high standard of quality through 
mass selection.409 When such a maintaining process was discontinued, the variety began to break 
up into different forms and returned to its inferior state. In the case of China, the degeneration 
was stimulated by a radical change of environment and further hastened through cross-
pollination by Chinese farmers who grew different varieties in the same or nearby field.410 In this 
way, the American cotton plant ended up as “a despised little foreign plant here and there in the 
field of native cotton, which the Chinese farmer hoes out with disgust as a weed.”411  
If a sudden environmental change was the trigger for deterioration, then cultivation 
should have succeeded at least in northern China, which allegedly had the climate most similar to 
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that of the southern United States.412 While acknowledging the significance of external factors, 
what Griffing saw as the most fundamental element, especially at the stage of acclimation, was 
an internal one: the laws of heredity. He wrote: 
The failure of seed to maintain its quality through a series of years is sometimes thought 
by the farmer to be due to unfavorable conditions of soil or climate in his immediate 
locality and he endeavors to gain new vigor by bringing seed from a superior 
environment. However, the successful standardization of varieties of seed in a great 
number of widely diverse localities through the practice of scientific selection and 
roguing has demonstrated that the laws of heredity are the governing factor.413 
 
The seed indeed bore the possibility of innumerable variations in its tiny little world; the 
environment only stimulated their manifestation. Instead of bringing yet another batch of fresh 
seeds, which Zhang Zhidong had tried 27 years ago in 1893, Griffing’s solution was to restore 
uniformity of the varieties through intensive roguing, a process of eliminating offtypes. Citing O. 
F. Cook’s study, he wrote that “the breaking up of uniformity is the first stage of degeneration. 
The re-establishing of uniformity is therefore a criterion of success in acclimation.”414 In other 
words, to attain a long staple was not enough; the fibers had to be uniformly long, which, 
Griffing believed, could be achieved only through rigorous roguing. During the following three 
years of cotton improvement projects, roguing formed the basis of his laboratory work to secure 
pure seeds of American cotton. 
5.2 Roguing, Observation, and the “Immutable Mobiles” 
Amid the disappointing outcome of the survey, Griffing saw potential for improvement. 
Most of all, China’s environment was not unfavorable to the cultivation of American cotton. In 
                                                 
412 Griffing, Cotton Culture, 3. 
 
413 Griffing, Roguing of Cotton, 1. 
 




fact, China’s milder climate allowed it a larger proportion of cotton-growing area than the United 
States.415 If we arithmetically apply the northern and southern edges of the United States cotton 
belt to China, below the northern Shandong province and above the Yangtze River would form 
major cotton cultivation areas.416 In reality, however, cotton grew farther north beyond these 
regions. Whereas the thirty-seventh latitude defined the northern limit of cotton production in the 
United States, cotton could grow well beyond Beijing, which is about forty degrees north. 
Northern China fulfilled many of the ideal conditions for successful cotton cultivation, which 
included hot summers with abundant sunshine and dry air, followed by clear and dry autumns.417 
The only limiting factor there was insufficient summer rainfall,418 but given cotton’s drought-
resistant tendency, this did not pose a critical obstacle. In American cotton cultivation, too much 
moisture caused more damage than too little, as an excess of moisture not only generated rank 
foliage but also introduced the notorious boll weevil, which was most destructive in rainy and 
humid areas. For this reason, cotton cultivation had been pushed into more arid regions in the 
United States.419 The dry environment of northern China offered more benefit than harm. 
In addition, certain American cotton types showed fairly good results in regions away 
from the coast and close to the north. Trice cotton had the best outcome in most experiment 
stations, followed by Acala. Additionally, the superiority of Chinese cotton in the lower Yangzi 
valley confirmed great possibilities of improvement in native stock. Given that American cotton 
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showed particularly poor quality in the humid coastal areas, these Chinese cotton types required 
further attention.420  
Based on these findings, the University of Nanking embarked on a three-year cotton 
improvement project in 1920 under the leadership of Griffing. The project was again funded by 
the Chinese Cotton Mill Owners Association and the Shanghai Cotton Anti-Adulteration 
Association. The constant financial support from the industrial circle clearly shows the driving 
force behind the cotton improvement work. After all, the idea of growing American cotton 
stemmed from the need to suit imported spinning machines, thereby enhancing productivity in 
cotton mills. From his earlier experience of the acclimation of Pima cotton, which had been 
introduced from Egypt to the United States, Griffing learned that the process could take from 
five up to thirteen years.421 A time span of three years, possibly set by the funder who wanted to 
see results as soon as possible, was certainly on the short side. By undertaking the work in a 
more rigorous manner and on a more extensive scale, he wished to be able to make up for the 
limited time.422 
In 1920, Griffing and his team imported pure seeds of Trice and Acala and planted them 
on separate seed farms to prevent cross-pollination. A number of experiment stations including 
that of Nantong Agricultural School cooperated with them at this stage, although Nantong 
Agricultural School wished to pursue their own program after the first season.423 In the summer 
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of the same year, they pulled up about 30% of offtype plants and picked and studied 7,000 of the 
best plants. In 1921, seeds secured from the best 300 of the 7,000 plants were planted in progeny 
rows. In 1922, seeds from the 1921 batch were divided into four groups and sent to different 
fields for further research except for the most inferior group, which was discarded. Seeds from 
the 1922 batch were considered fully acclimatized and thus ready for distribution.424 During 
these three years, a total of 12,500 plants were tagged and picked, a total of 630 progeny rows 
were picked and studied, and a total of 73 fields were picked, sampled, and ginned.425  
Collaboration with willing students, concerned gentry farmers, and cooperating 
agricultural schools and regional experiment stations was critical to each stage.426 Every 
participant had different interests and motives, but one unexpected factor that enabled their 
cooperation was Christianity. A good number of participating experiment stations were run by 
American missionaries who came to China with “agricultural missions,” hoping to “instill a 
Christian direction in economic development.”427 Moreover, the University of Nanking itself 
was a mission school, and most of its few long-term faculty members were missionaries, which 
included Lossing Buck, an American agricultural economist well-known for Pearl Buck’s 
husband.428 Despite a continued debate over agricultural work within the missionary circles, 
which in part stemmed from theological objections to secular pursuits, the participation of 
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mission stations was essential to the successful completion of Griffing’s cotton improvement 
work. 
Griffing relied on three barometers to assess progress in acclimation: lint length, seed 
index (weight of 100 seeds), and lint index (weight of lint per 100 seeds). The diagram in Figure 
5.2 is the visualization of these data. Among them, as he wrote, “Lint length is the most 
satisfactory single measurement of quality or value from the spinner’s standpoint.”429 The mean 
lint length of Trice cotton from the best group of the 1922 batch (“Selections of 141” in Figure 
5.2) was 27.25 mm (=1.07 inches), longer than the average value for the variety (1 inch) as well 
as the outcome of the 1919 batch from Nantong Agricultural School (0.95 inch, see Table 5.1). 
This seemingly minor difference could make a huge difference in cotton mills, since, as we have 
discussed in Chapter 3, spinning machines were precision instruments whose roller setting was 
sensitive to even a slight difference of 1/8-inch in staple length. The lint index, which is related 
to yield rather than quality, showed even more remarkable improvement. The mean lint index of 
Trice cotton from the best group of the 1922 batch (“Selections of 141” in Figure 5.2) was 5.146, 
much higher than the 4.31 from the 1920 batch.430 Finally, as the shrinking sizes of the circles in 
Figure 5.2 indicate, the degree of variation for all three criteria decreased, which confirmed the 
variety’s restored uniformity and thus successful acclimation.431 From the plants’ superior 
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characteristics surpassing the original Trice variety, Griffing inferred that they were a mutation 
from the parent stock, a positive one unlike most degenerate types.432  
 
Figure 5.2 Visualization of Progress in Acclimation of Trice cotton.433  
Both “Progeny 141” and “Selections of 141” are from the 1922 batch. 
 
The core of Griffing’s acclimation work was discerning degenerate types and pulling 
them out—i.e., roguing. In the first year of the project, Griffing published a booklet entitled 
Roguing of Cotton, in which he laid out instructions on how to do this work. In order to illustrate 
varying degrees of degeneration, Griffing selected five representative types of Trice cotton plants 
and presented each one’s characteristics in great detail along with their images (Figure 5.3). All 
from pure Trice seeds planted on the same site, some of them showed noticeable differences in 
structure, as we can see from the contrast between Types A and C, or E. But for others, the 
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variation was so subtle that drawing a clear line between the types, say Types A and D, was not 
always straightforward.  
 
   
Type A Type B Type C 
    
                                     Type D Type E 
 
Figure 5.3 Five Types of Trice Cotton434 
 
Type A was the exemplary plant that possessed most of the characteristics that Trice 
cotton growers should look for. It had “a medium height; a compact structure with short 
internodes; a fruiting branch from each node; no vegetative branches; a profusion of bolls and 
blossoms, with bolls five locked, broad at the base, and tapering toward apex; and finally, 
                                                 
434 From Griffing, Roguing of Cotton, Figure 1. Griffing notes that leaves were sufficiently removed to show the 




together with prolificacy, an evident tendency toward earliness shown by the size of bolls and 
stage of development.”435 The quality of Type A was certainly above average, and most plants 
did not meet the Type A requirements. While some of them were obviously offtype, others did 
not show considerable deviation from Type A. Could such plants stay in the field? Griffing 
answers:  
[Type B] represents the average of the plants that may be classed as good enough to 
remain. It is fairly prolific but has not the bolls nor squares nor indications of earliness of 
A. At the base are vegetative branches instead of fruiting branches. The whole structure 
of the plant is not as compact as A but is somewhat rangy, having rather long internodes. 
While somewhat inferior in type to A yet it does not make the radical departure from 
variety characteristics that is seen in type C. In C the ranginess of form and length of 
internode are so extreme that the plant is of course considered an off type and should be 
pulled up. This wide variation in form is usually accompanied by a varying boll shape 
and inferior lint. The yield of the plant is low though it requires more space and gives 
more shade than a good plant.436 
 
As Griffing noted earlier, if all plants showed slight differences, it was technically 
possible that plant types could be as varied as plant numbers, all of them located somewhere 
between Types A, B, and C or beyond. Yet their fate simply followed one of the two trajectories: 
to be pulled up or to stay in the ground. For those placed between Types A and B, judgment 
would have been easier, as Type B after all represented the average. However, for those placed 
somewhere between Types B and C, whose structure is not as compact as that of Type B and yet 
not as rangy as that of Type C, do they stay or not?  
Even more difficult was to distinguish genetic variation from change in habits of growth 
caused by environmental conditions such as soil type or moisture supply. Type D, for example, 
shows extreme compactness and vegetative tendency. Nearly every node has two sets of 
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branches, which create a mass of leaves and stems with no fruit. “Excessive vegetation and 
barrenness go together,” Griffing stated.437 Similar characteristics could be caused by abundance 
of soil fertility or moisture, which would cause vegetative growth in all plants.438 Spacing also 
affected the plant’s growth. When spaced close together, they tended to become tall and spindly, 
whereas spaced far apart, they became spread and rangy. In every case, Griffing argued, “a plant 
must be judged in comparison with its neighbors and the effect of its particular environment 
must be carefully considered.” In other words, the grower needed to be able to imagine what type 
the plant would have been had the environment been normal.439 
 “The roguing of cotton like the welding of iron or swimming is an art in which success 
cannot be attained by the reading of books but only by persistent application to the practice.”440 
The opening sentence of Griffing’s booklet well captures the nature of the work. As he asserted, 
“Not every one can master the art of quickly and accurately discriminating the off types.”441 An 
experienced breeder working ten hours a day could easily rogue fifty to seventy-five mu of 
cotton, but the volume would vary depending on the skill of the breeder.442 Although Griffing 
acknowledged the importance of theory, especially an understanding of the principles of 
heredity, throughout the booklet he emphasized hands-on experience in the field. In order to 
master the art of roguing, he stated that one must be “both willing and able to indulge in the 
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physical hardship of spending the hottest days of the summer in walking up and down the rows 
of the field pulling undesirable plants.”443  
Notwithstanding his emphasis on hands-on experience over reading books, his own books 
played a crucial role in disseminating knowledge about American cotton and its acclimatization. 
Roguing of Cotton was published as a second issue of the University of Nanking Agriculture and 
Forestry Series. Written by the university’s own instructor, it was highly likely that the booklet 
was used as class materials for relevant courses. The students probably continued to rely on it 
after graduation as they worked for cotton experiment stations in their hometown. With 3,000 
copies published in Chinese and 2,000 copies in English (Table 5.2), the booklet thus served as a 
primer to guide thousands of Chinese students, breeders, and farmers through the process of 
roguing and, eventually, growing American cotton. Many of his other booklets and reports, along 
with O. F. Cook’s works, were translated in Chinese for wider circulation among the Chinse 
readers as we can see in Table 5.2. Some of them were even translated into baihwa, a written 
from of colloquial Chinese spoken by ordinary people, with Chinese farmers as targeted 
audiences.444 He also wrote widely for magazines and newspapers across the country, ranging 
from Yishibao (益世报), a Tianjin-based newspaper, to Yunnan shiye gongbao (云南实业公报), 
a periodical published by the government of Yunnan province.445  The articles were published 
under his Chinese name Guo Renfeng (郭仁风), mostly translated by Shao Dexin（邵德馨）, a 
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student who assisted Griffing with cotton improvement work and who would later teach at the 
same school. 
Table 5.2 Publications on the Cultivation of American Cotton in China 
Titles English copies 
Chinese 
copies 
J. B. Griffing, Roguing of Cotton.  2000 3,000 
J. B. Griffing, Cotton Culture. 500 3,000 
J. B. Griffing, Possibilities of the Introduction of American Cotton 
into China, translated by Shao Dexin 
 1,000 
J. B. Griffing, American Cotton Culture, translated into baihwa by 
Shao Dexin. 
 6,000 
J. B. Griffing, Cotton Insect Problems of China, translated by Shao 
Dexin. 
500 3,000 
J. B. Griffing, Report of Cotton Improvement for 1920, translated by 
Shao Dexin. 
500 3,000 
J. B. Griffing, The Acclimation of American Cotton, translated by 
Shao Dexin. 
 2,000 
J. H. Reisner, “Dangers and Control of Cotton Seed Importation and 
Distribution in China,” Millard’s Review (January 29, 1921), 
translated by Shao Dexin. 
300 600 
O. F. Cook, “A Disorder of Cotton Plants in China,” Journal of 
Heredity, translated by Shao Dexin. 
 1,000 
O. F. Cook, Selection of Cotton by Character of Leaves, Stalks, and 
Bolls, translated by Shao Dexin. 
 2,000 
O. F. Cook, “Cotton a Community Crop,” Journal of Heredity, 
translated by Shao Dexin. 
 1,000 
Source: Griffing, Three Years' Cotton Improvement Work. 
With photographs of plants representative of each type from superior to inferior, 
Griffing’s booklet provided the most basic knowledge that the Chinese needed: what an 
exemplary Trice cotton plant should look like. Although he offered detailed descriptions of the 
characteristics of each plant type, texts alone were not sufficient. The importance of these 
photographs becomes clear when we consider why the cultivation of American cotton failed for 
nearly three decades. From thousands of years of experience in farming, the Chinese certainly 
knew the importance of roguing, but there was no established standard for the roguing of the new 
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cotton varieties. They encountered American cotton in the form of seed, not plant, and hence did 
not have the chance to see how the seed grew into a plant in the most favorable conditions—i.e., 
the southern United States. That is to say, even if they knew the importance of roguing, how 
could they figure out which plants were true and which were not when there was no image of a 
true cotton plant in their mind? For this reason, as noted earlier, the Chinse farmers hoed out 
American cotton plants, regarding them as weeds. Griffing’s booklet, with images of plant 
samples, was an outcome of the first organized effort to address this issue. 
As “immutable mobiles,” the photograph was a key medium that enabled the diffusion of 
American cotton to the remotest Chinese villages without altering its original properties. 
Proposed by Bruno Latour, “immutable mobiles” refer to movable objects such as maps, 
photographs, and specimens that represent the immovable whole without mutation.446 Thanks to 
these two attributes, Latour argues, the “immutable mobiles” have been a crucial mode of 
knowledge transfer.447 The photographs were “immutable,” since they were “inscribed” on 
paper, and no alteration or corruption was allowed. They were “mobile,” as printed in 3,000 
copies of the booklet, they could move from the experiment station of the University of Nanking 
to any cotton-growing village in China. Unlike the cottonseeds, which were mobile but also 
mutable, the printed photographs of cotton plants safely preserved all the characteristics of Trice 
cotton that Chinese cotton breeders should look for or avoid. They thus served as reliable criteria 
by which cotton growers made the most basic decision: what to uproot and what to keep.  
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In the end, the nub of the acclimation work was taming the unruly foreign species by 
continually eliminating offtypes. It was indeed its unruliness that brought together cotton experts, 
agricultural students, and farmers from China and the United States. Can we then say that, to a 
certain degree, it was the agency of American cotton plants that determined the path of cotton 
improvement work in China? Scholars have long debated whether we can grant agency to non-
human beings.448 The most well-known proponents of the idea are those who belong to the so-
called Actor-Network-Theory (hereafter ANT) school. In his case study of the scallops and 
fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay, which is regarded as the seminal study of ANT, Michel Callon 
shows how marine researchers “negotiated equally” with their colleagues, the local fishermen, 
and the scallops to prove the validity of their proposed solution to the dwindling scallop 
population in the bay: to induce scallops to anchor on collectors.449 The marine researchers 
endeavored to “persuade” the scallops to anchor themselves by eliminating threatening forces 
such as currents and parasites, and by providing more favorable conditions such as adequate 
depth and materials of the collectors. All these attempts were made based on the belief that 
scallops’ behavior could be changed if unfavorable external circumstances were eliminated.  
What differentiates my discussion of cotton plants from Callon’s study of scallops is the 
role of the gene and its non-negotiability. Unlike the researchers in St. Brieuc Bay, Griffing 
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firmly believed in the principles of heredity, which was something he could not negotiate. He of 
course thought that he could induce the plant to grow in a direction more favorable to humans by 
providing more favorable conditions such as adequate spacing, moisture, and fertilizer. However, 
that applied only when the proper gene was manifested.450 Once rogue genes were manifested, 
his only solution was to get rid of them instead of “persuading” them to grow true to type.  
The gene apparently served as the source of the plant’s “agency,” dictating its behavior. 
The action of roguing, however, clearly showed the upshot of the collision between the two 
entities. It was always the breeder, not the cotton plant, who pulled up the opponent that would 
not change its behavior. Their relationship was asymmetrical. The agency of the cotton plant 
never matched that of the breeder, although, as Jan Golinski has pointed out, it was “capable of 
redirecting human agency and [was] not entirely subject to it.”451  
Yet, thinking about the cotton plant in terms of its “behavior” sheds fresh light on our 
discussion of observation, an activity that is essential to the breeder’s efficient roguing. In order 
to classify the cotton plants into Types A, B, C, D, and E, the breeder first had to carefully 
observe them, which required him to adopt a passive role and keep a close watch on every 
minute detail of the cotton plants. Andrew Pickering theorizes observation as an expression of 
human passivity using the concept of the “dance of agency.” He explains the concept through the 
example of tuning: 
As active, intentional beings, scientists tentatively construct some new machine. They 
then adopt a passive role, monitoring the performance of the machine to see whatever 
capture of material agency it might effect. Symmetrically, this period of human passivity 
is the period in which material agency actively manifests itself. Does the machine 
perform as intended? Has an intended capture of agency been effected? Typically the 
answer is no, in which case the response is another reversal of roles: human agency is 
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once more active in a revision of modelling vectors, followed by another bout of human 
passivity and material performance, and so on.452 
 
His argument about the symmetry between the scientist and the machine is flawed 
because, unlike his claim, it was never achieved; the experiment was after all set by the scientist, 
who could put an end to “the dance of agency” by retracting the passive role at any given time. 
Despite that, I find his proposal helpful as it gives us fresh insights into the relationship between 
human and non-human, especially in laboratory settings where the most dominant human 
activity is observation. When we apply Pickering’s notion of human passivity to the observation 
of cotton plants, it becomes clear that the asymmetrical relationship between the breeder and the 
plant would be temporarily reversed, if not entirely, during the period of observation. In order to 
classify the plant into one of the categories suggested by Griffing, the breeder’s every sense has 
to be attuned to its structure and the surrounding environment. In this way, the breeder allows 
himself to be subjugated to the world of cotton plants, letting them dictate his behavior, not vice 
versa. Only after going through this process is the breeder able to achieve the goal of discerning 
and eliminating degenerate types. Perhaps it is this kind of deep immersion in the subject of 
observation and the voluntary passivity assumed by the breeder that have defined the unique 
research culture of the field, where botanists tend to describe their non-human subject using 
terms which only humans are considered to be entitled to.453 
5.3 Beyond the Laboratory 
After going through several rounds of observation and selection over a period of three 
years, Griffing and his team finally completed the acclimation project. In the winter of 1922, 
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they began to distribute seeds of improved American cotton. However, that did not lead to 
immediate cultivation. Chinese farmers, who were living on the margin of bare subsistence, were 
reluctant to take the risk of growing unfamiliar crops.454  
To penetrate local villages, Griffing and the team had to devise a range of marketing 
tactics, many of which were borrowed from what had been practiced in the southern United 
States. For instance, they established small demonstration farms along main roads to attract 
passing farmers’ attention. They also hosted fairs and exhibits to showcase improved American 
cotton along with the demonstration of a new ginning method.455 The highlight of such events 
was a play touting the benefits of American cotton, written by the Department of Cotton 
Improvement at the University of Nanking and performed by their students. As we can see in 
Figure 5.4, it was an effective means of attracting a large crowd. The play was usually followed 
by distribution of cottonseeds.456 It is not known exactly where in China they organized such 
events, but they traveled as far as Shandong province, perhaps due to its suitability for the 
cultivation of Trice cotton.  
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Figure 5.4 A Play Touting the Benefits of American Cotton.  
It took place in Linyi, Shandong457 
 
Finally, they utilized advertisements. With concise phrases and illustrations, the 
advertisement in Figure 5.5 was designed to convey the economic benefits of growing 
acclimatized American cotton to illiterate farmers.458 It is noteworthy that they made a 
comparison of American cotton not only with Chinese cotton but also with wheat and rice, 
attempting to convert even those who grew food crops to American cotton. Despite the obvious 
economic advantages of the new crop, however, it was not easy for Chinese farmers to abandon 
what they had been growing for years. Switching to American cotton was particularly so, since it 
meant a shift from food or subsistence crops to cash crops. It was a decision that involved 
opportunity costs that could be greater than the touted handsome profit, especially when disasters 
like famine struck. 
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Figure 5.5 Advertisements for American Cotton.459 
Ironically, the superior quality of American cotton sometimes became the reason why 
farmers avoided growing it. In the Wukiang district of Anhui province, farmers feared that the 
quality of American cotton was so good that it might induce more frequent theft, which was 
rampant in the region. Also, many of them were wary at the extension workers, since they had 
been cheated in the past by local officials who distributed free seeds, only to collect heavier taxes 
later on.  
“Added to these,” Griffing wrote, “was the conservatism that is characteristic of the 
farmer group throughout the world, but here intensified by illiteracy, age old customs, farm 




practice ingrained with superstitions, and the indifference of city landlords who control the 
cropping policy of their tenants and resent any change in the fixed habits of rent collection.”460 
His scornful tone, combined with the negative connotation of “conservatism,” suggests that 
Griffing confused prudence with sheer stubbornness, and that he failed to understand the 
farmers’ rationale behind their seemingly superstitious practices. Nonetheless, his observation 
was correct in that growing American cotton was more of a social issue than a mere material or 
technological problem, not least after the seeds moved beyond the laboratory.  
In his study of the political economy of western Shandong, Kenneth Pomeranz makes a 
similar observation. He finds the reason for the delayed spread of American cotton in the area 
from gleaning, a custom that had long been practiced in western Shandong due to its poverty, 
fuel shortage, and weak law enforcement.461 As American cotton took two to four weeks longer 
to ripen than native varieties, it was not fully ripe by the traditional day allowed for gleaning. 
The crop was ruined by the gleaners who rushed the fields, and the farmers were reluctant to 
plant it again the next year.462  
In spite of these initial difficulties, Pomeranz argues, American cotton made successful 
inroads into northwestern Shandong, where the lack of powerful local elites allowed great 
permeability to outside organizations that advocated the new varieties.463 In southwestern 
Shandong, by contrast, rural elites exerted a strong influence on local society. They viewed the 
expansion of American cotton as a potential economic and political threat, as the farmers would 
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increasingly rely on outsiders for seed, credit, and information. They also preferred food crops 
over cash crops, since the ability to protect people with stockpiled grain was an important source 
of power in a bandit-ridden region like southwest Shandong.464 Moreover, with increasing 
requisitions from warlords and Japanese, the few village elites of northern Shandong continued 
to flee their responsibilities from the 1920s until the 1940s, which accelerated the expansion of 
American cotton in the area. In the southwest, rural bosses survived this hard time. Without their 
cooperation, it was difficult for expansion agents to penetrate local society.465 
From a material perspective, southwest Shandong was no less advantageous than the 
northwest, as it had huge areas suitable for the cultivation of American cotton. Well aware of 
this, workers of the Shandong Office to Encourage Industry (quanyesuo) and agents of Tianjin 
and Qingdao cotton mills traveled to the most isolated counties of the region to distribute free 
seed and promote the new crop.466 However, good soil and proper climate did not always lead to 
the cultivation of a given crop. As Pomeranz has argued, farmers and landlords took various 
material, economic, and social factors into consideration when deciding on crops for the season.  
Sven Beckert’s study of the interconnections between land, labor, and cotton provides a 
broader global context in which we can situate the Chinese case. Beckert finds the reason for the 
rise of the U.S. cotton belt in the “planters’ command of nearly unlimited supplies of land, labor, 
and capital, and their unparalleled political power.” The European settlers successfully turned the 
land of Native Americans into “a land whose social structures had been catastrophically 
weakened or eliminated, a land without most of its people and thus without the entanglements of 
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history.”467 The American case posed a marked difference from those of the Ottoman Empire 
and India, and southwestern Shandong in China, where “powerful indigenous rulers controlled 
the land, and deeply entrenched social groups struggled over its use.”468 In addition to the 
forcibly emptied lands, what sustained the unprecedented economic success of the American 
cotton cultivation was slavery. Without violence and bodily coercion, the planters could never 
meet the increasing demand for raw cotton from the cotton manufacturing industry of Great 
Britain.469 “Slavery, the expropriation of indigenous peoples, imperial expansion, armed trade, 
and the assertion of sovereignty over people and land by entrepreneurs” were at the core of what 
Beckert calls “war capitalism.470 
By the last third of the nineteenth century, however, cotton-growing areas continued to 
expand even in countries without slavery, such as Egypt, Brazil, and India. New forms of 
coercion instead of outright physical violence began to be carried out by states in the form of 
contracts, laws, and taxation. 471 In India, for instance, the British colonial state successfully 
incorporated Berar province into the global cotton economy thanks to the railroad, which 
facilitated the transportation of raw cotton from the remotest corner of the province to cotton 
mills in Lancashire. It only took two decades for Berar, which had developed a diversified 
agricultural economy as well as robust household manufacturing, to turn into a major supplier of 
raw cotton for the global market. At the same time, with the influx of finished cotton goods from 
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Lancashire, local spinners and weavers increasingly lost their jobs and were pushed into 
agricultural labor. Berar was in effect deindustrialized under colonial rule.472 
China was not entirely free from this sweeping global phenomenon that transformed the 
global countryside into the supplier of raw cotton for industrial capitalism, as we can see from 
the industrialists’ continued support for cotton improvement and extension work. However, what 
distinguishes China from India and other cotton-growing countries discussed in Beckert’s study 
is the absence of a strong state that could enforce intensive agricultural policies with investment 
in infrastructure. China was not officially colonized by any imperial powers,473 although that did 
not necessarily mean it had its own strong government. Under the control of warlords and 
regional factions, a central government was absent in China in the 1910s and 20s, when the 
Chinese cotton industry started to gather momentum and Griffing and his team were struggling 
to expand the cultivation of American cotton.  
Coercion to cultivate cotton for its commercial supply did exist in the form of contracts, 
but it was mostly limited to the private sector. Zhang Jian, for instance, established a land-
reclamation company to secure an uninterrupted supply of raw cotton for his Dasheng Cotton 
Mills. Tenant farmers of his company were required to cultivate the main crop of cotton in the 
fall and wheat and beans in the spring. They were allowed to grow millet on the strips of land 
                                                 
472 Ibid., 294-97. Beckert does not provide a detailed account of how the colonial state coerced the Indian farmers 
into growing cotton. He does not specify the types of cotton cultivated in Berar, but they were possibly native 
varieties. Attempts to cultivate American upland cotton were made in colonial India, but they ended with little 
success. See ibid., 126-29. On the deindustrialization of India during colonial rule, also see Menon and Uzramma, A 
Frayed History, 33-43. 
 
473 However, scholars argue that China at that time was semi-colonized or rather hyper-colonized. See Goodman, 




near their dwellings but not together with cotton. Those who violated the rule were fined or, in 
the worst cases, evicted from the premises.474  
Such sporadic practices, however, did not match the systematic approaches to cotton 
cultivation deployed by the British colonial state in India or by the Japanese in Korea, backed up 
by the construction of infrastructure such as railways and telegraph. After the brief reform 
movement in the last decade of the Qing dynasty, no nation-wide attempt was made in China to 
reconfigure its countryside in favor of the emerging factory-based cotton industry. Such 
endeavors were made mostly at the local level by cotton mills, reform-minded elites, agricultural 
schools, and professional societies concerned with the cotton industry. These groups, as we can 
see from the sluggish campaign of Griffing and his team, were not strong enough to promote or 
to coerce the Chinese farmers into switching to the desired cotton varieties.475 
For this reason, Griffing’s view on the cultivation of American cotton on a commercial 
scale was negative, despite the successful completion of the acclimation project. In his 1923 
report, Griffing noted that cotton production had actually declined during the past few years in 
China. In addition to the social stratification and politics at the county level, he pointed out the 
general political situation of China as a major hindrance to the extension of American cotton.476 
Warlordism combined with factionalism gave rise to confusing taxation systems and poor 
infrastructure, both of which had damaging effects on the transportation and marketing of crops 
across provincial territories. The year after the completion of Griffing’s acclimation work, 1923, 
was indeed a disastrous year for the Chinese cotton industry. As discussed in Chapter 1, the 
                                                 
474 Köll, From Cotton Mill to Business Empire, 222-25.  
 
475 Even those dispatched by the provincial state were not strong enough. Pomeranz, The Making of a Hinterland, 
117. 
 
476 Griffing, Three Years' Cotton Improvement Work, 28.  
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WWI boom abruptly ended in 1923, when the industry entered a decade-long depression. In his 
analysis of the 1923 crisis, H. D. Fong, a contemporary economist who taught at Nankai 
University, Tianjin, also identified China’s unstable political conditions as a major cause. The 
recurring civil wars gave rise to increases in taxes, decreases in raw cotton supply, uncertainty of 
transport, reduction in market size, and high rates of interest, all of which had a negative impact 
on the cotton industry.  
Besides the unfavorable political conditions, Griffing pointed out misdirected educational 
resources. He regretfully wrote that “the efforts of many students and workers of cotton in China 
have been diverted to so called ‘experimental’ work.”477 Also, education was weighted towards 
“memorizing descriptions of foreign varieties, mathematical systems of breeding, and foreign 
systems of culture.”478 By “experimental,” he did not mean practice vis-à-vis theory. The 
agricultural students certainly got their hands dirty on the farm, but such efforts were still 
confined within the walls of the agricultural schools and experiment stations. He called for more 
active outreach to local farmers and communities, with emphasis on pure seed production and 
extension work. It was not that such concerns were not shared with the Chinese; in August 1922, 
a national convention of cotton workers was held in Nanjing, hosted by the Cotton Departments 
of the Southeastern University and the University of Nanking. Numerous ideas were formulated 
at this convention, but Griffing complained that “the progressive program adopted still exist[ed] 
only in the form of printed resolutions.”479 
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In spite of Griffing’s concerns, American cotton made inroads into major cotton-growing 
provinces during the following decades, although that did not lead to China’s self-sufficiency in 
the production of American cotton. A considerable number of local gazetteers compiled in the 
1930s mention American cotton as a local product. As we can see in the map in Figure 5.6, the 
geographical distribution of American cotton was wide enough to include Sichuan province to 
the west, Zhili to the north, and Fujian to the south.480 The map has been generated through the 
Local Gazetteers Research Tools (LoGaRT), a suite of tools for research on digitized Chinese 
local gazetteers developed by the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science. More 
specifically, the map is the geographical visualization of local gazetteers containing the keyword 
of meimian (美棉) or meiguomian (美国棉), both of which are Chinese terms for American 
cotton. The distribution of circles on the map refers to the geographical scope of local gazetteers 
containing the keywords, and the size of each circle indicates the frequency of their appearance 
in the corresponding region’s gazetteers.  
 
                                                 
480 One of the main features of LoGaRT is geovisualization, which enables the user to visualize data based on the 
temporal and spatial information of local gazetteers that contain the specified keywords. For more information on 
LoGaRT, see https://www.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/research/projects/logart-local-gazetteers-research-tools. LoGaRT 
can also be a useful tool for researching local flora and agricultural knowledge. I have learned that “Chinese cotton” 
was a generic term that encompassed a wide range of local cotton varieties with varying qualities, which brings our 




Figure 5.6 Geographical Distribution of American Cotton Cultivation in Republican China. 
The red arrow has been inserted by the author. 
 
Figure 5.7 shows the spatial composition of the largest circle on the map of Figure 5.6, 
marked with a red arrow. Shandong province was predominant, followed by Hebei and Henan. 
Given that the map was generated based on the number of pages containing the keyword of 
meimian (美棉) or meiguomian (美国棉) (both meaning American cotton), the prominence of 
Shandong should not be equated with the actual scale of cultivation in the province, although 
there must have been a positive correlation. The dominance of Shandong province or, more 
precisely, the frequent appearance of American cotton in their gazetteers complied at both the 
county and provincial levels instead attests to their active knowledge production about American 
cotton. In terms of temporal change, it first appeared in the 1900s, and its frequency peaked from 









Figure 5.8 Temporal Change in American Cotton Cultivation 
The content of the gazetteers was mostly practical. For instance, the 1935 gazetteer of 
Qidong (齊東) county, located in today’s Binzhou city of Shandong province, provided detailed 
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information on cotton varieties, cultivation methods, price ranges, and the market condition. The 
section on the cotton varieties reads as follows: 
American cotton that has been experimented in the cotton experiment stations includes 
Tuolisi (脱里司, Trice) and Jinshi (金氏, Kings). Chinese cotton includes 
Qidongxirong(齊東细绒), Zhengdingdamian(正定大棉), and Baimeimian(百美棉).  
[Among them] Tuolisi No.36 has been the most superior, so we are doing our best to 
expand its cultivation. Our local cotton, Xirongmian, also has its own strength and use, 
and thus not a few people are still growing it. American cotton is fine and long. Its fiber 
length is 1.06 inches, and it can spin 42s fine yarn. Chinese cotton is coarse and short. Its 
fiber is relatively inferior. Its length is 0.869 inch, and it can only spin 16s yarn.481  
 
A close reading of the text reveals that fifteen years after Griffing’s acclimation work, the 
improvement and extension of Trice cotton was still an ongoing project. Griffing’s concern was 
not entirely groundless. Yet, the experiments were now taken over by returning students from 
agricultural schools like the University of Nanking. With field experience on the school farms 
and textual and pictorial knowledge obtained through books like Roguing of Cotton, they were 
better prepared than their predecessors. Knowledge of the cultivation of American cotton in this 
way spread beyond the laboratory of the University of Nanking into the local fields of Shandong 
province. Acclimated to the environment of Qidong country, Toulisi No. 36 became a new local 
variety that not only surpassed the original Trice in terms of staple length, but also differed from 
the acclimated variety from Griffing’s Progeny 141. Nonetheless, it did not entirely replace 
existing local varieties. The market demanded not only fine cotton yarn, but also coarse yarn. As 
the compilers wrote, the “inferior” Chinese cotton had its own strength and use. 
It is noteworthy that the comparison between American and Chinese cotton was made in 
reference to the “counts of yarn”—i.e., 42s and 16s— a numerical expression of cotton yarn’s 
density used in machine spinning. Still in use today, the counts are determined by the number of 
                                                 





hanks required to weigh one pound, with each hank containing 840 yards of cotton yarn. So, 42s 
yarn would need 42 hanks, or 35,280 yards, to weigh one pound; 16s yarn would contain 16 
hanks, or 13,440 yards, in one pound. The bigger the number, the finer the cotton yarn. 
Reference to machine-spun yarn in the agricultural section of a local gazetteer clearly shows how 
the factory system shaped local agricultural knowledge, establishing new criteria for the 
assessment of cotton quality. Discussion of staple length, the most decisive factor in roller setting 
for spinning machines, was no longer confined to mechanical knowledge in circulation through 
machine manuals or engineering textbooks. After decades-long cotton improvement work, it 
became part of the agricultural knowledge of Qidong county.   
5.4 Conclusion 
Notwithstanding the remarkable distribution of American cotton in Shandong and 
neighboring provinces, its production was not sufficient to meet the demands of China’s cotton 
manufacturing industry. According to business reports published by Dasheng No. 1 Mill, as of 
1949, the company still relied on imports from the United States.482 Griffing’s prediction from 
three decades ago was not entirely wrong, although he did not foresee World War II and the 
subsequent Civil War between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party, which had a 
devastating impact on the agricultural sector.483 Today, American upland cotton accounts for 
more than 95% of cotton production in the world, and China is one of its largest producers and 
consumers.484 Chinese agronomists argue that it was only after the establishment of the PRC in 
                                                 
482 Nantong shi dang'anguan and Zhangjian yanjiu zhongxin, Dasheng jituan dang'an ziliao xuanbian: fangzhi bian 
V 大生集团档案资料选编: 纺织编 V (Selected archival materials on the Dasheng group: Textiles production V) 
(Tongzhou: Jiangsusheng tongzhoushi huamincaiyin youxianggongsi, 2007), 379, 409, 17, 38. They also relied on 
imports from India and Brazil. 
 
483 Zhao, Cotton Textile, 26-27. 
 
484 Huang et al., "Population Structure and Genetic Basis of the Agronomic Traits of Upland Cotton in China 
Revealed by a Genome-Wide Association Study Using High-Density SNPs," 1374. 
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1949 that major progress in cotton cultivation with science-based cultivation methods was 
made.485 This claim, however, requires validation as to whether the progress was an outcome of 
pure technological breakthroughs. Efforts to cultivate American cotton achieved only limited 
success in the first half of the twentieth century, due in part to the absence of a state strong 
enough to enforce its cultivation for the sake of cotton manufacturing industry. Combined with 
complex politics and entrenched practices at the county level, the unstable political conditions of 
China impeded the spread of American cotton during this time period. Growing American cotton 
on Chinese soil was not only a technological or material but also a social and political issue. 
In the era of industrialization, cotton circulated on a global scale in the form of seed, 
plant, lint, and photograph, but the encounters of these biological entities with humans did not 
take place in an abstract and neutral space. Most Chinese farmers encountered American cotton 
on the field and gradually learned about it while sowing seed, pulling out offtype plants, and 
picking bolls. “The power of practical knowledge,” James Scott has argued, “depends on an 
exceptionally close and astute observation of the environment.”486 If so, the most effective way 
of knowing the foreign species was through roguing, since it required the farmers to watch every 
minute detail of the plants and their environments to distinguish offtypes from similar-looking 
regular types. Hands-on experience was significant, but that was not the only way of learning 
how to observe. Books, in particular those with photographs of exemplary cotton plants, played a 
crucial role in transmitting knowledge for efficient observation and the classification of “good” 
and “bad” cotton plants.  
                                                 
 
485 Jianlong Dai and Hezhong Dong, "Intensive Cotton Farming Technologies in China: Achievements, Challenges 
and Countermeasures," Field Crops Research 155 (January 1, 2014): 100, 
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The ultimate goal that Griffing wished to achieve by classifying Trice cotton plants into 
Types A, B, C, D, and E was to secure seeds that would yield uniformly long fibers suitable for 
machine spinning. By the same logic, most Chinese native varieties with short staple were 
categorized as inferior. As we can see from the experimental data from Nantong Agricultural 
School and Griffing’s project at the University of Nanking, staple length was the single most 
important criterion for assessing cotton quality and progress in acclimation. Years later, even 
people in Qidong country began to discuss the inferiority or superiority of their cotton varieties 
in reference to staple length and spinnable yarn density in the factory. Machine spinning in this 
way profoundly affected agricultural knowledge in rural China as well as its landscape.  
Griffing left China in 1927, which coincided with the inauguration of the Cornell-
Nanking project between 1925 and 1931, an official program that extended the existing sporadic 
cooperation between the two institutions. As the project was officially funded by the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s International Education Board, the University of Nanking was no longer pressured 
into working with the Chinese Cotton Mill Owners Association to secure funding. Their research 
emphasis consequently shifted from cotton to food grains, especially dryland crops such as 
wheat. Although Griffing was gradually deprived of university resources for his research, cotton 
improvement work continued to be carried out at the cotton experiment stations across the 
country, now by the Chinese students who were trained under Griffing’s guidance.  
The legacy of their work requires a cautious appraisal. On the other hand, Griffing and 
his colleagues firmly believed in the economic benefits that American cotton could bring to the 
Chinese farmers. By the late 1930s, as Pomeranz has demonstrated, northwest Shandong had a 
much higher per capita income than the traditionally richer southwest Shandong, thanks to the 
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spread of American cotton in the area.487 On the one hand, however, they were standing at the 
forefront of the vicious industrial capitalism discussed by Beckert, with research and 
experiments to provide the types of raw cotton desired by the capitalists. Dismissive of the 
concerns raised by hesitant Chinese farmers, Griffing failed to address the damaging 
consequences of the exclusive cultivation of cash crops. Also, an advocate of the one-variety 
community movement, a campaign to cultivate one single cotton variety in the community to 
prevent cross-pollination, he did not consider the implication of monoculture for the farmers and 
the land.488  
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If we define the mechanization of cotton spinning in the narrowest sense, it means the 
replacement of the spinner by the spinning machine. Using the pressure of the thumb and the 
index finger, the spinner controlled the speed, amount, and the tension of cotton wad that would 
be spun into the spinning wheel after passing through the fingers. The bodily movement was so 
delicately adjusted that the spinner could process all varying grades of raw cotton without relying 
on reference materials like “engineering data,” which was the first resort in the factory when 
setting textile machines. The spinner perhaps did not know how the varying movements of the 
fingers could translate into figures, but that was not even necessary because the spinner learned 
the work through bodily engagement with cotton lint, and now that knowledge had been 
embodied in the fingers.489 The spinner’s successor—i.e., textile machinery—was not equipped 
with the capability to adjust itself, more precisely the rollers, to the changing qualities of raw 
cotton. It might have replaced the spinner but failed to capture the subtle movement of the 
fingers, which could be fulfilled only with the aid of skilled workers. While the machine made 
certain human skills obsolete, it created whole new groups of “industrial artisans,” without 
whose skill it could never perform at maximum efficiency. 
In a broader sense, the mechanization of cotton spinning in China meant the 
formalization of the spinning industry. No longer a “petty” handicraft performed by peasant 
wives and daughters, it became a “serious” industry on which China’s future as a modern nation 
hinged on. High-ranking officials weighed in with detailed blueprints for the shop floor. 
                                                 
489 The importance of embodied knowledge is not specific to cotton spinning. See, for instance, Jacob Eyferth’s 
study of papermaking, Madeleine Zelin’s on salt mining, and Dorothy Ko’s on inkstones. Jacob Eyferth, Eating Rice 
from Bamboo Roots: The Social History of a Community of Handicraft Papermakers in Rural Sichuan, 1920-2000 
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Economists began to assess the country’s manufacturing capacity by tracking the number of 
spindles, and engineers emerged as a new social group that would lead China’s industrialization 
on the ground. The change also had a profound impact on the agricultural sector. In an effort to 
secure a constant supply of good-quality cotton, the cotton mill owners encouraged peasant 
farmers to grow American cotton in lieu of food crops or native cotton varieties, while funding 
research for cotton improvement work. Decisions as to what to grow in their small plot of land 
were no longer left to the farmers. They became a national concern. 
The formalization of the industry was naturally accompanied by the institutionalization of 
spinning knowledge. China witnessed a surge of technical institutions and agricultural schools as 
industrialization went along. Moreover, numerous professionals in the field, including 
industrialists, engineers, and agriculturalists, began to produce and circulate knowledge of cotton 
spinning in the form of written text. Every minute detail of the trade, both commercial and 
technological, was documented by these male professionals and was publicized through 
textbooks, journal articles, manuals, factory regulations, and even advertisements. 
Complemented by pictorial sources such as images of cotton plants or exemplary roller settings, 
these written sources allowed the Chinese readers access to the most recent knowledge in 
circulation, both foreign and domestic, providing them with a theoretical foundation for further 
research and experiments.   
Yet, written sources or formal knowledge was not always reliable. Su Yuqing’s article on 
the roller setting was a mistranslation of the original American source; the Whitin headquarters 
romanticized Yang Sih-Zung’s business letter in the course of editing; Yang’s articles failed to 
predict an imminent recession; Fu Daoshen and Zhu Xiwen’s articles on American machinery 
could hardly be free from the publisher’s pro-American stance; Zhang Jian’s meticulously 
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designed shop floor could exist only in the form of written regulations; and “true knowledge” 
about China, which the Whitin headquarters desperately sought after, was never written into 
official documents.  
There were indeed types of knowledge that were hard to write down and were thus 
difficulty to obtain by reading books. One’s ability to figure out a roller setting that best suits a 
given cotton type, to piece broken yarn ends on a fast-revolving spinning machine, and to 
distinguish offtype cotton plants from similar-looking regular types all relied on hands-on 
experience and craftsmanship. Ironically, the importance of this kind of embodied, often tacit, 
knowledge became visible only when it was written down in such texts as manuals, factory 
regulations, booklets, and journal articles by educated male authors who had the capacity to 
write. Texts served as a powerful medium to convey the importance of non-textual knowledge in 
the making of the factory system, but by doing so they perpetuated the existing hierarchy that 
prioritized textual knowledge, creating a new divide between elitist engineers like Yang Sih-
Zung and other less-privileged technical experts like Miss Qinling. 
Whitin’s adventurous engineers as well as American agriculturalists who volunteered to 
come and teach in China played a vital role in this process. Even after their initial instructions, 
however, experimentation had to continue as maintaining the factory system required incessant 
onsite solutions to various local problems, both on the factory shop floor and in cotton 
experiment stations. Hence, the factory system in China was not a ready-made import from the 
West. It was an industrial craftwork, made by numerous technical experts with multiple layers of 
knowledge obtained through hands-on experience of machines and cotton as well as formal 
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